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I. INTRODUCTION 
Restrictions on affirmative action by the United States Supreme 
Court1 and the ban of the policy by some states2 created anxiety among 
affirmative action proponents that the high court would use the 
opportunity afforded by the challenges to the University of Michigan's 
affirmative action programs to declare affirmative action 
unconstitutional.3 This anxiety explains the acclaim with which these 
I. See Norma M. Riccucci, The Immortality of Affirmative Action, in Public Personnel 
Management: Current Concerns, Future Challenges 73, 73-79 (Carolyn Ban & Norma M. Riccucci, 
eds., 3d ed., Longman 2002) (highlighting the series of affirmative action decisions by the federal 
courts, beginning with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion), 
including some of the decisions which eroded affirmative action). 
2. See id. at 79-80 (discussing the rash of anti-affirmative action voter referenda, both 
ongoing and concluded, in many states). At the time the Michigan cases were decided in the summer 
of 2003, four states-California, Florida, Texas, and Washington-all adopted initiatives or voter 
referenda banning the use of race in public education, public employment, and government 
contracting. For example, the California Civil Rights Initiative (CCRI), passed in 1996, ended thirty 
years of affirmative action practice in that state. 
3. This is not the first time proponents of race-conscious programs felt apprehensive that the 
Supreme Court might seize an appropriate opportunity to invalidate affirmative action. In 1997, 
black leaders paid over $400,000 to a white woman, Sharon Taxman, to prevent her case from 
reaching the Supreme Court. Taxman, a teacher, sued the Board of Education in Piscataway 
Township, N.J., alleging that she was laid off because of her race, while another teacher of similar 
qualifications hired on the same day as herself, who was black, was retained. Taxman was rehired by 
the time the case reached the Supreme Court but had to be paid $433,500 in back pay and legal fees 
to drop the case, a bill African American leaders were all too glad to foot. See Hanes Walton Jr. & 
Robert C. Smith, American Politics and the African American Quest for Universal Freedom 2\9 (2d 
ed., Longman 2003) (discussing Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(en bane), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997)). A similar 
apprehensiveness occurred with respect to Regents ofU. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See 
Thomas R. Hensley et al., The Changing Supreme Court: Constitutional Rights and Liberties 713 
(West Publg. 1997) (indicating that some groups advised the University of California at Davis not to 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, after the University lost at the lower court level, on the ground 
that a negative U.S. Supreme Court decision would endanger affirmative action programs across the 
country). 
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cases, particularly the pro-affirmative action ruling in Grutter v. 
Bollinger,4 have been received in civil rights and educational quarters. 
For example, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP) stated that the decision has "provided the [N]ation with 
a road map on how to construct affirmative action programs in higher 
education."5 Additionally, the Urban League applauded it as "an historic 
victory for America and a reaffirmation of the nation's commitment to 
equality and diversity."6 The American Bar Association welcomed it as a 
"victory for progress toward a legal profession that reflects the American 
society it serves."7 And the Association of American Colleges and 
Universities (AACU) remarked, "The courts have recognized that racial 
inequality still disfigures our democracy and that higher education can 
and should play a crucial role in closing the opportunity gap."8 
Notable individuals have hailed the Grutter decision in 
commentaries published in both popular and scholastic media. These 
individuals include Professor Lani Guinier of Harvard Law School, who 
called it "a slam-dunk for affirmative action;"9 the legal analyst Martin 
Michaelson, who assessed that not since Brown v. Board of Education 10 
in 1954 "has the [Supreme] [C]ourt spoken with one voice in a major 
ruling that affected race and education;"11 and the university 
4. 539 U S. 306 (2003 ). 
5. The Thin Race Line, Chi. Trib. Red Eye Ed. 10 (June 24, 2003) (quoting NAACP 
President Kweisi Mfume). The NAACP was founded in 1909, on the hundredth anniversary of the 
birth of President Abraham Lincoln, by upper-middle-class white Protestants and Jews as an 
interracial organization. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 95. Until the 1960s, it remained the principal 
civil rights protest organization. !d. The organization has a membership of about 450,000 people in 
1700 local chapters and an annual budget of about $11.9 million in 1995. !d. at 118. 
6. Urban League Applauds Court AA Ruling, New Pitt. Courier A5 (July 2, 2003) (quoting 
Urban League President Marc Moria!) [hereinafter Urban League Applauds AA Ruling]. The 
organization stated: "With this decision, the [C]ourt has made clear that diversity and excellence are 
not mutually exclusive." !d. It took special care to distinguish Grutter from Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244 (2003). "It is extremely important that citizens realize that the [C]ourt did not reject 
affirmative action, it rejected Michigan's specific scoring system." /d. The Urban League is designed 
to promote African American economic advancement. Founded in 1910, the organization has about 
118 local affiliates in 34 states and the District of Columbia, and boasts an annual budget estimated 
at about $24 million in 1995. !d.; Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 118. 
7. Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., American Bar Association, News Release, Statement of Alfred P. 
Carlton, Jr., President, American Bar Association, June 23, 2003, RE: Ruling by Supreme Court of 
United States in Grutter v. Bollinger, http://www.abanet.org/medialjun03/statement062303.html 
(accessed Oct. 7, 2005). 
8. Greg Winter, Ruling Provides Relief,' But Less Than Hoped, N.Y. Times A26 (June 24, 
2003) (quoting AACU President Carol Geary Schneider). 
9. Lani Guinier, The Constitution Is both Colorblind and Color-Conscious, 49 Chron. 
Higher Educ. B II (July 4, 2003 ). 
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
II. Martin Michaelson, The Court's Pronouncements Are More Dramatic and Subtle Than 
the Headlines, 49 Chron. Higher Educ. 811 (July 18, 2003 ). 
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administrator M. Lee Pelton, who praised the decision as a "summer 
blockbuster ruling" on affirmative action. 12 
However, not all analysts who wrote commentaries on Grutter 
believed the decision marked an auspicious development in the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence on affirmative action. Critics of the decision can 
be divided into two categories: individuals who assessed it as going too 
far and those who viewed the decision as not going far enough. The first 
category includes Professor Shelby Steele and Ward Connerly. Steele, a 
black conservative, lambasted Grutter as "a victory for [ w ]hite guilt," 
maintammg, "[ w ]e deserve justices who can feel certain about the 
capacity of [W]hites to be fair and the capacity of minorities to 
compete." 13 Connerly, a black reputed for his stout opposition to 
affirmative action, berated the Grutter ruling as a "cloudy vision of a 
race-free America."14 
Commentators who viewed the decision as not going far enough 
include the distinguished educator and veteran commentator on African 
American affairs, Professor Ron Walters, and the newspaper writer 
Derrick Z. Jackson. Professor Walters assesses Grutter merely as "a stay 
of execution on affirmative action." 15 He would "hold [his] applause-or 
maybe applaud lightly" and view any victory dance as premature, given 
that "what the court did was to constitutionalize the concept of diversity 
as an appropriate basis for the practice of affirmative action." 16 He 
condemned the role of the Bush administration in the Michigan cases. 17 
Similarly, Jackson opined that Grutter means simply that "affirmative 
12. M. Lee Pelton, After the Supreme Court Michigan Cases, 6 Presidency 18 (Fall 2003) 
(Pelton is the President ofWillamette University). 
13. Shelby Steele, A Victory for White Guilt, Wall St. J. A 16 (June 26, 2003 ). For a discussion 
on the identity and ideology of the new black conservatives, see Lucius J. Barker et al., African 
Americans and the American Political System 98-101 (4th ed., Prentice Hall 1999). The group also 
includes Justice Clarence Thomas of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
14. See Ward Connerly, The Cloudy Vision of a Race-Free America, Chron. Higher Educ. 
B 12 (July 4, 2003). Connerly stated regrettably, "While I and many others viewed Michigan's 
reasoning about diversity as the snow job of the century, the [C]ourt saw otherwise and elevated 
Justice Lewis Powell's dictum in the Bakke case to the law of the land." !d. Connerly serves on the 
governing board of the University of California and is one of the architects of the CCRI, which is a 
measure approved by voters of California in 1996, that forbids the use of race, gender, or ethnicity as 
criteria in state hiring and admission to public universities. 
15. Ron Walters, Affirmative Action Wins: But Which Version? 39 Wash. Informer 13 (July 9, 
2003). 
16. !d. 
17. See generally Ron Walters, The Michigan Affirmative Action Case and Black Patriotism, 
10 N.Y. Beacon 8 (May 21, 2003). He berates the "crowd in the [Bush] White House" as "especially 
callous." !d. He points to the actions of the government as "one powerful reason why" blacks 
generally maintain a lukewarm attitude with respect to the war in Iraq, and because "[t]hey are not 
sure they are full Americans," they "do not engage as much as Whites in flag-waving, decal-wearing 
and chest-thumping exercises of Americanism." !d. 
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action survived, but in a form more limited than ever and with [Justice 
Sandra Day] O'Connor setting the nation's timer to get rid of it by 
2028." 18 
Affirmative action is a necessary tool of remediation. 19 Affirmative 
action is the use of race or gender0 consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution,2 as a factor in decisions relating to 
18. Derrick Z. Jackson, Taking on the Bonus Points for Whites, Chi. Trib. § I pg. 19 (June 30, 
2003). Although this piece discussed Grutter, its main focus, as even the article's very caption bears 
out, was on Gratz. Jackson contended: "Getting rid of a point system may sound fine to someone 
who refuses to open a history book .... The court took away bonus points for black, brown, and red 
people on behalf of angry white people. But the bonus points of white privilege are still in place, 
unchallenged and unrelenting, no matter how angry minorities get." !d. 
19. See Kanya Adam, The Politics of Redress: South African Style Affirmative Action, 35 J. 
Modem African Stud. 231, 240 (June 1997) (quoting former South African president, Nelson 
Mandela, "[Affirmative action is] corrective action to bring previously disadvantaged people to the 
same competitive levels as those who have been advantaged."). See also William J. Clinton, 
Remark\· on Affirmative Action at the National Archives and Records Administration, July 19, 1995, 
in Public Papers olthe Presidents <Jlthe United States: William J. Clinton 1995 Book JJ 1108 (Nat!. 
Archives & Rec. Admin. 1996) (indicating that affirmative action is a tool designed "to give our 
Nation a way to finally address the systemic exclusion of individuals of talent on the basis of their 
gender or race, from opportunities to develop, perform, achieve, and contribute"). As a presidential 
candidate, Clinton pledged, "I don't think we've got a person to waste." Charles R. Lawrence Ill & 
Mari J. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action 176 (Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 1997). Then as President, he released an important statement on affirmative action 
preceded by a long study. The statement came one month following the handing down of Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), analyzed below in this Article, where the Supreme 
Court applied strict scrutiny, its highest standard of constitutional review, to all affirmative action 
programs. He said "While our Nation has made enormous strides toward eliminating inequality and 
barriers to opportunity, the job is not complete." Clinton, supra n. 19, at 1113. He directed all federal 
agencies to comply with the decision. See id. at 1114 (citing Adarand v. Peiia). Clinton pledged that 
"we will seek reasonable ways to achieve the objectives of inclusion and anti[-]discrimination 
without specific reliance on group membership." Jd. at 1114. And in complying with Adarand, his 
administration will "apply the four standards of fairness to all our affirmative action programs" that 
he articulated, namely: no quotas in theory or practice; no illegal discrimination of any kind, 
including reverse discrimination; no preference for people who are not qualified for any job or other 
opportunity; and as soon as a program has succeeded, it must be retired. Any program, he said, that 
doesn't meet these four principles must be eliminated or reformed to meet them. !d. Clinton pled 
with Americans by stating, 'The job of ending discrimination in this country is not over. ... We 
should reaffirm the principle of affirmative action and fix the practices. We should have a simple 
slogan: Mend it, but don't end it." ld. 
20. The portion of the U.S. Constitution that guarantees equal protection under state law is the 
Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, which provides that "[n]o State shall ... deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I. 
Challenges to affirmative action involving the federal government are decided under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Statutory provisions also implicated in challenges to 
affirmative action programs include Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § I981 
(2000). Title VI, in relevant part, provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of 
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 
U .S.C. § 2000d (2000). Title VI applies to institutions receiving federal funds, including private 
colleges and universities. Section 1981 (a) provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the 
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public contracting, public employment, and public education?' "[M]ere 
prohibition of discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the 
effects of past practices and to permit attainment of an equitable 
representation of minorities, women, and handicapped persons."22 As 
President Johnson said, employing the metaphor of a footrace in which 
some runners are shackled while others make their way around the track, 
"Freedom is not enough. You do not take a person who, for years, has 
been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him to the starting line of 
a race, and then say, 'You are free to compete with all the others,' and 
still justly believe you have been completely fair."23 Affirmative action 
programs are measures, voluntary or court-imposed,24 "beyond simple 
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce 
contracts, ... and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons 
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." Rev. Stat. § 1977, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(2000). Section 1981 applies to public and private contracts, such as the contract that is formed when 
a college or university admits a student. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976) 
(explaining that a contract for educational services qualifies as a "contract" for purposes of§ 1981 ). 
It is inescapably odd for white litigants to be asking for protection and benefits "enjoyed by white 
citizens." Consequently, the Court has explained that the provision was "meant, by its broad terms, 
to proscribe discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any 
race." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976). Under the Supreme 
Court's jurisprudence, all three provisions are coterminous: a use of race consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause also withstands challenge under Title VI and§ 1981. In contrast, a use of race 
found to violate the Equal Protection Clause is also a violation of Title VI and§ 1981. 
21. Many public higher educational institutions admit almost every student who applies and 
have little need for any affirmative action policy. Competition for places is fierce only for elite 
public institutions like the University of California at Davis, whose affirmative action program came 
under scrutiny in Bakke, and the University of Michigan, whose own programs came under review in 
Grutter and Gratz. For example, the University of Michigan Law School "receives more than 3,500 
applications each year for a class of around 350 students." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-13. The Equal 
Protection Clause binds state-owned or public schools. Interestingly, the Harvard Plan, the 
affirmative ac~ion program Justice Powell held out as a model in Bakke, was designed not by a 
public school but rather by Harvard University, a private school. Note, however, that although equal 
protection binds only public schools, affirmative action also applies to private universities, since 
federal law forbids racial discrimination by institutions that receive federal funding, which most 
universities, public and private, do. Competition for scarce educational resources in elite higher 
educational institutions, public and private, is not limited to admission, but rather includes 
scholarship awards and opportunities, as well. The Supreme Court has yet to review a dispute 
involving affirmative action in primary and secondary educational institutions. 
22. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 620 (1987) (approvingly 
citing the employer's thoughtful argument for adopting the gender-conscious affirmative action plan 
under challenge). This case, decided under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upheld a 
voluntarily developed affirmative action program intended to eliminate imbalances against women 
in traditionally segregated job categories-such as road dispatchers. !d. Title Vll (§ 703A) outlaws 
employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (2001 ). 
23. Lyndon Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, in The Affirmative Action Debate 16, 16-24 
(George Curry ed., Addison-Wesley Publg. Co. 1996) (commencement address at Howard 
University in 1965). 
24. An example of a voluntary program is the Johnson case referred to in supra n. 22. 
Congressional legislation supports voluntary affirmative action measures designed to diversify the 
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termination of a discriminatory practice,"25 designed to redress the 
lingering effects of past discrimination against minority groups in society 
and to level the playing field for talented individuals who, in the past, 
have been systematically excluded for no reason other than their race or 
gender. 26 Like many government laws and programs, affirmative action 
policies go beyond a strict interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. 27 In addition to being a remediation device, affirmative action is 
also an indispensable tool for inclusiveness of groups "regularly 
excluded from decision making in government, business, industry, the 
legal system, religious hierarchies, labor organizations, and political 
parties" because of their gender, race, or other immutable 
characteristics.Z8 Every responsible government has a constitutional 
obligation "to act affirmatively to achieve equal opportunity for all."29 
In the past, the U.S. government sponsored certain relief programs 
for minority groups. These included measures unveiled, following the 
Civil War (1861-65), by the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and 
30 Abandoned Lands, known as the Freedmen's Bureau. They also 
workforce. See 137 Cong. Rec. S7024 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) (providing that "Nothing in the 
amendments ... shall be construed to affect ... voluntary employer actions for workforce diversity, 
or affirmative action or conciliation agreements .... "). 
25. U.S. Commn. Civ. Rights, Statement on Affirmative Action 2 (Clearinghouse Publication 
1977). 
26. See the quote attributed to the former President Clinton, supra n. 19. 
27. Steffen W. Schmidt et al., American Government & Politics Today 171 (2005-06 ed., 
Wadsworth/Thomson Learning 2005). As Justice Blackmun said in Bakke, to treat people equally, 
we are sometimes compelled, legitimately, to treat persons differently. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). And to get beyond racism and gender 
discrimination, we may, legitimately, have to take race and gender into account. See id. at 407 
(referring only to racial discrimination). Justice Blackmun thinks it "somewhat ironic to have us so 
deeply disturbed" over interjecting race in decision making regarding distribution of educational 
resources, and yet quite oblivious to widespread special preferences in higher education based on 
athletic skills, legacy (benefits to children of alumni) and the like. /d. at 404. It is not clear whether 
the disturbed "us" in the sentence is the Supreme Court or society generally. His message resonates 
regardless. Justice Blackmun warned, "We cannot-we dare not-let the Equal Protection Clause 
perpetuate racial supremacy." /d. at 407. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 
(1986) (holding, "[w]e have recognized ... that in order to remedy the effects of prior 
discrimination, it may be necessary to take race into account."). 
28. See Michael E. Milakovich & George J. Gordon, Public Administration in America 48 
(8th ed., Wadsworth Publg. 2004). Affirmative action's value as an inclusive tool was one reason 
why, despite the regressive rulings by the federal courts on affirmative action, Professor Riccucci 
still indicated "affirmative action may be around for a long time or at least until it is truly no longer 
needed, that is, when discriminatory practices cease to exist and when diverse workforces become 
the norm in this nation." Riccucci, supra 11. I, at 81 (hence the "immortality" in the title of her 
piece). 
29. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
30. Congress created this "first race bureaucracy" to provide education for the newly freed 
slaves. See Walton & Smith, supra 11. 3, at 227, 229. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Thurgood 
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included initiatives by various U.S. presidents from Roosevelt to 
Eisenhower, building on the Unemployment Relief Act of 1933.31 While 
some of these relief initiatives, without question, served as important 
prelude to present policies, 32 affirmative action, in its present format, has 
a more recent history that parallels the civil rights movement. 33 As both 
doctrine and policy, affirmative action was born during the Kennedy 
administration,34 received a strong shot in the arm during the Johnson 
Marshall designated the Freedmen's Bureau programs affirmative action, but, most informatively, 
with the two words secluded in quotes. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (Marshall, J., concurring and 
dissenting). But for the reasons given below, these sporadic and short-lived remedial measures do 
not form proper policy; although, along with latter programs such as those unveiled starting from the 
1930s (see infra n. 31 and corresponding text), they may have served as preludes for modem-day 
affirmative action programs. 
31. This law incorporated the principle of equal employment opportunity for African 
Americans by outlawing discrimination in hiring based on race, color, or creed. In the aftermath of 
this law's passage, President Franklin Roosevelt, in 1941, promulgated an executive order that 
established the first Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC). Following the FEPC, President 
Truman wrote an executive order creating the President's Committee on Government Contract 
Compliance. President Eisenhower did something similar by creating the President's Committee on 
Government Contracts. Emmanuel 0. Jheukwumere & Philip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, 
and the March Toward Co/or-Blind Jurisprudence, II Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rights L. Rev. I, 5 (2001 ). 
32. It is difficult to draw a rigid line regarding the starting point in the evolution of modem 
affirmative action; accordingly, this Article does not contest Jones's suggestion that the roots of 
modem affirmative action were tucked away in the policy statements of the initial order of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. See James E. Jones, Jr., The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative Action 
in Employment: Economic, Legal, and Political Realities, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 901,907 (1985). 
33. See Cornel West, Race Matters, 63-64 (Beacon Press 1993) (portraying affirmative action 
as a distinctive outcome of a "protracted struggle" during the 1960s between "American 
progressives and liberals in the courts and in the streets."). See also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 
159 (stating that equality before the law became an idea whose time had come "[a]s the civil rights 
movement mounted in intensity."). The civil rights movement is a movement for African American 
equality that later broadened to include other minority groups, such as Hispanic Americans, and 
Native Americans, among others. See id. at 162. 
34. In 1961, President Kennedy formed the President's Committee on Equal Employment 
Opportunity. Next, he issued Executive Order I 0,925, which forbade discrimination within the 
federal government based on race, religion, color, and national origin as well as mandated 
affirmative action in federal employment. The use of the term "affirmative action" in Executive 
Order I 0, 925 marked the first time such terminology appeared in an executive order. The term itself 
was coined by Hobart Taylor, an African American lawyer from Detroit, who, along with Arthur 
Goldberg and Abe Fortas, drafted Executive Order 10,925, signed by President Kennedy. The Order 
banned discriminatory hiring in federal contracting. "I put the word 'affirmative' in there at that 
time," Taylor said. Explaining why he chose that term, Taylor disclosed, "I was searching for 
something that would give a sense of positiveness to performance under that executive order, and I 
was tom between the words 'positive action' and the words 'affirmative action' ... [a]nd I took 
'affirmative action' because it was alliterative." See Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action 
Apart, N.Y. Times Mag. 40 (June II, 1995). Revealingly, Goldberg and Fortas went on to become 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices. They were both Caucasian. However, Taylor, an African American, 
was all but forgotten. Goldberg (1908~90) served on the Supreme Court from 1962~65; Fortas 
(1910~82), who replaced Goldberg, served on the Court from 1965~69. Both were Democrats 
appointed by Democratic Presidents, Goldberg by President Kennedy, and Fortas by President 
Johnson. 
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administration,35 and "effectively became the law of the land" under 
P .d N. 36 res1 ent 1xon. 
35. The foundation for the strong rooting of affirmative action that took place during the 
Nixon administration was laid under President Johnson. Johnson complemented Kennedy's 
Executive Order 10,925 with his own order, Executive Order 11,246. Issued in 1965 and amended in 
1967, this order (a) required contractors conducting business with the federal government to refrain 
from discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin; and (b) mandated them to 
take race and gender into account in recruitment and promotion. The Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) was also established during the period of the Johnson presidency. 
President Johnson's unflinching support for affirmative action was evidenced in the commencement 
speech he gave at Howard University in 1965 where he used the metaphor of a footrace in which one 
runner is shackled as the others make their way around the track. Just freeing the shackled runner 
and shouting "compete" without more to help the formerly shackled runner compete, he said, is 
unfair. See Johnson, supra n. 23 and corresponding text. Under President Johnson, government 
agencies at all levels-national, state and local-were required to implement affirmative action 
policies. So also were companies that sold goods or services to the federal government, institutions 
receiving federal funds, and employers under court order or order by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission to maintain affirmative action programs because of evidence of past 
discrimination. Finally, labor unions who discriminated against women and other minorities were 
required to establish and comply with affirmative action plans. See Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 
171. 
36. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 198. A monument of President Nixon's affirmative action 
initiative was his support for the Philadelphia Plan. The Plan was designed by Arthur Fletcher, an 
African American, who was the Assistant Secretary of Labor, with the assistance of another Nixon 
appointee, John Wilks, director of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance. It was a revived 
version of the Cleveland Plan that used Philadelphia as the model city. It required government 
contractors to set specific numerical goals for the employment of minority workers. The Cleveland 
Plan was designed to promote equal employment opportunity for blacks in the Cleveland, Ohio 
construction industry. Its architect and brainchild was Edward Sylvester, an African American and 
director of the OFCCP under President Johnson. The Sylvester plan required that construction 
companies awarded government contracts develop detailed plans specifying the precise number of 
blacks they planned to hire in all phases of their work. However, it drew strong opposition from 
labor unions, business groups, conservatives, and liberals who argued that it established racial hiring 
quotas and was dropped after the comptroller general (head of the General Accounting Office, the 
congressional watchdog agency) ruled it illegal, not because it imposed quotas, as its opponents 
argued, but because it violated standard contract bidding procedures. !d. 
Unlike the Cleveland Plan, the Philadelphia Plan complied with standard contracting 
procedures. Yet, the comptroller general ruled it illegal, but this time on the ground that it used race 
as a factor in determining employment. President Nixon rejected the comptroller general's ruling, 
arguing that as president he had the inherent "executive power" to implement the Philadelphia Plan 
by executive order. The Senate passed an amendment upholding the comptroller general's decision. 
It took the rejection in 1971 of the Senate's amendment, by a vote of208 to 156, following intense 
lobbying by President Nixon and Secretary of Labor George Shultz before, as Professors Walton and 
Smith said, "Affirmative action became the law of the land." Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 198. 
Prior to the Bakke case in 1978, the Philadelphia Plan was the model for affirmative action in the 
U.S./d. 
Other affirmative action achievements of President Nixon include the passages of§ 718 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (2001), 
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Also, Nixon took office following publication 
of the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, better known as the Kerner 
Commission, after Illinois governor Otto Kerner, who chaired the panel. President Johnson set up 
the Commission to investigate the causes of the rash of violent uprisings or rebellions in many urban 
areas that took place during the 1960s and recommend solutions. The Report concluded, darkly, that 
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Whether by fate or design, black political appointees have played an 
instrumental role in the design and implementation of these affirmative 
action policies.37 The instrumental role black federal appointees played 
in the design of affirmative action policies probably explains the support 
for the policies by later black officials, such as former Secretary of State 
General Colin Powel1,38 and the impatience with which some African 
Americans view black federal personnel opposed to affirmative action, 
such as Justice Clarence Thomas.39 
While early challenges to affirmative action came from Caucasian 
males, recent challenges include Caucasian women. Almost from the 
very moment of its inception, affirmative action generated challenges 
from Caucasian males who viewed these programs as "reverse 
discrimination."40 One analyst speculates that increased competition for 
admission to schools coupled with "a political environment of backlash 
against" President Johnson's Great Society programs helped to galvanize 
these challenges to race-conscious programs.41 A significant recent 
development in the affirmative action debate is the growing number of 
Caucasian females who, secure in the gains preferential programs have 
brought white women,42 have no qualms pointing their finger at 
"[o]ur [N]ation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate and unequal." 
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1967). 
37. See supra nn. 34 and 36 and accompanying text. 
3 8. See Jheukwumere & Aka, supra n. 31, at 13. 
39. See Vernon Jarrett, Thomas Stabs Douglass in Grave, Chi. Defender (June 28, 2003) 
(accusing Thomas of "stab[bing] Douglass in [the] grave" by comparing himself to Douglass); see 
also Thomas Shows His True Colors on Affirmative Action Ruling, Westside Gazette 3B (Ft. 
Lauderdale, Fla.) (July 9, 2003) (A commentary, as the title shows, berating Justice Thomas, while 
praising O'Connor as "an unabashed conservative" who "refuse[s] to be typecast by her ideological 
disposition."). 
40. See e.g. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), and the Bakke decisions, both of 
which were lawsuits brought by white men. 
41. William C. Kidder, The Struggle/or Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African 
American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950--2000, 19 Harv. Blackltr. L.J. 
1, 19 (2003) (drawing on the authority of James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States 
1945-1974 676-77 (Oxford U. Press 1996)). The extent to which affirmative action divides America 
is reflected in the large number of "friend of the court" briefs filed before the Supreme Court in 
cases, such as DeFunis, 416 U.S. 312, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, and the Michigan cases, Grutter, 539 
U.S. 346, and Gratz, 539 U.S. 301. Regarding DeFunis, Professor Peltason noted, "By the time the 
case came before the Supreme Court it was the center of national attention. More amicus curia . 
briefs were filed in this case than in any other case ever argued before the Supreme Court." J. W. 
Peltason, Corwin & Peltason 's Understanding the Constitution 205 (7th ed., Dryden Press 1976). 
More than a hundred groups turned in briefs as friends of the court for or against affirmative action 
in the Michigan cases. 
42. See Tracey Robinson-English, Minority Set-Aside Programs Help Women Get a Piece of 
Affirmative Action, N'Digo (Chicago) 7 (Mar. 24-30, 2005) (citing a recent study by Catalyst, a 
New York-based organization that promotes the interests of women in business, showing that 
"[o]verall, White women are the biggest winners of affirmative action programs, claiming more than 
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preferences based on race. Women were plaintiffs in Grutter 43 and Gratz 
v. Bollinger 
44 
as well as in the Fifth Circuit Court's decision in Hopwood 
v. Texas,
45 
which struck down the University of Texas law school's 
affirmative action program and called into question the weight of Justice 
Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 46 as 
precedent. In contrast, since Johnson, few, if any lawsuits, have been 
instituted contesting affirmative action programs based on gender.47 The 
challenges, by Caucasian women, to programs that inject race into 
decisions relating to admissions into public institutions of higher learning 
are an ironic occurrence in the current affirmative action controversy in 
America. Could it be that white America is comfortable with preferential 
treatment based on gender or other factors but cannot stand to accept 
preferences based on race? If so, the controversy at the moment relating 
to affirmative action has much more to do with the state of race relations 
in America and the politics of race than with the programs themselves. 
Grutter marks a crucial advance in the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence on affirmative action. Several factors make the case hugely 
significant. First is the fact that this momentous case, standing for 
maintenance of affirmative action, came out from the deeply 
conservative Rehnquist Court. Justice 0 'Connor's lukewarm attitude 
toward race-conscious programs prior to Grutter was well-known. 48 Yet 
O'Connor wrote the opinion of the court in Grutter and provided the 
critical fifth vote upholding the affirmative action program under 
challenge. However, Professor Klarman persuasively explained this 
mystery: "Justice O'Connor's conservative commitment to preserving 
the status quo trumped her ideological aversion to race-conscious 
[forty J percent of all managerial or professional jobs in the late 1990s"). See also Andrew Hacker, 
Two Nations: Black & White, Separate. Hostile, Unequal 152 (Simon & Schuster 2003 ). The Hacker 
book takes its title from the conclusion of the Kerner Commission Report; see supra n. 36. 
43. 539 U.S. 306. 
44. 539 U.S. 244. 
45. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
46. 438 U.S. 265. 
47. See480U.S.616. 
48. Michael Klarman, Are Landmark Court Decisions All That Important?, Chron. Higher 
Educ. BlO (Aug. 8, 2003). Professor Klarman importantly points out that "[b)efore Grutter, [Justice 
O'Connor] had never voted to sustain a race-based affirmative-action plan, though she had explicitly 
noted that such policies might be acceptable under certain stringent conditions." !d. "Based on her 
earlier opinions and votes," Klannan said, "one might easily have predicted that O'Connor would 
invalidate the admissions policies of the University of Michigan on the grounds that they relied on 
the impermissible stereotype that race correlates with diversity of perspective and that they failed to 
adequately consider nonracial alternatives for securing a diverse student body." /d. The fortunate 
thing about Grutter, for proponents of race-conscious programs, was that Justice O'Connor chose to 
uphold the program in question. 
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governmental remedies.',49 Years earlier, in Bakke, five Justices-
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and White-stood for the 
proposition that the use of race could serve a compelling government 
interest, whether based on diversity, as Powell posited, or on the 
rationale of remediation of past discrimination. When the Michigan cases 
were decided, the number had climbed to seven Justices-Breyer, 
Ginsburg, O'Connor, Souter, Stevens,50 plus former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist51 and Kenne~.52 The only two holdouts against the use of 
race were Justices Scalia and Thomas. 54 
Second, the Court announced the Grutter decision while a 
Republican administration staunchly opposed to affirmative action was 
in office. When he ran for president, George Bush advocated 
"affirmative access" which he defined as increasing access for minorities 
without using quotas. 55 The President also favored race-neutral 
alternatives to affirmative action such as the "~ercentage plans" he 
unveiled in Texas during his period as governor. 6 Given this lack of 
49. Id. As Hensley said of Justice Powell in their text on the Supreme Court, O'Connor may 
be seen as a conservative justice who favors conservative outcomes in most cases and seeks "to 
balance carefully the competing interests in cases presented to the Court," as opposed to the class of 
conservative justices, like Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, who seek "to advance a particular 
ideology." See Hensley eta\., supra n. 3, at 67. 
50. Recall that Justice Stevens was part of the Burger plurality that struck down the 
affirmative action plan in Bakke. The other members of that plurality were Chief Justice Burger, and 
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart. Stevens's vote for affirmative action was an important development 
for this sometimes nondescript jurist. See Hensley et a\., supra n. 3, at 67. Professor Baum, in his 
primer on the Supreme Court, calls Stevens the Court's "most liberal justice." Lawrence Baum, The 
Supreme Court 117 (6th ed., Cong. Q. Inc. 1998). What caused Justice Stevens's tum in favor of 
affirmative action? Professor Baum provides a possible explanation: "When a justice's position 
shifts relative to that of the Court as a whole, it is usually because new appointments have shifted the 
Court's ideological center, while the justice has retained the same general views. This appears to be 
the case with John Paul Stevens, who moved to the liberal end of the Court as more liberal justices 
were replaced by conservatives." Id. at 158. 
51. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257. 
52. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (despite his dissent based on the 
abandonment of a strict scrutiny review, Justice Kennedy wanted to "reiterate [his] approval of 
giving appropriate consideration to race in this one [student diversity] context."). 
53. I d. at 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) ("The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-
provided education is no exception."). 
54. !d. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Scalia, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating "I would hold that a 
State's use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is categorically prohibited by the 
Equal Protection Clause"). 
55. Bob Kemper, Democrats Hope Court Rulings Bruise Bush, Chi. Trib. News Sec. 17 (June 
24, 2003). 
56. These plans, adopted in public undergraduate institutions in states like California, Florida, 
Texas, and Washington, grant automatic admission to all students above a certain class-rank 
threshold, usually the top 10 or 20 percent, of the graduating class. However, as Justice Ginsburg 
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sympathy, it is unsurprising that the Bush Justice Department filed briefs 
in the Michigan cases urging the Supreme Court to strike down the 
programs on the ground that they represented "disguised quotas."57 
Although the Michigan cases were important, they hardly signify a 
progressive tum of events in the Supreme Court's disposition toward 
affirmative action; substantial residues of hostility toward affirmative 
action remain in the high Court, and the Court continues to maintain an 
orientation of non-solicitude for minority rights. 58 
This Article has two main parts, excluding the introduction and the 
conclusion. Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's role in the development 
of affirmative action policies. The discussion is divided into three 
sections, namely: 1) comment on the role of the Court in policymaking; 
2) the Court's vacillating role in the African American civil rights 
movement; and 3) the role of the Court in affirmative action up to and 
including the Michigan cases, with special reference to public education. 
Part III isolates and discusses various key indicators drawn from the 
Michigan cases that testify of the Court's continuing hostility toward 
affirmative action and minority rights. 
II. FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: 
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES IN AMERICA 
This portion of the Article ties the Supreme Court's affirmative 
action jurisprudence to its earlier involvement in African American civil 
pointed out in her dissent in Gratz, these plans cannot be race-neutral, since they "unquestionably 
were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing representation of African-Americans and 
Hispanics in the public higher education system." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303 n. 10 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for the Court in Grutter, identifies the nature of the 
Court's misgiving with respect to these plans: it is not clear what relevance they may have for 
graduate and professional schools. Also, assuming for argument's sake, that they are race-neutral, 
they may militate against the "holistic," individualized assessment necessary for achievement of a 
racially diverse student body. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 340. See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back 
Affirmative Action by 5 to 4, But Wider Vote Bans a Racial Point System, N.Y. Times AI (June 24, 
2003). 
57. Kemper, supra n. 55. 
58. See generally Opoku Agyeman, The United States Supreme Court and the Enforcement of 
African-American Rights: Myth and Reality, 24 PS: Political Sci. & Pol. 679-84 (1991 ). The 
Supreme Court is viewed as a tribunal that, before 1938, failed to distinguish itself as a protector of 
minority rights but which, however, turned a "modem chapter" of better protectiveness, following a 
"doctrinal direction" beginning in 1938 resulting in "a more generous view of the rights of racial 
minorities and a more daring assessment of the Court's capacity to protect them." !d. at 682 (citing 
Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 208 (U. of Chi. Press 1960)). Professor 
Agyeman disputes this conventional wisdom and demonstrates the tenuousness of the Court's claim 
as guardian of minority interests, maintaining that its "more fundamental, enduring role" is "as the 
protector of property rights." !d. at 684. 
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rights; the two phenomena are intimately related. Affirmative action 
evolved as a remedy designed to eliminate the legacy of discrimination 
and exclusion of groups based on immutable characteristics such as their 
race, ethnicity, or gender, which the Supreme Court, wittingly or 
unwittingly, contributed to. Remedial measures became imperative 
because, as Justice Brennan and company pointed out in Bakke, the 
Equal Protection Clause "was early turned against those whom it was 
intended to set free, condemning them to a 'separate but equal' status 
before the law, a status always separate but seldom equa1."59 Connecting 
civil rights and affirmative action, as this Article does, is sound in that it 
constitutes a richer approach that provides the important historical 
perspective and depth necessary for a proper understanding of 
contemporary affirmative action, both as doctrine and policy. Although 
cases dealing with affirmative action in public employment and public 
contracting are mentioned, the main emphasis here is on cases relating to 
affirmative action in education. 
A. The Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution 
The judiciary has the "province" to say what the law is. 60 This 
authority flows from the power of interpretation and judicial review. 61 In 
his landmark work on American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville 
commented: "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States 
that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."62 Because 
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27 (Opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
60. See Marhury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 ( 1803) (ruling a particular provision of an act of 
Congress unconstitutional, and in the process, recognizing the power of judicial review for American 
courts). 
61. In addition to the responsibility of statutory interpretation, U.S. courts are invested with 
the greatest of all interpretational responsibilities, namely, the power of judicial review. Statutory 
interpretation involves merely interpreting the laws or deciding what the legislature meant when it 
enacted a given piece of legislation; in contrast, judicial review is much more. It is the power of U.S. 
courts to scrutinize the legality of the laws and actions of the other branches of government and to 
declare unconstitutional (and therefore unenforceable) any initiatives of these branches that do not 
conform with the Constitution. There is no explicit provision for judicial review in the U.S. 
Constitution; instead, the judiciary claimed this power for itself in MarhUfy, 5 U.S. 137. On the 
legitimacy of judicial review, including the historical antecedents of this authority, see Gerald 
Gunther, Constitutional Law 13-20 (12th cd., Found. Press 1991 ). On the finality of the judiciary's 
interpretation of the Constitution, see id. at 21-28; see also Corwin & Pcltason, supra n. 41, at 31 
(pointing out that the president, congresspersons, and other public officials have a duty to act 
constitutionally and measure their actions against their own readmg of the ConstttutiOn, but only 
when there is 110 relevant Supreme Court ruling, and they must abide by the Court's interpretation 
where such ruling exists). 
62. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455 (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracv in America 
248 (Harper & Row, Publishers \966)). 
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of their_ po_w~r of interpretation and judicia_! _review and ~iven that the 
federal JUdiciary forms part of the U.S. political process, U.S. judges 
play a larger role in public policy-making than judges in most other 
. . h 1 64 
countnes m t e word. Judges (and courts) make policy "whenever 
they interpret the law or the Constitution in a new way, extend the reach 
of existing laws to cover matters not previously thought to be covered, or 
design remedies for problems in ways that require [them] to act in 
administrative or legislative ways."65 This role makes them ~olitical 
actors and "policymakers working within a political institution. "6 
As the tribunal at the apex of the judicial system and given its special 
status as the only federal Court created by the Constitution (the other 
federal courts were the more lowly handiwork of Congress),67 the 
Supreme Court is a "part of a policymaking s~stem that includes lower 
courts" and other branches of government; 8 it is also "[t]he most 
important political force within [the federal] judiciary."69 Emphasis on 
the Court is something motivated by "[m]ore than pedagogical 
tradition,"70 but rather the reality that the over 500 volumes of reports 
the high Court has authored encompass "a remarkable range of 
constitutional questions" forming "the richest source of constitutional 
law."71 Finally, it is also an acknowledgment of the fact that "[o]n those 
questions that do get to court, the Supreme Court's last word makes it 
obviously the most important judicial voice."72 
Accordingly, federal judges play a crucial role in (re)shaping "the 
63. Baum, supra n. 50, at 4. 
64. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455. 
65. James Q. Wilson, American Government, Briel Version 317 (7th ed., Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 2005). 
66. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455. What makes U.S. judges, including Supreme Court 
justices, political, is that they "make important decisions on major issues; people care about those 
decisions and want to influence them." Baum, supra n. 50, at 4. With specific reference to the 
Supreme Court, Professor Dahl defines a political institution as "an institution ... for arriving at 
decisions on controversial questions of national policy." See also Robert A. Dahl, Decision-making 
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279 (1957). 
67. See U.S. Const. art. Ill, § I (providing "The judicial Power of the United States shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish."). 
68. Baum, supra n. 50, at 5. 
69. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 455. 
70. Gunther, supra n. 61, at I. 
71. !d. 
72. !d. Dismissing the notion that the Supreme Court is the "all-power" tribunal some people 
make it out to be, Professor Baum concedes, nonetheless, that the Court is a "remarkable institution" 
with an "extraordinary" role "for a single small body that possesses little tangible power." Baum, 
supra n. 50, at 273. 
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contours of affirmative-action law."73 Attention to the ever-evolving and 
ever-changing attitude of the Supreme Court toward affirmative action 
and minority rights generally can shed much needed light on the politics 
of inclusion and exclusion in America. Few issues in American history 
"stand out more dramatically than the ebbing and flowing of our 
commitments to dealin9 with the injustices-and the potential richness-
of racial differences." 4 It is not just presidents who engage in the 
politics of affirmative action; 75 judges, including Supreme Court justices, 
do the same, with serious ramifications on minority rights. 
B. The Supreme Court and the Zig-Zags of African American 
Civil Rights from Dred Scott to Brown v. Board of Education 
Emphasis here will be on African American civil rights, 76 not 
because black civil rights exhaust the universe of minority rights in 
America, for they do not,77 but rather because African American 
experience with all forms of discrimination, including slavery, 
segregation, and racism7 has been one of the most odious endured by any group in U.S. history. 8 This Article characterizes and organizes the 
black struggle in terms of a fateful zig-zag journey-from ( 1) 
73. Riccucci, supra n. I, at 76, 79; see also id. at 74-75 (Table 6.1) (listing "the chronology 
of legal actions around affirmative action;" a chronology of legal activities without question 
evidencing the dominant role of the courts). 
74. Lee C. Bollinger, My Case, Wall St. J. AS (June 20, 2003). 
75. See supra n. 36 (discussing the role of President Nixon). 
76. Civil rights is about equality and freedom from discrimination, specifically the rights of 
all Americans to equal treatment under the law, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Schmidt 
et al., supra n. 27, at 151. "Essentially, the history of civil rights in America is the story of the 
struggle of various groups to be free from discriminatory treatment." !d. Although similar, civil 
rights are distinguishable from civil liberties. Civil liberties are basically constitutional limitations 
that specify what the government cannot do, whereas civil rights specify things the government must 
do to ensure equal protection and freedom from discrimination. !d. 
77. See also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 151 (pointing out other groups besides African 
Americans, such as Hispanics, Native Americans, Asian Americans, Arab Americans, and persons 
from India also, like African Americans, have engaged or are still engaging in their own struggle for 
equality). See e.g. Frank Wu, Yellow: Race in American Beyond Black & White chapter 4 (Basic 
Books 2002). (analyzing affirmative action with respect to Asian Americans in a chapter titled 
"Neither Black Nor White"). 
78. E.g. Justice Marshall's opinion in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387--402, in which the distinguished 
jurist referred to the forms of discrimination blacks endured "during most of the past 200 years" as 
"the most ingenious and pervasive." !d. at 308. Marshall said racism directed against blacks was 
so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The 
experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree. from that of 
other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people 
were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the 
great melting pot has not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even 
made it into the pot. 
/d. at 400-01 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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constitutional servitude, to (2) progress toward a condition of 
constitutional equality, to (3) reversion to inequality marked by 
segregation, and, finally, to ( 4) progress toward equality. This Article 
highlights milestone occurrences that characterize each period or era, 
focusing on the role or contribution of the Supreme Court in each era or 
period. 
1. Constitutional Servitude: "All Men are Created Equal, Except 
Negroes" 
Constitutional servitude characterized the fate of African Americans 
during the antebellum period before 1861. The Declaration of 
Independence proclaimed a number of "self-evident Truths," including: 
"all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness." 79 Yet, at the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia in 1787, delegates failed to resolve the issue of slavery. 
Without mentioning the word slavery, the final document that emerged 
from the meeting was marred by several provisions bearin§b directly on 
racial matters, namely: the "Three-Fifths" Compromise, the Slave 
Commerce Clause,81 and the Fugitive Slave Clause.82 These provisions 
79. Declaration o/ Independence ['I! 2] ( 1776 ). The original draft of the Declaration accused 
the King of England of waging a "cruel war against human nature itself, violating its most sacred 
rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who never offended him, captivating and 
carrying them into slavery in another hemisphere, or to incur miserable death in their transportation 
thither." John H. Franklin & Alfred A. Moses Jr., From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African-
Americans 71 (7th ed., Knopf 1997). John Adams called those charges the "vehement philippic 
against Negro slavery." The charges were unacceptable to Southern delegates at the Continental 
Congress and were stricken from the final document. !d. 
80. U.S. Con st. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing, "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be 
apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, 
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths 
of all other persons"). Like many things in the Constitution, this provision was a compromise 
between delegates from the Northern and the Southern states. The North wanted the slaves to count 
for taxation purposes, whereas the South wanted them to count for representation purposes. Franklin 
D. Gilliam Jr., Farther to Go: Readings and Cases in Ajrican-American Politics 3 (Harcourt Brace 
2002). 
81. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. I ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the 
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to" 
1808, "but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each 
Person."). This was another one of those compromises, designed to accommodate delegates from 
Southern states, and delegates, like James Madison, opposed to slavery and the rest of the 
"impending abolitionist movement." See Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 3. 
82. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under 
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be 
discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom 
such Service or Labour may be due."). For slaves, as Professor Gilliam aptly observed, this clause 
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are emblematic of the hard-ball compromises leading up to the adoption 
of the Constitution. 83 However, they also depict the delegates' low 
perception of blacks as humans, and particularly of slaves as part-
property and part-human.84 "The degradation of American [BJlacks 
was . . . woven into the very fabric of American government. "8 The 
abolitionist and African American leader Frederick Douglass poignantly 
lamented, "Liberty and Slavery-opposite as Heaven and Hell-are both 
in the Constitution."86 It was an observation with which Abraham 
Lincoln appeared to concur when he sarcastically stated, "All men are 
87 
created equal, except Negroes." 
The Supreme Court first assumed a role in African American 
inequality when it decided Dred Scott v. John F.A. Sariford in 1857.88 
Described by one political scientist as "perhaps the most important 
governmental act concerning race in the 19th century,"89 this case lent 
constitutional imprimatur to slavery in America. Dr. John Emerson left 
Missouri and went to Illinois, where for four years he served as an Army 
surgeon. He took along with him Dred Scott, his slave. Although 
meant, "[i]n essence there was no way to flee for freedom." Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 3. 
83. See e.g. Wilson, supra n. 65, at 27 (commenting on the relationship between the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, reasoning that the Framers "clearly postponed the 
issue of slavery in order to create a union strong enough to handle the issue when it could no longer 
be postponed"). 
84. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 3. 
85. ld. 
86. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 151. 
87. ld. Two views have evolved regarding the "resolution" of the slavery issue in the U.S. 
Constitution. The first held by Professor Wilson, supra n. 65, and others, regards the maintenance of 
slavery in the original Constitution as simply part of the bargain to adopt the Constitution. The 
second view is held by analysts like the Swedish scholar Gunnar Myrdal, author of the seminal book, 
An American Dilemma, who attributed the failure to handle slavery well as an attempt to maintain 
domination over blacks. Although there were groups other than blacks denied basic rights in 
America, slavery was a brand of domination of "overwhelming proportions" in scope and extent, 
reserved especially for blacks. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 5. Additionally, in the U.S. slavery was an 
institution with a special "racist caste." Denial of fundamental political and human rights to slaves 
relegated or condemned them to a subordinate position in the social, political, and economic 
hierarchy. Slaves had no rights to their bodies, their offspring, or their fate. The enforcement of 
restrictive laws or slave codes directed at blacks was achieved through several social control 
mechanisms, including slave patrols, whippings, imprisonment, and lynching. Southern defense of 
slavery was based on the view that blacks were not fully developed human beings and they needed 
protection, guidance, and discipline. The black condition and situation contrasted from that of white 
indentured servants, the majority of whom, by 1800, had bought their way out of servitude and were 
accorded rights of citizenship. So slavery was not something merely driven by economic changes 
and concerns brought about by the Industrial Revolution, as some writers argue. Rather, in addition 
to being critical to the stability of the Southern economy, control of the slave population was also 
critical to the very nature of Southern life. See id. See also Justice Marshall's dissent in supra n. 78, 
which corroborates this account. 
88. 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
89. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at II. 
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Missouri was a slave state, under the Missouri Compromise of 1850 90 
Congress had prohibited slavery in Illinois. Scott returned to Missouri 
and sued for his freedom on the grounds that his residence on free soil 
made him a free man. Scott won his suit in the lower court, but lost in the 
Missouri Supreme Court. The case was then tried in federal district court 
and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In Dred Scott, two issues were presented before the Court: (l) 
whether blacks were citizens of the U.S., and (2) the constitutionality of 
the Missouri Compromise. In a judgment for the Court written by Chief 
Justice Taney,91 the Court answered the first question in the negative. It 
held that the slavery commerce and the fugitive slave clauses "point 
directly and specifically to the Negro race as a separate class of persons, 
and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people or 
citizens of the government then formed."92 Taney reasoned blacks "had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect. "93 Turning to the 
second issue, the Court ruled that Congress overstepped its authority by 
prohibiting slavery in the territories covered under the Missouri 
Compromise. Therefore, the Court declared unconstitutional the very 
Compromise under which Scott brought his suit. Dred Scott embodied 
underlying differences between the North and South that foreshadowed 
the start of the Civil War.94 And far from settling the issue of slavery, 
which the Philadelphia Convention left unresolved, the Dred Scott ruling 
brought that issue to a head.95 Dred Scott is one of the most wrongly 
decided cases ever in the history of the U.S. Supreme Court.96 
90. The Missouri Compromise was an act of Congress that admitted Maine into the Union as 
a free state, admitted Missouri as a slave state, and banned slavery in all federal terntories north of 
the 30° latitude (the southern border of Missouri). For an informative historical story on this 
factually-rich case, see Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case, in Quarrels That flave Shaped 
the Constitutioll 87-99 (John A. Garraty ed., Harper & Row, Publishers 1987). 
91. Roger B. Taney (1777-1864), a Democrat from Maryland, was appointed by President 
Jackson, a Democrat from Tennessee (1829-37) and served on the high court from 1836 until his 
death in 1864. 
92. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 411. 
93. !d. at 407. Few cases in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence match Dred Scott 
when it comes to deployment of a collection of opprobrious assertions designed to degrade a people. 
In addition to having no rights that were respected, Taney branded blacks an "article of property," 
who "might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit." !d. at 407-08. "They were at 
that time considered as a subordinate and interior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the 
dominant race ... . "!d. at 404-05 
94. See Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 11--12. Some of the manifestations of these fundamental 
differences that the Dred Scott decision brought to a head were that Northern states sought to 
increase the number of free states admitted to the Union, while Southern states sought to extend 
slavery into the territories under the control of the federal government. !d. 
95. !d. at 12. 
96. See McCloskey, supra n. 58, at 94 (assessing the decision as "the most disastrous opinion 
the Supreme Court has ever issued"). Abraham Lincoln opposed the decision "in a certain way" 
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2. Progress Toward a Condition of Constitutional Equality 
While the first period covers the era before the Civil War, the second 
period encompasses the era of Reconstruction, "[t]he period between the 
freeing of the slaves in 1863 and the return of Southern white supremacy 
after the presidential election of 1876."97 It took the pains of a 
tormenting civil war from 1861 to 1865 and numerous Reconstruction 
initiatives to correct the constitutional defects of the formative years98 
and move African Americans to the condition of constitutional equality. 
These initiatives include President Lincoln's Emancipation 
Proclamation, the Civil War Amendments, and the Civil Rights Acts of 
1865 to 1875, designed to enforce these amendments. 
The Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 abolished slavery in the 
Confederate States, but protected it in the Union States. 99 In practical 
terms, this presidential decree freed no slaves, even though it helped 
Lincoln politically by securing him black support for the federal side. 
The proclamation also had important symbolic value in that it set the 
ground for the movement toward constitutional equality that the 
Thirteenth Amendment and the other Civil War amendments solidified. 
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments made further 
during his campaign for the U.S. Senate in 1858. "We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if 
we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject," he indicated. Gunther, supra n. 61, at 
23. There were also white public officials at that time who viewed the decision with lividness. For 
example, Senator Seward of New York called upon the people of the United States to defy the 
unconstitutional and abhorrent principle, embedded in the decision, that one man can own another 
man. He stated that the "people of the United States never can, and they never will, accept principles 
so unconstitutional and so abhorrent. Never, never!" Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., I st Sess. 943 (1858). 
He also threatened to help "reorganize the Court and thus reform its political sentiments and 
practices, and bring them into harmony with the Constitution and the laws of nature." !d. 
97. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 24. The Reconstruction is so named because the central political 
question that characterized that period involved the conditions for the re-entry of the seceding 
Confederate States into the Union. !d. These conditions included "a clear directive to abolish 
slavery." !d. 
98. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in a statement he released before the celebration of the 
Constitution's 200th anniversary in September 1987, indicated he was unimpressed by the Framers' 
wisdom and foresight. He would not credit to them the fact that the Constitution today no longer 
enslaves. Rather, he said, that credit belongs "to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions 
of 'liberty,' 'justice,' and 'equality,' and who strived to better them." Thurgood Marshall, 
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United Constitution, 101 Harv. L. Rev. I (1987) (text of a 
speech given at a seminar in Maui, Hawaii). A recent echo of Justice Marshall's position was made 
by the Reverend Jesse Jackson who contends that the Founders' vision left many out. The 
constitutional republic the Founders gave us, the civil rights leader said, was a republic "designed to 
protect the rights of the few, particularly property holders and creditors, from the passions of the 
many, particularly working people and debtors." Accordingly, "[t]he America we celebrate today is 
not the America of the Founders. It is the America of Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King." 
Jesse Jackson, Founders' Vision Left Many Out, Chi. Sun-Times 37 (July 5, 2005). 
99. Text of this document can be found in Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 21-22. 
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progress in correcting Constitutional inequalities. 100 The Thirteenth 
Amendment not only abolished slavery throughout the United States, 101 
it also granted Congress the authority, through legislation, to enforce the 
Amendment. 102 "[I]t represents the first national attempt at broad-scale 
racial reform." 103 In one impressive swoop, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
ratified in 1868, accorded citizenship to "all persons born or naturalized 
in the United States," effectively overturning Dred Scott; 104 struck down 
the "Three-Fifths" Compromise; 105 and provided for privileges and 
immunities of citizenship, due process, and equal protection under the 
106 laws. Although the Fourteenth Amendment made blacks "whole" by 
striking "three-fifths," it was only for the purpose of calculating their 
numbers for representation in the House of Representatives; it did not 
give them the right to vote. The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870, 
granted that right, 107 effectively extending the right to vote to black 
108 
males. 
I 00. The three amendments, collectively, are called the Civil Rights Amendment because 
"[t]hey were, so to speak, the victory terms dictated by the North to the South." Corwin & Peltason, 
supra n. 41, at 184. For example, the federal government conditioned the withdrawal of federal 
troops from Southern states and restoration of their right to full participation in Congress upon their 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. /d. The federal troops which occupied Southern states 
during the Reconstruction era were withdrawn in 1877. 
101. U.S. Cons!. amend. Xlll, § l ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude ... shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). Some slaves had been freed 
during the Civil War. This Amendment freed the rest and abolished slavery. The Thirteenth 
Amendment takes its significance from the fact that it effectively eliminated all provisions in the 
Constitution that allowed slavery, such as the Slave Commerce Clause, id. at art. l, § 9, and the 
Fugitive Slave Clause, id. at art. IV, § 9. By also making illegal the notion that human beings could 
be held as private property, the Amendment completed and gave constitutional footing to prior 
initiatives like the Emancipation Proclamation. 
l 02. /d. at amend. Xlll, § 2. It is hard to minimize the huge irony the Thirteenth Amendment 
signified for Southern States who fought hard to maintain slavery. Before the war, a bedrock 
constitutional principle was that the national government should not interfere with slavery in the 
states. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 93. In fact, Congress proposed an ill-fated Thirteenth 
Amendment, quickly ratified by Illinois, Maryland, and Ohio, and personally signed by President 
Lincoln, that prohibited any amendment to the Constitution granting Congress the power to interfere 
in any way with slavery in any state. See Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 189. However, the 
Thirteenth Amendment not only interfered with slavery, it abolished the institution altogether and in 
doing so, also effectively abolished the rule, later formally eliminated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, discussed below, by which three-fifths of the slaves were counted when apportioning 
seats in the House of Representatives. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 93. 
I 03. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 22 
104. U.S. Cons!. amend. XIV,§ I. 
I 05. /d. at amend. XIV, § 2. 
l 06. /d. at amend. XIV,§ I. 
l 07. !d. at amend. XV, § l ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude."). 
l 08. Notably, the right to suffrage did not include women, black or white. Only with the 
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As earlier indicated, the Civil Rights Acts, about eight in all, were 
meant to enforce the Civil War Amendments. Three of these were 
particularly important, namely: the Enforcement Act of 1870,109 which 
laid out specific criminal penalties for interfering with the right to vote as 
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment; the Civil Rights Act of 1872,110 
otherwise known as the Anti-Ku Klux Klan Act, which made it a federal 
crime for anyone to use law or custom to deprive an individual of any 
right secured by the Constitution or federal law; and the Second Civil 
Rights Act of 1875,111 which made it a federal crime for an owner or 
operator of any public accommodation, including schools, churches, 
cemeteries, hotels, places of amusement, and common carriers, to deny 
any individual "the full enioyment of the accommodations thereof' on 
d f l. . 1 f2 groun o race or re 1g10n. 
3. Reversion to Inequality: "The Strange Career of Jim Crow" 
Southern states resisted the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment 
with the "black codes." These laws were ostensibly designed to govern 
"the status and conduct" of the newly freed slaves and, therefore, provide 
social and economic stability in these states. In actuality, these codes 
were restrictive and punitive measures that, in many ways, returned 
blacks to bondage-like conditions. Two infamous Supreme Court 
d . . h c· 'tR· h C 113 dPl 17 114 ectswns, t e zvz zg ts ases, an essy v. rerguson, are more 
illustrative of this period than any other event. 
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck down the Second Civil 
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment fifty years later, in 1920, did women win this right. /d. at 
amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of sex."). Although Mrs. Abigail Adams pled with her 
husband, John Adams "to remember the ladies," see Steffen W. Schmidt et al., American 
Government & Politics Today 163 (2003-04 ed., Wadsworth/Thomson Learning 2003) [hereinafter 
Schmidt et al. 2003-04 ed.] (quoting Letters o/a Nation: A Collection of" Extraordinary American 
Letters 60 (Andrew Carroll ed., Kodansha America, Inc. 1997), the Constitution that the Framers 
wrote did not give women the right to vote, but rather left the matter to the states who limited the 
franchise to adult white males who owned property. Nor did the limitation seem unusual to the 
Framers, given that the prevailing view then appears to have been that "the people who own the 
country ought to govern it," as John Jay said. Noam Chowsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism 
and Global Order 46 (Seven Stories Press 1999). 
109. Ch.lll4, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 
110. Ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871). 
Ill. Ch.ll4, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
112. Schmidt et al. 2003-04 ed., supra n. I 08, at 148-49. 
113. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The lawsuit consisted of five cases originating from California, 
Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, and Tennessee, which were consolidated and decided together. At 
issue in the five cases was the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, hence the 
designation of the cases as the Civil Rights Cases. 
114. 163U.S.537(1896). 
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Rights Act of 1875, which made it a federal crime to deny blacks full 
enjoyment of public accommodation. 115 It ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment only protected against discrimination by states, not 
discrimination by private individuals. 116 Put differently, the Supreme 
Court regarded discrimination by white citizens against blacks as a 
private affair against which the law and Constitution provided no 
recourse. The Court also ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment "[did] not 
invest Congress with power to lefislate upon subjects which are within 
the domain of state legislation."11 
Only one justice, Justice Harlan118 dissented from the judgment of 
the Court. 119 He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment could not 
reach the discrimination complained of in the cases and found the rights 
involved to be legal rights, not social intercourse, as the Court 
claimed. 120 He was also certain that the Thirteenth Amendment 
applied. 121 He said that today it is "the colored race" whose rights are 
being violated "by corporations and individuals wielding ~ublic 
authority;" who knows which other race's tum it will be tomorrow? 22 
The ruling in the Civil Rights Cases signified a major setback in 
African American civil rights. "Less than two decades after the Civil 
War, the Supreme Court had seriously weakened the Fourteenth 
Amendment and neutralized the efforts of Congress to pass civil rights 
laws to protect black citizens."123 These cases and their antecedents 
placed the civil rights of blacks "back in the hands of the States, their 
124 
staunchest oppressors." 
I 15. See text accompanying supra n. 112. 
116. 109U.S.at3. 
117. !d. at II. 
118. John Marshall Harlan ( 1833-1911 ), a Republican from Kentucky, was appointed by 
President Hayes, a Republican from Ohio and President from 1877 to 1881. He served on the high 
court from 1877 until his death in 1911. 
119. Civil Rights Cases, I 09 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
120. !d. at 59. 
121. See id. at 35 (contending that "since slavery ... was the moving or principal cause of the 
adoption of that Amendment, and since that institution rested wholly upon the inferiority, as a race, 
of those held in bondage, their freedom necessarily involved immunity from, and protection against, 
all discrimination against them, because of their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to 
freemen of other races.")(emphasis added). !d. 
122. !d. at 62. 
123. Agyeman, supra n. 58, at 682; see also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 153 (stating that the 
other civil rights laws that the Court did not specifically invalidate became dead letters in the statute 
books, although they were never repealed by Congress). 
124. J. Owens Smith et al., Blacks & American Government: Politics, Policy, & Social Change 
65. (Kendall/Hunt Publg. Co. 1987). Those antecedents include The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 
36 (1873) (ruling that state and national citizenships are distinct, applying the principle of duality of 
citizenship the Court established in Dred Scott); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (ruling that 
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Plessy v. Ferguson involved a challenge to an 1890 Louisiana law 
that mandated "equal but sevarate accommodations" for white and black 
passengers in railroad cars. 25 Homer A. Plessy, reportedly one-eighth 
black, was arrested and convicted for sitting in a seat in a coach for 
whites rather than the one reserved for "Colored Only." Plessy appealed 
his arrest and conviction to the Supreme Court. He argued that the 
Louisiana statute violated his civil rights under the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In an opinion for the Court by Justice Brown, 
the Court stated-just like it did in the Civil Rights Cases thirteen years 
before-that the law in question did not violate the Thirteenth 
Amendment because it did not "reestablish a state of involuntary 
servitude."126 Nor, it said, did the law violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. True, the object of the Fourteenth Amendment "was 
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the 
law;" nonetheless, "in the nature of things, it could not have been 
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social ... 
equality."127 The Court maintained that racial segregation was not 
discriminatory and did not "necessarily imply the inferiority of either 
race to the other," but rather a reasonable exercise of the state police 
power "for the promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance 
or oppression of a particular class."128 At any rate, "[i]f one race be 
inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the U.S. cannot put them 
129 
upon the same plane." 
the rights of black litigants, including the right to peaceful assembly, infringed upon by a group of 
Louisiana whites, were not nationally protected rights that Congress could punish violation of); and 
U.S. v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (ruling that the Fifteenth Amendment did not guarantee all citizens 
the right to vote but rather simply listed grounds that could not be used to deny that right). 
125. 163 U.S. 537,540 (1896). 
126. !d. at 543. Not until Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 (1968), involving a developer 
who refused to sell a home to a black couple, did the Supreme Court use the Thirteenth Amendment 
to reach discrimination perpetrated by private individuals. In that case, a majority of the Court, with 
only two justices dissenting, construed section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to bar private 
discrimination, stating that "[ w ]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghettos and makes their 
ability to buy property tum on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery." See Corwin & 
Peltason, supra n. 41, at 185-86. 
127. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. 
128. !d. at 550. 
129. !d. at 552. In Cummings v. County Bd. ojEduc., 175 U.S. 528 ( 1899), three years later, the 
Court extended the separate-but-equal doctrine to public schools. The separate-but-equal doctrine 
presumed that the constitutional requirement of equal protection was served so long as facilities were 
equal, even if they remained separate. The problem, however, was that under the doctrine, 
'"[s]eparate' was indeed the rule, but 'equal' was never enforced, nor was it a reality." Schmidt et 
al., supra n. 27, at 154; see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 326-27 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, 
JJ., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (describing separate but equal as "a status always 
separate but seldom equal"). Thus, in Mississippi, as late as 1950, black schools received $32.55 in 
educational funding per pupil, compared to $122.95 per pupil for white schools. See Hilary Herbold, 
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As in the Civil Rights Cases thirteen years before, 130 once again, 
only one justice, John Marshall Harlan, dissented from the ruling of the 
Court. 131 As in the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan believed the 
discrimination involved in Plessy violated both the Thirteenth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. 132 He contended that the 
Louisiana law prescribing separate coaches for blacks and whites was 
designed to exclude blacks from coaches assigned to white persons; 133 
therefore, he said, it "interferes with the personal freedom of citizens."134 
In language that still resonates today, he wrote, the eye of the law and 
Constitution recognizes no caste. 135 To the contrary, "[o]ur Constitution 
is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens."136 He darkly predicted that the Court had rendered a decision 
that would, in time, be as pernicious as Dred Scott, 137 and stated, 
significantly, that "[t]he thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations ... will 
not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done." 138 After 
observing that the decision would defeat "the beneficent purposes" 
Congress and the people had in mind in adopting the Civil War 
Amendments, 139 he advised that it served the collective interests of 
whites and blacks that "the common government of all shall not Bermit 
the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law." 40 He 
added, "What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly 
create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state 
enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored citizens 
are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public 
coaches occupied by white citizens?"141 It is hard, he said, to reconcile 
the portraiture of America as a land of freedom "with a state of the law 
which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a 
large class of our fellow-citizens." 142 Given the belief of Justice Harlan 
Never a Level Playing Field: Blach and the G.!. Bill, 1994-95 J. Blacks Higher Educ. I 06 (Winter 
1994-95). 
130. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
131. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553-64 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
132. /d.at554-55. 
133. !d. at 557. 
134. !d. 
135. !d. at 559. 
136. !d. 
137. !d. 
138. !d. at 562. 
139. !d. at 560. 
140. !d. 
141. !d. 
142. !d. at 562. 
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in the "beneficent purposes" of the Civil War Amendments and the 
significance of the remedies those amendments envisage for the sin of 
slavery and exclusion of blacks, it is ironic that anti-affirmative action 
forces today should use his color-blind language to support their 
opposition to these remedial measures. 
Less than twenty years after the Civil War, the white majority "was 
all too willing to forget about the Civil War Amendments and the civil 
rights legislation of the 1860s and 1870s."143 Judges "generally tend to 
avoid issuing decisions that they know will be noticeably at odds with 
public opinion;"144 in particular, the Supreme Court is ever apprehensive 
that it "may lose stature if it decides a case in a way that markedly 
diverges from public opinion."145 So, it is of little surprise that at the 
time it was decided, the Civil Rights Cases reflected white public 
opinion. 146 But none of this, including the regain of governmental power 
by many former pro-slavery secessionists in the Southern states, 147 
absolves the Court or minimizes the opprobriousness of this decision. 
Plessy provided "the judicial cornerstone" 148 of Jim Crow laws that 
prevailed all over the country, especially in the South. 149 These were 
segregation laws, similar to the future policy of apartheid or separateness 
in South Africa, that provided for separate facilities for blacks and 
whites. These laws encompassed schools, playgrounds, swimming pools, 
beaches, parks, hotels, hospitals, libraries, restaurants, cemeteries, water 
fountains, toilets, buses and street cars, interracial sex, marriage, and 
love, 150 and numerous other aspects of American life. They were strictly 
enforced by both legal and extra-legal means, 151 and maintained by 
143. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 153. 
144. !d. at 477. 
145. !d. 
146. See id. at 153. 
147. See id. at 153, 154. 
148. !d. at 155. 
149. "Jim Crow" was a derogatory term for a black person. 
150. See C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (2d rev. ed., Oxford U. Press 
1966). The "strange career of Jim Crow" that the Plessy decision legitimized, in some places 
bordered on the absurd. For example, Alabama prohibited blacks and whites from playing checkers 
together; in some states schoolchildren of different races could not use the same books; Louisiana 
established separate districts for black and white prostitutes; in Oklahoma, blacks and whites could 
not use the same public telephone; in North Carolina, young children could be arrested for interracial 
kissing; in Georgia and several other states, blacks were required to use separate polling places, 
separate courthouse doors, separate record rooms, separate record books, separate pens and ink, and 
separate color-coded tax receipts-white for white taxpayers and pink for black taxpayers. See 
Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 20 (citing Woodward, supra). 
151. Lynching, sometimes preceded by torture, and riots were extra-legal measures of choice 
in many Southern states. See Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 155. Newspapers covered stories of 
lynchings like sporting events are covered today, and the practice itself was so widespread that in 
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custom, depending upon the region of the country in question. Well into 
the first half of the twentieth century, "blacks were forced to receive food 
from the back of restaurants, drink from separate water fountains, and 
ride in the back of the bus," among numerous other degradations. 152 
More seriously, especially in the South, blacks faced the constant threat 
of death for perceived crimes like a black male looking a white woman 
in the eye (known as "familiarity"), failing to yield the right of way to a 
white yedestrian, or addressing a white person in an "impertinent" 
tone. 15 Avoiding the formal use of race, the South used manx other 
measures, including white primaries, 154 the grandfather clause, 55 poll 
taxes, 
156 
race riots designed to stamp out economic competition from 
blacks, and literacy tests, 157 to disenfranchise blacks and reinforce acts 
of separation. Thus, along with the Civil Rights Cases, Plessy "destroyed 
the movement toward complete equality" that the Reconstruction 
. d 158 maugurate . 
1881, the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama (Tuskegee University today) began issuing annual reports 
on the incidents of lynching. Not until 1952 did it report that there were no lynchings to document in 
a given year. See Barker et al., supra n. 13, at 17. By 1914, more than 1,100 African Americans were 
estimated to have been lynched, sometimes for crimes as minor as a black man looking a white 
woman in the eyes in "familiarity," or "insulting" a white person. Franklin & Moss, supra n. 79, at 
311-17. Although lynching was illegal in many states, Southern authorities rarely prosecuted these 
cases, and white juries would not convict. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 155. With about 200 
descendants of lynching victims and a ninety-one-year-old man believed to be the only living 
survivor of a lynching attempt listening from the visitors' gallery, the United States Senate, in June 
2005, apologized for its role in blocking anti-lynching legislation. See Jim Abrams, Senate 
Apologizes.fiw Lynching-Ban Delays, Associated Press (June 13, 2005). 
152. Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 41. 
153. See also Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 154. 
154. The Democratic Party used this device to keep black voters out of its primaries under the 
guise that political parties were private organizations. The Supreme Court upheld the white primary 
until 1944 when, in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944), it ruled that these primaries 
violated the Fifteenth Amendment. 
155. This clause restricted voting to those who could prove that their grandfathers had voted 
before 1867. But few black grandfathers voted before 1867. In fact, the Fifteenth Amendment 
extending the right to vote to black males was ratified only in 1870. So, this requirement effectively 
nullified the voting rights of blacks. 
156. Poll taxes require a voter-black or white-to pay a fee in order to vote. But fewer blacks 
than whites had jobs and could afford to pay such taxes; so, the requirement effectively chilled black 
voting. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, abolished these taxes as a precondition for 
voting. Also, in 1966, the Supreme Court declared poll taxes unconstitutional in all elections, Harpa 
v. Va. St. Bd. ofE/ections, 383 U.S. 663,666 (1966). 
157. These tests required potential voters to read, recite, or interpret complicated texts, such as 
a section of the state constitution, to the satisfaction of local registrars in order for them to vote. 
Many local registrars were never satisfied with the responses of African Americans and used those 
as excuses to prevent them from voting. 
!SR. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 402 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Had the 
Court been willing in 1896, in Plessy, to hold that equal protection forbids differences in treatment 
based on race," Justice Marshall recounted ruefully in Bakke, "we would not be faced with this 
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4. Progress Toward Equality: 159 "Separate Educational Facilities Are 
Inherently Unequal" 
A landmark decision that marks and colossally dominates this era is 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 160 Like the Civil Rights Cases 
more than seventy years earlier, Brown was a consolidated opinion, 
involving cases from the States of Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, 
and Virginia, "premised on different facts and different local conditions," 
yet tied together by a common legal question justifying their 
consolidation. 161 It was the last in a progression of cases that attacked 
separate but equal, 162 yet contrasted from those cases that limited 
themselves to proving that separate but equal was all separate but not 
equal, in that it signified a frontal attack or "re-examin[ation]" of the 
doctrine itself, as Chief Justice Warren said in his opinion for the 
Court.l63 
In Brown, the plaintiffs contended that segregated public schools are 
not equal and cannot be made equal; accordingly, they maintained, their 
constitutional rights to equal protection under the laws, had been 
violated. 164 The Supreme Court agreed, stating, 
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
"separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others 
dilemma in 1978." !d. at 401. Instead, for 60 years until Brown, the U.S. was a Nation where, by 
law, blacks were marked as inferior, while white persons received special treatment based on skin 
color. !d. at 400. This "legacy of unequal treatment," he said, is the reason we must now consider 
race "in making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige." 
!d. at 401. 
159. Characterization or designation of the current era as such is a figure of speech that should 
not be taken to mean that the African American's vacillating struggle for equality has finally been 
resolved in favor of equality. This is why this Article instructively speaks of a progress or movement 
toward equality, as opposed to equality standing by itself. An alternative way to look at things is to 
view each progress in the African American struggle for equality as a series of far-reaching 
"revolutions" that can also run their tide. In that case, the current phase starting with Brown, an event 
"far from complete," "inaugurate[ d) the progressive destruction of the racial caste system in the 
United States" as well as of black integration into the social, economic, and political fabric of 
American society. See Alfred H. Kelly, The School Desegregation Case, in Quarrels That Have 
Shaped the Constitution, supra n. 90, at 310. 
160. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
161. !d. at 486. The cases include Gebhart v. Belton, 344 U.S. 891 (1952) (Delaware), Briggs 
v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952) (South Carolina), and Davis v. County School of' Prince Edward 
County, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952). The Court extended its ruling in Brown to Bolling v. 
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), dealing with school desegregation in the District of Columbia. The 
case was decided under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
162. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 491-92 (identifying six Supreme Court cases, the results of the 
court's labor "for over half a century" with the separate but equal doctrine). 
I 63. See id. at 402. 
164. !d. at 488. 
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similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by 
reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the 6§ual 
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 
29 
In other words, segregating children in public schools solely based on 
their race, even if the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors m'bt 
be equal, deprive minority children of equal educational opportunities. 1 0 
The Court reached this verdict unanimously. 167 
The Court's holding was preceded by extensive insightful analysis 
on "public education in the light of its full development and its present 
place in American life throughout the Nation."168 The Court first 
assessed that "[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function 
of state and local governments," adding 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for 
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of 
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of 
our most basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of 
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, 
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be exRected to succeed in 
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. 69 
Given this importance, the Court said, "[s]uch an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be available to 
all on equal terms." 170 It briefly summarized its ruling in two cases 
involvinr, educational opportunities in professional and graduate 
schools, 1 adding, 
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and 
165. /d. at 495. 
166. !d. at 493. Like in Brown, the Court ruled in the companion case, involving the District of 
Columbia, that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper government 
objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes 
an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause." Bolling, 347 U.S. at 
500. 
167. As a law clerk for Robert Jackson, one of the justices who decided Brown, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist wrote a memorandum regarding the pending case, in which he argued in favor of 
maintaining separate but equal schools. Confronted with this infonnation during his Senate 
confirmation hearing, Rehnquist responded that these were not his views; rather, he said, he was 
following Jackson's instructions to prepare a memo arguing the segregationist position. See Hensley 
et al., supra n. 3, at 64. Jackson (1892-1954), a Democrat from New York and appointed by 
President Franklin Roosevelt, served on the Court from 1941 until his death in 1954. 
168. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93. 
169. /d. at 493 (ellipsis added). 
170. !d. 
171. See id. 
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high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of 
inferiority as to their status in the community that way affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 1 
The Court cited approvingly a finding in one Kansas case regarding 
the devastating psychological effect of segregation on black children 
from a court, which, despite the profundity of that finding, "nevertheless 
felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs." 173 
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater 
when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the 
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the [N]egro 
group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. 
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to 
[retard] the educational and mental development of Negro children and 
to deprive them of some of the f,enefits they would receive in a 
racial[ly] integrated school system. 1 4 
Following the main case, Chief Justice Warren issued a second 
Brown decision, 175 focusing on implementation, in which the Court 
ordered district courts to ensure that African American children are 
admitted to schools on a nondiscriminatory basis with "all deliberate 
speed." 176 They should consider devices in their desegregation orders 
that might include "the school transportation system, personnel, [and] 
revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to 
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis." 177 It took fifteen long years for the Court to finally 
178 demand that the states desegregate the schools at once. 
This circumspectness did not avert the fierce opposition from 
Southern states that Brown elicited. These states fought off desegregation 
and integration of African Americans into formerly segregated schools 
with all manners of tactics, which in states like Arkansas and Mississippi 
included violence. In order to quell the violence that attended the 
integration of Central High School in Little Rock in 1957, a reluctant 
President Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National Guard and 
172. !d. at 494. 
173. !d. 
174. /d. (quoting McLaurin. 347 U.S. 483 ( 1954)). 
175. Brown v. Bd. ofEd., 349 U.S. 294 ( 1955) (Brown![). 
176. !d. at 301. 
177. !d. at 300-0 I. 
178. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. o{Ed., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (I 969). 
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deployed the Army's lOlst Airborne Division. 179 Mississippi was the 
epicenter of the fireball of violence in opposition to integration. There, 
the attempt ofthe African American student, James Meredith, in 1962, to 
enroll at the University of Mississippi led to violent riots by whites that 
resulted in two deaths and 375 military and civilian injuries, many from 
gunfire. 180 Order was restored and the University of Mississippi in 
Oxford integrated after President John Kennedy sent in 30,000 federal 
combat troops, more force, reportedly, than the U.S. then had stationed in 
181 Korea. 
179. See Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 155. In 1958, the Little Rock School Board applied to 
the U.S. District Court for a twenty-two year postponement of its desegregation plan. It contended 
that intense public hostility that would attend desegregation would prevent them from adequately 
ensuring public safety or providing public education. In Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958), the 
Supreme Court rejected the claim, stating that the conditions the School Board depicts "are directly 
traceable to the actions of legislators and executive officials of the state of Arkansas, taken in their 
official capacities, which reflect their own determination to resist this Court's decision in the Brown 
case." !d. at 15. In other words, in rejecting the plaintiffs claim to suspend the Little Rock 
desegregation plan, the Court saw the violence and disruption surrounding the integration of Central 
High as a direct result of state action. 
180. See William Doyle, An American Insurrection: James Meredith and the Battle of Oxford, 
Mississippi, 1962 67-<i8, 280 (Anchor Books 2001). 
181. !d. at 278. Because desegregation took place conterminously with the civil rights 
movement, it is difficult to segregate acts of violence isolable to desegregation and those that 
attended the peaceful protests of the civil rights movement. Besides the killings of Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. and Malcolm X, these would include the unleashing of police dogs and deployment of 
electric cattle prods against unarmed protesters in spring of 1963 involving Police Commissioner 
Eugene "Bull" Connor in Birmingham, Alabama; the murder of four little black girls inside the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in, again, Birmingham, Alabama, on Sept. 15, 1963; and cold-
blooded killings in Southern states of Caucasians perceived as sympathizing or working with blacks. 
In Alabama, "[b]ombings of homes and churches of black leaders were so common that Birmingham 
[was] nicknamed 'Bombingham' [and] [t]he city's best black neighborhood was known as 
'Dynamite Hill."' David B. Oppenheimer, Martin's March, 80 ABA J. 54 (June 1994). 
As for those whites who died because they tried to help blacks, championship of black 
freedom or equality, going back into the past, has, unfortunately, been nothing short of hazardous for 
courageous whites who thrust that challenge on their shoulders. This was the fate of Senator Charles 
Sumner who served in the U.S. Senate from 1852 until his death in 1874. A most outspoken 
champion of black freedom, Sumner gave a speech in 1856, one year before the issuance of Dred 
Scott, in which he bitterly attacked two of his colleagues for their support of slavery. Two days later, 
one Preston Brooks, a Congressman, entered the Senate chamber and nearly beat Sumner to death on 
the ground that his remarks libeled the South. It took three years before Sumner recovered and 
returned to the Senate to, incredibly, resume his struggle for black freedom. With another 
Congressman, Thaddeus Stevens, Sumner led the fight in Congress for civil rights legislation and 
passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The two were also responsible for the idea of 
"forty acres and a mule," legislation designed to confiscate the slave-holders' plantations, divide 
them up, and give them to the slaves as compensation or reparation, and punish the slave-holders for 
treason. At the time of his death, Sumner was fighting for a civil rights bill that would have banned 
discrimination and segregation in the use of public accommodations. On his deathbed, surrounded 
by the African American leader, Frederick Douglass, and other African American leaders, Sumner's 
last words were reported to have been, "Take care of my civil rights bill~take care of it~you must 
do it." Douglass most appropriately praised Sumner "as the greatest friend the Negro people ever 
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Today, integration devices, such as busing, which in the past enjoyed 
some measure of support among Americans as legitimate remedial 
182 
measures, have been all but abandoned. The result has been a 
"resurgence of minority schools,"183 and a growing fear that racial 
separation has become inevitable and lega1. 184 More than fifty years after 
Brown, the dream of "a common, universal school ~stem for all 
Americans without regard to race" remains just a dream. 18 
Several "beachhead" cases leading up to the frontal attack on 
. . B . 1 d M. . l G . C d 186 segregatiOn m rown me u e zssoun ex re . ames v. ana a, 
Sweatt v. Painter, 187 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents. 188 First, 
in Gaines, the Supreme Court ruled that equal protection under the 
Constitution required Missouri to provide separate but equal legal 
education facilities for blacks. Lloyd Gaines was a black applicant who 
was refused admission to the University of Missouri Law School because 
of his race. Since Missouri could not provide separate but equal facilities 
for him, it had to admit him to the law schoo1. 189 The Court found 
untenable Missouri's defense that it would pay Gaines's tuition in an out-
of-state school, pending the establishment of a separate law school for 
blacks. 190 
Next, in Sweatt, the University of Texas Law School (UTLS) denied 
admission to Marion Sweatt, a black applicant, on the ground that blacks 
had separate and equal legal educational opportunities in a hastily-
had in public life." See Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 178 (drawing on Frederick Blue, Charles 
Sumner & the Conscience of the North (Harlan Davidson1994)). 
182. See e.g. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEd., 269 F.3d 305 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that race-based admission quotas could no longer be imposed constitutionally). 
183. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 157 (pointing out that "[t]oday, one out of every three 
African American and Hispanic students goes to a school with more than [ninety] percent minority 
enrollment. In the largest U.S. cities, fifteen out of sixteen African American and Hispanic students 
go to schools with almost no non-Hispanic whites"). 
184. See Georgia Persons, Is Racial Separation Inevitable and Legal?, 33 Society 19-24 
(Mar./ Apr. 1996). 
185. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 215. See also Gloria J. Browne-Marshall, Crumbs from the 
Table of Plenty: A Commentary on Brown and the Ongoing Struggle .fiJr Educational Equity in 
American School. Paper Commemorating the 50'h Anniversary ofBrown (Word for Word Publg. Co. 
2004) (giving an equally unoptimistic analysis of immense historical depth that assesses the race-
conscious gains of Cruller as "crumbs from a table of plenty"). q: Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 
157 (stating "[t]he goal of racially balanced schools envisioned in" Brown "is giving way to the goal 
of better education for children, even if that means educating them in schools in which students are 
of the same race or in which race is not considered"). 
186. 305 U.S. 337 (1938). 
187. 339 u.s. 629 (1950). 
188. 339 u.s. 637 (1950). 
189. Gaines, 305 U.S. at 352. 
190. !d. at 350. 
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constructed law school. 191 In a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice 
Vinson, 192 the Court found no "substantial equality in the educational 
opportunities" Texas offered to black law students, compared to the 
opportunities it provided to white law students and ruled that Sweatt be 
admitted into the UTLS. 193 Besides listing the many tangible and 
intangible features which importantly distinguish the UTLS from the 
Houston-based law school hastily set up for blacks, 194 the Court also 
stated that a law school "cannot be effective in isolation from the 
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts."195 It 
importantly observed that the newly established law school for blacks 
"excludes from its student body members of the racial groups which 
number [eighty-five] percent of the population of the State and include 
most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other officials with 
whom petitioner would inevitably be dealing when he becomes a 
member of the Texas Bar." 196 
In McLaurin, George W. McLaurin, a black student, was admitted to 
the University of Oklahoma Graduate School of Education197 but was 
required to sit in a roped-off section of the classroom away from white 
students and in a separate area of the library and cafeteria facilities. 198 
Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, found that the restrictions 
impaired the student's "ability to study, to engage in discussions and 
exchange views with other students and, in general to learn his 
profession." 199 These cases, along with Brown, formed part of a 
coordinated desegregation litigation plan of attack, by the NAACP Legal 
191. Texas state law reserved the University of Texas for white students. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. 
at 631 n. I. 
192. Frederick M. Vinson ( 1890-1953) was Chief Justice of the United States until his death in 
1953. 
193. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633. 
194. !d. ("In terms of number of faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, 
size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities," not to 
mention key intangible qualities for greatness in a law school, like "reputation of the faculty, 
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, 
traditions and prestige," the University of Texas Law School is superior.). !d. at 634. Ridiculing the 
claim of the Texas government that the fly-by-night law school established for blacks has anything 
resembling substantial equality with the UTLS, Chief Justice Vinson stated that "[i]t is difficult to 
believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools would consider the question 
close." !d. at 633-34. 
195. !d. at 634. 
196. !d. Sweatt withdrew from the law school in 1951 without graduating, after enduring a rash 
of cross-burnings, tire slashings, and racial slurs from UTLS students and faculty. See Hopwood v. 
Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555 (W.O. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
197. The University admitted McLaurin while his suit was still pending. 
198. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640. 
199. !d. at 641. 
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Defense Fund, against separate but equal, which began with showing that 
separate facilities for blacks provided by states were never equal with 
whites and ended in Brown with a frontal attack on the doctrine itself.200 
C. The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action from De Funis to the 
Michigan Cases with Special Reference to Public Education 
I. The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action Up to Bakke 
The first-ever affirmative action lawsuit to reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court was DeFunis v. Odegaard in 1974.201 The suit involved the 
University of Washington Law School. The law school had an 
affirmative action program that targeted and benefited minority 
applicants, including African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native 
Americans, and Filipinos. Marcos DeFunis Jr., a Caucasian male, was 
denied admission to the school and blamed his rejection on the 
affirmative action 8:rogram-something he alleged violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. 2 2 The law school defended the program by pointing 
out that factors other than grades and test scores were taken into 
consideration in its admissions decisions and that the use of race was 
compellingly necessary to expand opportunities for minorities to enter 
the legal profession, given their lack of access in the past.203 A state trial 
court ruled in favor of DeFunis and ordered his admission to the law 
school in 1971.204 The state supreme court reversed that ruling, and 
200. Two other cases identified as forerunners to Brown are Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590 
(Md. 1936), and Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 ( 1948). Of the two, only 
Sipuel is a Supreme Court decision, and a per curiam decision at that. In Pearson, the court ordered 
the admission of Pearson, a black, to the University of Maryland Law School. Given that "in 
Maryland now the equal treatment can be furnished only in the one existing law school," the court 
said, "the petitioner, in our opinion, must be admitted there." Pearson, 169 Md. at 594. In Sipuel, the 
Supreme Court ruled, per curiam, that the state of Oklahoma must provide legal education for the 
petitioner, Ada Louis Sipuel, a black woman, "in conformity with the Equal Protection Clause ... 
and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group." Sipuel, 332 U.S. at 632~33. 
Numerous studies chronicling the NAACP "fighting segregation through litigation" strategy include 
Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court. 1936~61 
(Oxford U. Press 1994); Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of 
Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution (Basic Books 1994); Mark Tushnet, The NAACP's 
Legal Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925~50 (U. of N.C. Press 1987); and Richard 
Kluger, Simple Justice: The History (Jj' Brown v. Board of Education (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1977). 
Attack on Jim Crow schools was only one of many fronts in the NAACP's campaign against 
segregation. Other fronts, also entailing litigation, include white primaries, restrictive covenants 
impeding black access to housing, and Jim Crow transportation. 
201. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
202. !d. at 314. 
203. Jd.at346-47 
204. 1d.at314~15. 
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DeFunis appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted review. 
DeFunis was allowed to remain in school, pending disposition of the 
appeal. By the time the Court considered the case in 197 4, he was in his 
final year of law school and expected to graduate. Therefore, the Court, 
in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, dismissed the suit on the grounds 
that the case had become moot. 205 
Four justices, Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White, dissented 
from the judgment. 206 They asserted that the Court should have given the 
case full consideration and warned that the controversy would inevitably 
wind its way back into the Court. 207 Of the dissenters, Justice Douglas 
wrote a separate opinion in which he reached the merits.Z08 The opinion 
contained strong language opposing the use of race in admissions 
decisions. Justice Douglas believed "[t]he Equal Protection Clause 
commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation."209 He 
contended that "[ t ]he purpose of the University of Washington cannot be 
to produce black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish 
lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good 
lawyers for Americans. . . . A segregated admissions process creates 
suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a segregated 
classroom .... "210 He supported consideration of applications in a 
racially neutral way, which he believed the Law School Admission Test 
(LSA T) works against, in that it is racially biased in favor of white law 
applicants.Z 11 He said abolition of the LSAT would be a ~ood "start" in 
the design of such a racially neutral admission regime.21 Law schools 
ought to find other ways to ensure diversity without the LSAT. 
The dissenters' prediction in DeFunis that the Court would 
inevitablj rule on affirmative action came true four years later in 
Bakke. 21 The decision is significant as the first Supreme Court decision 
to address the constitutionality of affirmative action. The case involved 
the University of California at Davis Medical School. Aiming to increase 
205. !d. at 319-20. 
206. !d. at 348-50 (Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, & White, JJ., dissenting). 
207. !d. 
208. See 416 U.S. at 321-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas, a Democrat from Connecticut 
appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933--45) and who sat on the Court for a record 
thirty-six years from 1939 to 1975, retired after this case and was replaced by Justice John Paul 
Stevens, who has been on the Court since 1975. 
209. !d. at 342. 
210. !d. at 342-43. 
211. !d. at 334 (stating that "minorities have cultural backgrounds that are vastly different from 
the dominant Caucasian" and that they "come from such disparate backgrounds that a test sensitively 
tuned for most applicants would be wide off the mark for many minorities."). 
212. !d. at 340. 
213. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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its minority enrollment, the medical school set up a special admissions 
program, which reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats in the entering 
class for minorities.214 The school identified various purposes the 
affirmative action program was designed to serve, including (i) reducing 
the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical 
schools and in the medical profession, (ii) countering the effects of 
societal discrimination, (iii) increasing the number of physicians who 
will practice in communities currently under-served, and (iv) obtaining 
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student 
body? 15 In the case, Allan Bakke, a Caucasian male, was denied 
admission twice to the medical school and subsequently challenged the 
affirmative action program on the grounds that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
C 1 ·~ . c . . 216 a 110m1a onstttutwn. 
The trial court agreed with Bakke and ruled that the special 
admissions program was a racial quota, insofar as minority applicants 
were rated only against each other and sixteen out of one hundred seats 
were reserved for them.217 The California Supreme Court affirmed. 
While it found the goal of integrating the medical profession a 
compelling state interest, the court found that the means chosen to attain 
that goal were not narrow]~ tailored218 and race may not be a factor in 
the admissions decision?' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
review the case. 
The Court issued a complex five-to-four decision, with Justice 
Powell's vote determining the outcome. Powell joined a plurality 
consisting of Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and 
Stewart (the Burger plurality) in holding the special admissions program 
was a quota and therefore invalid. However, Powell also agreed with the 
other plurality of Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and White (the 
Blackmun plurality) that race or ethnicity could be a leffitimate factor in 
admissions decisions. In other words, Justice Powell22 provided a fifth 
214. !d. at289. 
215. /d. at305-06. 
216. /d. at 277-78. For a newspaper story on plaintiff Allan Bakke, see Robert Lindsey, 
White/Caucasian-and Rejected, N.Y. Times Mag. 42-47 (Apr. 3, 1977). For case studies of the 
lawsuit that include oral presentation of counsels on both sides before the Supreme Court, see 
Hensley et al., supra n. 3, at 712-14; see also May It Please the Court (Peter Irons & Stephanie 
Guitton, eds., New Press 1993). 
217. !d. at278-79. 
218. !d. at 279-80. 
219. !d. 
220. Lewis F. Powell Jr. (1907-98), Democrat from Virginia, appointed by President Richard 
Nixon, served on the high court from 1972 until his retirement in 1987. As a justice on the Burger 
Court (1969-86 ), he was a moderate with conservative leanings and a swing voter who cast the 
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vote both for invalidating the University's special admissions program 
and for taking race into account in admissions decisions for purposes of 
diversity in a public university's student body. Justice Powell stated that 
"race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular 
applicant's file, yet this does not insulate the individual from comparison 
with all other candidates for the available seats."221 His main complaint 
with the Davis medical school program was that it "focused solely on 
ethnic diversity" and effectively indicated to non-minority applicants that 
"[n]o matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and 
extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to 
educational diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with 
applicants from the preferred groups for the [set-aside] special 
d 0 0 ,222 a missions seats. 
One unmistakable feature of Bakke was the lack of agreement among 
the justices as to an appropriate standard of review for affirmative action 
cases. Justice Powell and the Blackmun plurality both decided the case 
on equal protection grounds,223 while the Burger plurality, avoiding the 
equal protection question altogether, decided the case on statutory 
grounds, holding that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits racial 
discrimination in programs receiving federal financial assistance?24 
Additionally, Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny as the standard of 
review,225 while the Blackmun pluralit~ viewed intermediate scrutiny as 
the appropriate and applicable standard. 26 
Examining the various purposes the medical school listed for its 
affirmative action program and applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell 
identified diversity, or "obtaining the educational benefit that flow from 
decisive vote in a Court closely divided between liberals and conservatives. Hensley et al., supra n. 
3, at 66. Although Powell tended to favor conservative outcomes in most cases, he differed from 
conservative justices such as Rehnquist and Scalia in the sense that he "sought to balance carefully 
the competing interests in cases presented to the Court rather than to advance a particular ideology." 
!d. at 67. 
221. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. As Justice O'Connor clarifies for the record in Grutter a quarter 
century later, "The only holding for the Court in Bakke was that a State has a substantial interest that 
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive 
consideration of race and ethnic origin." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322-23 (internal quotes omitted). 
222. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315, 319. 
223. !d. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
224. !d. at 408 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Steward and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring 
in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
225. !d. at 299 (stating that when government decisions "touch upon an individual's race or 
ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on 
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest"). 
226. !d. (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
38 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2006 
an ethnically diverse student body," as the only purpose or interest, under 
the Constitution2 that in a proper case could justify a race-conscious preference plan. 27 He would also give deference to a university or 
professional school's judgment that diversity is crucial to its educational 
mission. "The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to 
education includes the selection of its student body."22 Justice Powell 
grounded his analysis in the academic freedom that "long has been 
viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."229 The "nation's 
future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to the ideas 
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."230 And 
a university seeks "to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in 
the fulfillment of its mission" when it seeks the "right to select those 
students who will contribute the most to the robust exchange of 
"d ,231 1 eas. 
2. The Supreme Court and Affirmative Action Since Bakke and Before 
the Michigan Cases 
The Court's decision in Bakke provided helpful insight into the 
validity of affirmative action, but did not resolve the controversy over 
affirmative action as doctrine and program.232 What is more, in Bakke's 
aftermath, the Supreme Court imposed severe limitations on affirmative 
action?33 Two cases which signified this trend-as well as the Court's 
hostility toward affirmative action-were City of Richmond v. J.A. 
234 - 235 Croson Co. and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. Croson marks 
227. See id. at 306--10. Justice Powell views the first purpose, relating to the reduction of the 
historic deficit of minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession, as an unlawful interest 
in racial balancing. !d. at 306--07. He considered the second purpose, related to countering the 
effects of societal discrimination, as also an unlawful interest because it could lead to measures that 
could place burdens on innocent third parties "who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the 
beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered." !d. at 310. He also 
found the third purpose, related to the increase of the number of physicians who will practice in 
under-served communities, unacceptable and rejected it, indicating that even if an interest based on 
that policy could be compelling in some circumstances, the program under review was not "geared 
to promote that goal." !d. at 306, 310. 
228. !d. at 312. 
229. !d. An important exception is that "constitutional limitations protecting individual rights 
may not be disregarded." !d. at 314. 
230. !d. at 313 (internal quotes omitted). 
231. !d. (internal quotes omitted). 
232. Hensley et al., supra n. 3, at 714. 
233. See Riccucci, supra n. I and corresponding text; see also Thomas Boston & Usha Nair-
Reichert, Affirmative Action: Perspectives Ji"om the United States, India, and Brazil, 27 W. J. Black 
Stud. 3 (2003). 
234. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
235. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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the first time that a majority of the Court subjected an affirmative action 
program to strict scrutiny, its highest standard of review for questions 
involving constitutional violations. Adarand is crucial because, here, the 
Court made the decision that it would henceforth apply strict scrutiny to 
every racial classification and affirmative action program, regardless of 
the intention underlying that classification, and regardless of what entity, 
federal, state or local, designed that program. 236 
In Croson, the Richmond City Council adopted an affirmative action 
program known as the Minority Business Utilization Plan in 1983, after 
studies indicated that, although the city's population was fifty percent 
African American, minority contractors received only .67 percent of the 
city's major contracts.237 The Plan required major contractors, who were 
awarded city contracts, to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar 
amount of the contract to minority business enterprises (MBEs), defined 
as businesses owned by African Americans, Hispanics, Asians, Native 
Americans, and Eskimos.Z38 It was patterned after the federal 
government program upheld by the Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick239 
and, like the program in Fullilove, a contractor could receive a waiver if 
no qualified MBEs could be found. 
In an opinion for the Court by Justice O'Connor, the plurality struck 
down the affirmative action plan as unconstitutional on the ground that it 
did not meet strict scrutiny-even though the Court said it had "no doubt 
that the sorry history of both private and public discrimination in this 
country has contributed to a lack of opportunities for black 
entrepreneurs." 240 It said that, unlike Congress, which "has a specific 
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,"241 a state or local government seeking to implement a 
remedial action to address discrimination "must identify that 
discrimination, public or private, with some specificity before they may 
use race[-]conscious relief."242 Richmond's evidence lacks specificity, it 
said; also, the program was so "gross[ly] overinclusive[ ]" it "strongly 
236. !d. at 227 (stating that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or 
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny"). 
237. 488 U.S. at 479 (plurality opinion). 
238. !d. at 477. 
239. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (overruled in part, Assoc. Builders &Contractors v. Sewerage & 
Water Bd., 996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3978 (E.D. La. Mar. 15, 1996)) (upholding the constitutionality, 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, of a federal government's ten percent set-aside 
program established in 1977). 
240. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion). 
241. /d. at 490. 
242. /d. at 504. 
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impugn[ed] the city's claim of remedial motivation."243 Finally, the 
city's thirty percent goal was a quota of the type outlawed in Bakke; but, 
the majority made it clear that what it did was kill the affirmative action 
program in question, not the principle of affirmative action. 244 
Three Justices-Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall-dissented from 
the judgment of the Court in a strongly reasoned opinion by Justice 
Marshall. 245 Marshall accused the majority of "constitutionalizing its 
wishful thinking,"246 and he called their vision of equal protection 
"cramped."247 He found the evidence Richmond provided adequate. 
Besides statistics showing that minority-owned businesses have received 
virtually no city contracting dollars and testimony that discrimination has 
been widespread in the local construction industry, Marshall said that the 
Richmond City Council also provided "the same . . . federal studies 
relied on in Fullilove. "248 Yet still, he pointed out, the affirmative action 
program the Court struck down "is indistinguishable in all meaningful 
respects from-and in fact was patterned upon-the federal set-aside 
plan which the Court upheld in Fullilove."249 
Marshall could not comprehend why the Court should apply strict 
scrutiny to race-conscious programs, like Richmond's, designed to 
eliminate past discrimination, as distinguished from classifications that 
discriminate against minorities. He contended, "A profound difference 
separates governmental actions that themselves are racist, and 
governmental actions that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism or to 
prevent neutral government activity from perpetuating the effects of such 
racism."250 He added, 
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different 
standard of review under the Constitution than the most brute and 
243. /d. at 506. 
244. /d. at 509 ("Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to 
rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its jurisdiction."). 
245. /d. at 528-{) I (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
246. /d. at 552. 
247. !d. at561. 
248. /d. at 529. 
249. !d. at 528. Reinforcing Justice Marshall's argument regarding the adequacy of evidence is 
that the affirmative action program upheld in Metro Broadcasting embodied a definition of minority 
similar to the one the Court considered grossly overinclusive in Croson. See Metro Broadcasting v. 
Fed. Commun. Commn., 497 U.S. 547, 565-66 (1997) (upholding the constitutionality, under the 
Fifth Amendment, of the F.C.C.'s set-aside policy with a history of long-standing support from 
Congress). The F.C.C. defined "minority" to include "those of Black, Hispanic Surnamed, American 
Eskimo, Aleut, American Indian and Asiatic American extraction." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 
554 n. I. 
250. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551-52 (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan & 
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
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repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this Court 
signals that it regards racial discrimination largely as a phenomenon of 
the past, and that government bodies ~led no longer preoccupy 
themselves with rectifying racial injustice? 
41 
Conversely, Justice O'Connor, in her opinion for the Court, asserted that 
even if the Court did not believe generally in strict scrutiny of race-based 
remedial measures, "'the circumstances of this case' require the Court to 
look upon the Richmond City Council's measure with the strictest 
scrutiny."252 Justice Marshall considered the assertion racist,253 and 
contended that "such insulting judgments have no place in constitutional 
jurisprudence."254 He said the sole such circumstance the majority 
pointed to was the fact that blacks in Richmond form a "dominant racial 
group" in the city. He said he agrees that the numerical and political 
supremacy of a given racial group is a factor bearing upon the level of 
scrutiny to be applied, but that the Court has never held that numerical 
inferiority, standing alone, makes a racial group "suspect" and thus 
entitled to strict scrutiny review. Rather, the Court has identified other 
"traditional indicia of suspectness" such as whether a group has been 
"saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process."255 
Marshall believed whites (or non-minorities) in Richmond had no 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment."256 Additionally, they did not 
have "any of the disabilities that have characteristically afflicted the 
groups the Court had deemed suspect."257 Indeed, he said, the numerical 
and political dominance of non-minorities in Virginia and the Nation as a 
251. !d. at 552. 
252. !d. at 495. 
253. /d. at 554 ("The majority's view that remedial measures undertaken by municipalities 
with black leadership must face a stiffer test of equal protection scrutiny than remedial measures 
undertaken by municipalities with white leadership implies a lack of political maturity on the part of 
this Nation's elected minority officials that is totally unwarranted."). While Justice Marshall did not 
use the term racism, the word describes what he meant here. Racism is "the predication of decisions 
and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and 
· t · · g control over it." See e.g. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 6 (citalion omitted). The set of 
mam amm . f h. m cy or black 
ideas used in the U.S. to justify and maintain racism is the Jdeology o w Jte supre a . 
inferiority. !d. For an exhaustive analysis on the nature of racism and wh1te supremacy m Amenca, 
consult Hacker, supra n. 42. 
254. Croson, 488 u.s. at 555 (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J.,joined by Blackmun & Brennan, 
JJ ., dissenting). 
255. Jd. at 553 (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973)). 
256. !d. at 553. 
257. !d. 
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whole provides an enormous political check against the "simple racial 
politics" at the municipal level which the majority fears. 258 "If 
anything," he said, "the 'circumstances of this case' [the majority refers 
to] underscore the importance of not subjecting to a strict scrutiny 
straitjacket the increasing number of cities which have recently come 
under minority leadership and are eager to rectify, or at least prevent the 
perpetuation of, past racial discrimination."259 
Following Croson, Adarand further exemplified the Court's hostility 
toward affirmative action. Adarand involved a federal affirmative action 
program in federal contracts for highway construction. The program 
provided monetary bonuses to prime contractors who subcontracted at 
least ten percent of the overall amount to "disadvantaged business 
enterprises" (DBE)?60 These DBEs were defined to include small 
businesses owned and operated by minority groups, such as African 
Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans. Like in Croson, 
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court. Also like in Croson, 
the Court acknowledged, "the unhappy persistence of both the practice 
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups 
in this country is an unfortunate reality."261 Still, again like in Croson, it 
applied strict scrutiny, but here the case was decided under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, since a federal program was 
involved. The Court overruled its previous decision in Metro 
Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission;262 not only 
would all race-conscious preferential programs, regardless of which level 
of government that designed them, now be subject to strict scrutiny, 
Justice O'Connor said, "the standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or 
benefited by a particular classification."263 The Court remanded the case 
to the lower court for reexamination consistent with that review standard. 
Besides joining the judgment of the Court, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas authored separate concurrences in which the~ contended that 
affirmative action programs are never permissible.2 4 Justice Scalia 
stated that "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial 
258. !d. at 554. 
259. !d. 
260. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200,208. 
261. !d. at 237. 
262. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). See infra n. 295 and accompanying text. 
263. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 222. 
264. See id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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discrimination in the opposite direction."265 He said that "under our 
Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor 
race."
266 He maintained that pursuit of "the concept of racial 
entitlement ... is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of 
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred."267 
He concluded
8 
"In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is 
American."26 Justice Thomas denounced race-conscious preference 
programs as a "racial paternalism."269 He said preferences designed to 
help people are as noxious as preferences that oppress. 270 "In each 
instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple."271 Also, he said, 
affirmative action programs, such as the one here at issue, are "at war 
with the princ!Jile of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our 
Constitution,"2 and that they "undermine the moral basis of the equal 
protection principle."273 What is more, he said, this "government-
sponsored racial discrimination" suggests minorities cannot compete 
. 274 275 Without help, provokes resentment from people not favored, stamps 
"a badge of inferiority" among beneficiaries,276 and engenders 
dependency on government assistance, 277 among other ills. In a 
statement meant specifically to counteract language in Justice Stevens's 
dissent, he wrote 
I believe that there is a "moral [and] constitutional equivalence" 
between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute 
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of 
equality. Government cannot make us equal:2
7
kt can only recognize, 
respect, and protect us as equal before the law. 
Four Justices, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, rejected the 
application of strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action pro~ams. 
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, each authored a separate dissent. 79 In 
265. !d. at 239 (Scalia, J ., concurring). 
266. !d. 
267. !d. 
268. !d. 
269. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
270. !d. at 241. 
271. !d. 
272. !d. at 240. 
273. /d. 
274. /d. at 241. 
275. !d. 
276. !d. 
277. !d. 
278. !d. at 240. 
279. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 270---76 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 
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her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court itself acknowledged 
the unfortunate reality embodied in the unhappy persistence of both the 
practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against 
minority groups in this country?80 "Those effects, reflective of a system 
of racial caste only recently ended, are still evident in our workplaces, 
markets, and neighborhoods."281 Remedial programs like the affirmative 
action programs at issue, which the Court disapproved of, were adopted 
282 by Congress to respond to these unhappy effects and to help finally 
realize the equal protection of the law that the Fourteenth Amendment 
had promised since 1868.283 The effects remain because, for most of its 
history, the U.S. did not embrace the idea that "we are just one race."284 
Instead, "[f]or generations, our lawmakers and judges were unprepared 
to say that there is in this land no superior race, no race inferior to any 
other."285 She said barriers still exist, products of "traditional and 
unexamined habits of thoughts," needing to be eradicated in order for 
"equal op~ortunity and nondiscrimination" to genuinely take root in this 
country. She pled that the divisions in this case would "not obscure 
the Court's recognition of the persistence of racial inequality" and the 
Court's very own acknowledgment of Congress's authority to act 
affirmatively to end racial discrimination and counteract its lingering 
effects?87 
In his dissent, Justice Souter indicated that an affirmative action plan 
may still be constitutionally permissible, though it may have a negative 
effect on innocent parties who bear no :flersonal responsibility for the 
discriminatory conduct, if it is temporary. 88 "[I]f the justification for the 
preference is eliminating the effects of a past practice, the assumption is 
that the effects will themselves recede into the past, becoming attenuated 
and finally disappearing. "289 
Finally, Justice Stevens, in his own dissent, complained that the 
Court "ignore[ d] a difference, fundamental to our constitutional system, 
between the Federal Government and the States."290 And it also 
264-70 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 242-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
280. !d. at 273 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting). 
281. !d. 
282. /d. 
283. /d. at 274. 
284. !d. at 275. 
285. !d. at 272. 
286. !d. at 274. 
287. /d. 
288. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 270 (Souter, J.,joined by Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ, dissenting). 
289. /d. 
290. !d. at 264 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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"ignore[ d] a difference, fundamental to the idea of equal protection, 
between oppression and assistance."291 He stated: 
There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is 
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate 
racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of 
oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the 
power of the majority. Remedial race-based prefer~~~es reflect the 
opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society. 
Before Croson and Adarand, the Supreme Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny in evaluating challenges to affirmative action 
programs designed by Congress. Under this review standard, race-
conscious measures, designed to remedy past discrimination, were 
considered constitutional if they "serve[ d] important governmental 
interest and [were] substantially related to the achievement of those 
purposes."293 Unlike strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny does not 
require the entity setting up an affirmative action program to establish 
specific findings of discrimination. Such intermediate review was 
applied in Metro Broadcasting. 294 There, speaking for the Court, Justice 
Brennan ruled that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by 
Congress ... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve 
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."295 Intermediate 
review was also the standard applied in Fullilove, where the Court ruled 
that Congress need not establish specific findings of discrimination 
because it has broad authority and an affirmative du~ to react to and 
address discrimination as a matter of national concern. 6 There, too, the 
Court acknowledged that "Congress, not the courts, has the heavy burden 
of dealing with a host of intractable economic and social problems,"297 
and that no organ of government, whether state or federal, possesses a 
more comprehensive constitutional power9 "competence and authority to 
enforce the equal protection guarantees."2 8 
Perceptive legal scholars, such as Professor Wu and Professor Pillai, 
view Adarand negatively. Wu assessed that Adarand "render[ed] 
291. !d. at 264. 
292. !d. at 243. 
293. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 519. 
294. 497 U.S. 547. 
295. !d. at 564-65. 
296. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-23 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment). 
297. !d. at 486. 
298. !d. at 483. 
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affirmative action the constitutional equivalent of invidious racial 
discrimination."299 Pillai argues that by its "shifting and unprincipled" 
interpretation in Adarand and other cases, the Supreme Court deprives 
Congress of its "significant remedial and enforcement power" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.300 He warns that this "indiscriminate and 
unprincipled restructuring of the Fourteenth Amendment" risks 
"undermining the integrity of the constitutional process of 
adjudication."301 Soon after Croson, a debate ensued over whether the 
ruling created insuperable obstacles to creation of affirmative action 
programs by state and local governments. It took reassurance embodied 
in a statement released by a group of leading constitutional scholars 
before state and local governments became encouraged to resume their 
ffi . . 302 a 1rmat1ve actwn programs. 
3. The Michigan Cases 
Grutter and Gratz involved challenges to the affirmative action 
programs of the University of Michigan, a public educational institution 
owned and funded by the State of Michigan. The challenges came from 
both disgruntled Caucasian men and women, a departure from earlier 
challenges undertaken only by white males. The cases were sponsored by 
the Center for Individual Rights (CIR), a Washington D.C. public policy 
law firm and an organization that, before now, scouted for and sponsored 
plaintiffs in cases challenging affirmative action in Texas and 
Washington?03 Grutter involved the University of Michigan's Law 
299. Frank H. Wu, The Pragmatism of Bakke, 64 Black Issues in Higher Educ. (back cover), 
(June 25, 1998). 
300. K. G. Jan Pillai, In Defense of Congressional Power and Minority Rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 68 Miss. L.J. 431, 519 (1998). The other ruling Professor Pillai refers to is 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), where the Supreme Court invalidated the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994) enacted by Congress, 
pursuant to its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
30 I. /d. at 519 n. 430. Pillai recalled the wisdom of the legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin who 
advised the Court not "to nourish the cynical views ... that constitutional law is only a matter of 
which President appointed the last few justices." /d. (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The 
Moral Reading of the American Constitution 57 (Harv. U. Press 1996)). 
302. See Tribe et al., Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After Croson, 98 
Yale L.J. 1711 ( 1989). 
303. See June Kronholz, Does A White Mom Add Diversity?, Wall St. J. 83 (June 25, 2003). 
Although it bears a deceptively liberal-sounding name, the CIR is a conservative advocacy 
organization which, along with other groups, had been conducting a nationwide campaign of 
lawsuits to dismantle race-conscious preferences. See Vernon Jarrett, Beware! Old Race War Still 
On'. Chi. Defender (May 10, 2003). The tactics, of these conservative advocacy groups, of using the 
courts reminds one of the NAACP's own "fighting segregation through litigation" strategy, see 
supra n. 200. The main difference, however, is that the NAACP turned to the courts because its 
leaders felt relatively powerless in the ordinary politics of lobbying Congress and the President. 
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School affirmative action program. Gratz concerned the University's 
undergraduate affirmative action plan, specifically that of the College of 
Liter~ture, Science, and the Arts. Although they may look different, 
standmg for two diametrically different outcomes, certain key factors 
link the cases. First, the Supreme Court "repudiated the argument in both 
cases that racial classifications are always odious" and "rejected the 
claim that race no longer matters. "304 Instead, in Grutter, as well as in 
Gratz, the high court gave its "imprimatur to holistic considerations of 
race" by universities for purposes of realizing the benefits of diversity. 305 
Second, the two decisions, between them, "reinforce the importance of 
employing flexible and individualized considerations of race in 
admissions."306 In both, as Professor Guinier points out, the Supreme 
Court drew a line between "considerations of race that are nuanced, on 
one hand, and 'mechanistic,' on the other. The former are permissible, 
307 the latter suspect." 
(i) Grutter v. Bollinger 
The University of Michigan Law School maintained an admissions 
policy that sought to achieve student body diversity based on Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke. 308 The policy emphasized applicants' 
academic ability and a flexible assessment of their talents, experiences, 
and potentials. It required admissions officials to evaluate each applicant 
based on all the information available in the file, including a personal 
statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing how the 
These right-wing groups, in contrast, are turning to the courts in their opposition to affirmative 
action, even though they have powerful friends in Congress and enjoy the advantage of being on the 
same emotional wavelength with the President. One scholar dubbed the tactics of these groups "legal 
guerilla warfare." Boston & Nair-Reichert, supra n. 233, at 4. However, except for the 
circumspectness in their names, there is little that is subterranean or non-regular about the tactics and 
operations of these groups. The activities of these conservative advocacy groups cannot but call to 
mind the method of operation of so-called Redeemers who, hiding under the cover of their equally 
innocent-sounding name, worked hard during the Reconstruction to undo black civil rights. See 
Gilliam, supra n. 80, at 35. 
304. Guinier, supra n. 9; see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the Court "acknowledges" that educational institutions "are not barred from 
any and all consideration ofrace when making admissions decisions"). 
305. Guinier, supra n. 9. 
306. See Kerstin Forsythe, Student Author, Racial Preference and Affirmative Action in Law 
School Admissions: Reactions from Minnesota Law School.~ and Ramifications for Higher Education 
in the Wake of'Grutter v. Bollinger, 25 J. Pub. L. & Policy 157, 158 n. 5 (Fall2003). 
307. Guinier, supra n. 9. As Professor Guinier elegantly puts it, "[a)s long as the decision 
maker is 'hand picking' rather than machine sorting, the decision maker is free to consider race as 
one of many factors in order to realize the benefits of diversity." !d. 
308. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 312-16, 318-20, for an encapsulation of the history and features 
of the policy in question. 
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applicant would contribute to law school life and diversity, and the 
applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and law school 
admission test score (LSA T). The policy also required officials to look 
beyond grades and scores to so-called "soft variables," such as 
recommenders' enthusiasm, quality of undergraduate institution(s) 
attended, the applicant's ess~, and the areas and difficulty of 
undergraduate course selection. 3 
The policy did not define diversity solely in terms of racial and 
ethnic status, and did not "restrict the types of diversity contributions 
eligible for substantial weight."310 However, it reaffirmed the law 
school's longstanding commitment to one particular type of diversity, 
namely, "racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the 
inclusion of students from groups which have been historically 
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native 
Americans, who, without this commitment, might not be represented" in 
the law school's student body in a critical mass or meaningful 
number. 311 In short, as part of its goal of "assembling a class that is both 
exceptionally academically qualified and broadly diverse," the law 
school seeks to enroll a "critical mass" of under-represented minority 
students who will contribute to the law school's character and to the legal 
fi . 312 pro esswn. 
In Grutter, the law school denied admission to Barbara Grutter, a 
white Michigan resident with a GPA of 3.8 and an LSAT score of 
161.313 Ms. Grutter challenged the admissions policy, alleging that the 
law school discriminated against her based on her race, contrary to the 
U.S. Constitution and applicable federallaws. 314 She contended that the 
law school's use of race as a predominant factor gave minority applicants 
a significantly greater chance of admission than students with similar 
credentials from disfavored racial groups, and that the law school had no 
compelling interest to justify its use of race in making admissions 
d . . 3"'15 eClSlOnS. 
309. !d. at 336--39. 
310. Jd. at 316. 
311. ld. at 313-16. 
312. !d. at 316. "Critical mass" means that under-represented groups are enrolled at a variable 
or unspecified, meaningful number that promotes participation in the classroom by members of these 
groups without making them feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race. /d. at 318-19. 
313. 539 U.S. at 316-17. For more information on this applicant, by the admissions officer of 
the law school at the time Ms. Grutter applied for admission and who reviewed her application, see 
Dennis J. Shields, A View from the Files: Law School Admissions and Affirmative Action, 51 Drake 
L. Rev. 731-52 (2003). 
314. See supra n. 20 for a highlight of the constitutional and statutory provisions involved in 
this and other affirmative action challenges. 
315. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317,329. 
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
found the law school's use of race as a factor in decision-making relating 
316 h · h c· · c fA 1 · · to admissions unlawful. T e Stxt trcmt ourt o ppea s, stttmg en 
bane, reversed, holding that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was 
binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling state interest. It 
also ruled that the use of race by the law school was narrowly tailored, 
given that race was merely a "potential 'plus' factor" in admissions 
decision, and the affirmative action program under challenge was 
"virtually identical" to the Harvard admissions program that Justice 
Powell endorsed and appended to his opinion in Bakke? 17 The 
petitioners requested Supreme Court review and the Court granted 
. . 318 
cert10ran. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals; 
Justice O'Connor authored the judgment of the Court? 19 Two questions 
were presented before the Court. The first was whether diversity of a 
school's student body was a compelling governmental interest that 
justified the use of race in admissions decisions. The second was whether 
the use of race was narrowly tailored to further the interest in diversity 
the law school sought to achieve. The Court answered these two 
questions in the affirmative, 320 anchoring its holdings on Justice 
316. !d. at 321. The district court did not consider the law school's asserted interest in a diverse 
student body compelling because "the attainment of a racially diverse class ... was not recognized 
as such by Bakke and it is not a remedy for past discrimination." !d. at 321 (quoting the District 
Court). The court said, assuming diversity was a compelling use ofrace, it was not narrowly tailored 
to further that interest. For example, it took the law school to task for failing to consider race-neutral 
alternatives, such as "using a lottery system" or "decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on 
undergraduate GPA and LSAT scores." !d. at 340. 
317. !d. at 321. 
318. Grutterv. Bollinger, 537 U.S. 1043 (2002). 
319. Sandra Day O'Connor ( 1930--2006), the first woman to serve on the Supreme Court, is a 
Republican from Arizona appointed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Her appointment ended 
191 years of male exclusivity on the high court. She replaced another Republican, Justice Potter 
Steward, appointed by President Dwight Eisenhower. Steward served on the Court from 1958 to 
1981. True to the expectations of the Reagan administration, which appointed her, Justice O'Connor 
has maintained a generally conservative voting record on issues relating to civil rights and liberties. 
For one account on Justice O'Connor's background, voting record before this case, and judicial 
philosophy, see Hensley et a!., supra n. 3, at 69-71. After twenty-four years on the high court, 
Justice O'Connor retired on July I, 2005, pledging in a letter to President George W. Bush 
announcing her decision, "I will leave (the court] with enormous respect for" its integrity "and its 
role under our constitutional structure." Supreme Court Justice 0 'Connor Retiring, Associated Press 
(July I, 2005) (available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8430976/page/2/print/l/displaymode/1 098/) (accessed Oct. 7, 2005). 
320. To get to the substantive issues, Justice O'Connor disposed a number of underbrush 
matters. There was first the matter of whether the petitioner had standing to sue. Yes, she said, citing 
the Supreme Court's opinion in Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America 
v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). Jacksonville, discussed below, lowered the requirement for 
"injury in fact" in equal protection cases. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317. Next was whether Justice 
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Powell's opinion in Bakke.321 Like Justice Powell in Bakke, the Court 
gave deference to the law school's judgment that attainment of a diverse 
student body is at the heart of its educational mission. 322 The "important 
purpose of public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and 
thought associated with the university environment,"323 among other 
things, justified the deference. 
The Court insisted that the benefits of diversity are real and 
substantial, not theoretical, pointing to the plentiful amicus curiae briefs 
that the case garnered in support of the law school. 324 "[T]he diffusion of 
knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher 
education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or 
ethnicity."325 The Court referred back to its decision in Brown, in 1954, 
where it reco~nized that "education ... is the very foundation of good 
citizenship."3 5 Elite public educational institutions, like the University 
of Michigan, form "the training ground for a large number of our 
Nation's leaders."327 "Effective participation by members of all racial 
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream 
of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized."328 "[T]o cultivate a set of 
leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that 
the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified 
individuals of every race and ethnicity."329 With particular reference to 
Powell's diversity rationale was binding precedent under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 
(1977). Marks came up because of the fractured nature of the Court's decision in Bakke. As Justice 
O'Connor stated, "in the wake of [the] fractured decision ... [lower] courts have struggled to 
discern whether Justice Powell's diversity rationale, set forth in part of the opinion joined by no 
other justice, is nonetheless binding precedent under Marks." Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 325. Marks stands 
for the proposition that "[ w ]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining 
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Marks, 430 
U.S. at 193 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the test the Court set up in that case 
is more "easily stated than applied," O'Connor conveyed, and it was not necessary for the resolution 
of the present case to decide whether Powell's opinion was binding precedent under Mark~. Gruffer, 
539 U.S. at 325. 
321. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 322-27,334-44. 
322. Jd. at 328-29. 
323. !d. at 329. 
324. /d. at 330-31. 
325. /d. at 331. Amazingly, given its opposition to race-conscious programs, the United States 
agreed with this position. Its brief, quoted by the Court, stated that "ensuring that public; institutions 
are open and available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and 
ethnicities, represents a paramount government objective." !d. at 331-32. Citing this statement, 
Justice O'Connor pulled through a clever masterstroke that reinforces her point. 
326. /d. at 331 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493). 
327. /d. at 332 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634 ). 
328. !d. 
329. !d. 
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law schools, access to legal education and the legal profession "must be 
inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of every race and 
ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society may 
participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and 
d . d . A . ,330 e ucatwn necessary to succee m menca. 
The Court ruled that the law school did not give too much weight to 
or make race too decisive in decision-making relating to student 
admissions. Instead, the Court held that the admissions program 
"adequately ensures that all factors that may contribute to student body 
diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions 
decisions."331 Put differently, the law school "seriously weighs many 
other diversity factors besides race that can make a real and dispositive 
difference for non-minority applicants as well."332 The Court also said 
the law school's goal of enrolling a critical mass of under-represented 
minority is a concept "defined by reference to the educational benefits 
that diversity is designed to produce"333 that does not, therefore, rise to 
. . 1 . 1 b 1 . 334 335 Th . b unconstJtuttona rac1a a ancmg or quota. e connectiOn etween 
critical mass and educational benefits of diversity is borne out by the fact 
that when a critical mass of under-represented minority students is 
present, racial stereotypes lose their force because non-minority students 
learn there is no "minorit~ viewpoint" but rather a variety of viewpoints 
among minority students. 36 Finally, the race-conscious program under 
challenge was a "highly individualized, holistic review of each 
applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the wa;s an applicant 
might contribute to a diverse educational environment."33 
In Bakke, Justice Powell said race could constitutionally be used to 
form a plus factor to promote diversity in a public university's student 
body, given a proper case. ln Grutter, the Court found that proper case-
an affirmative action plan narrowly tailored, without quotas, that used 
race as a plus factor in the context of individualized consideration,338 
possessed "a logical end point,"339 was attentive to race-neutral 
330. !d. at 332-33. 
331. !d. at 337. 
332. !d. at 338. 
333. !d. at 330. 
334. !d. at 329-30; see also id. at 336 (rebutting Chief Justice Rehnquist's contention). 
335. !d. at 335-36. 
336. See id. at 319-20. 
337. !d. at 337. 
338. !d. at 341-42; see also id. at 337 (stating that the law school program is a "highly 
individualized, holistic review of each applicant's file, giving serious consideration to all the ways 
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment."). 
339. !d. at 342-43. 
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alternatives (which is not to suggest that every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative be exhausted),340 and was not unduly harmful to innocent 
. 341 parties. 
In addition to joininf the majority opinion, Justices Ginsburg wrote a 
separate concurrence. 34 She agreed with the Court that there must be a 
logical endpoint to preferential programs, something she said "accords 
with the international understanding of the office of affirmative 
action."343 However, Justice Ginsburg did not agree with the application 
of strict scrutiny to inclusive affirmative action programs such as the one 
here at issue, but saw no basis for objection, given that the admissions 
policy under challenge withstood strict scrutiny.344 She also had a 
problem with the Court's idea of a phase-out date for affirmative action. 
Regarding the Court's observation that "[i]t has been twenty-five years 
since Justice Powell first approved the use of race to further an interest" 
in diversity in public higher education, she pointed out that the law was 
not settled during much of the period. As for the next twenty-five years, 
within which the Court speculated that affirmative action would not be 
necessary to further an interest in diversity, she said "well documented" 
evidence exists of discrimination and biases in many areas, including 
access to public education, that "imped[ e] realization of our highest 
values and ideals."345 Accordingly, "[t]rom today's vantage point, one 
may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, 
progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will 
make it safe to sunset affirmative action."346 
Four justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas, each separately dissented from the judgment of the 
340. /d. at 339. 
341. !d. at 341. 
342. !d. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring). 
343. The two global human rights treaties that Justice Ginsburg cited, id. at 344, are the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forrns of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forrns of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W). The 
ICERD stipulates that preferential measures "shall in no case entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which 
they were taken have been achieved." The CEDA W stipulates that "temporary special measures 
aimed at accelerating de facto equality ... shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of 
opportunity and treatment have been achieved." The ICERD was ratified by the U.S. in 1994; the 
CEDAW in 1980. For texts of these documents, see 25+ Human Rights Documents (2001) at 37-44 
(the ICERD) and 45-53 (the CEDA W). Following this concurrence and her dissent in Gratz, Justice 
Ginsburg wrote a piece published in a law review amplifying the value of a comparative perspective. 
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective, 
22 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 329 (2004). 
344. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (unnumbered footnote preceded only by asterisk). 
345. !d. at 345-46. 
346. /d. at 346. 
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Court?47 In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that the 
Court's strict scrutiny was not strict enough. Not only did the Court give 
"unprecedented" deference to the law school's educational judgment as 
to the educational benefit of a diverse student body,
348 
it also "casually 
subverted" the duration of relief, an important component of strict 
scrutiny, by accepting the law school's "vaguest of assurances" that its 
affirmative action program would not be permanent.
349 
The Chief Justice 
also opined that the law school discriminated against minorities (in favor 
1. d h . k f . . 1 
350 
of black app 1cants) un er t e gmse or smo escreen o cntlca mass. 
Justice Kennedy, in his own dissent, echoed the views of the Chief 
Justice, maintaining that the Court's deference to the law school's 
educational judgment is of a magnitude so inconsistent with strict 
scrutin/51 that it works an "abandonment" of the review standard.
352 
Justice Scalia mockingly questioned the educational benefit 
embedded in diversity-which he says "is a lesson of life rather than 
law" taught to children, such as Boy Scouts and kindergartners, as 
353 
opposed to full-grown adults at law schools. He also poured scorn on 
concepts like critical mass which throughout his dissent he enclosed in 
quotes and alternately referred to as "mystical, "354 "fabled" (citing 
Justice Thomas approvingly),355 and "a sham to cover a scheme of 
racially proportionate admissions. "356 He believed the case raised 
347. ld. at 378-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); id. 
at 387-95 (Kennedy, J . .' dissentmg); id. at 346-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., 
concurrmg m part and dissentmg m part); id. at 349-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., 
concurnng In part and dissenting in part). 
" 348. See id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) 
( Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of that 
review is unprecedented in its deference."). 
349. !d. at 386-87. 
350. !d. at 379-86, including id. at 379, where the Chief Justice wrote, "stripped of its 'critical 
mass' veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing." 
35 I. !d. at 394 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) ("Deference is antithetical to strict scrutiny, not 
consistent with it."). 
352. !d. Justice Kennedy does not think anything, including the Court stipulation of a possible 
phase-out date for race-conscious programs affirmative, mitigates any imaginary damage done to 
strict scrutiny. /d. ("[N)either petitioner nor other rejected law school applicants will find solace in 
knowing the basic protection put in place by Justice Powell will be suspended for a full quarter of a 
century."). 
353. !d. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
354. /d. at 346. 
355. /d. at 347. 
356. ld. During oral arguments in the case, Scalia characterized critical mass as a euphemism 
for quota. As he reportedly put it, "once you use the terms 'critical mass,' you're in Quota Land." 
(cited In Charles Lane, O'Co~nor Questions Foes ofU-Michigan Policy, Wash. Post AOI (Apr. 2, 
2003)). Scaha beheved Michigan brought the problem upon itself by creating an elite law school. 
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numerous questions, relating to issues like critical mass and 
individualized consideration, among others, that would form the basis for 
future litigation.357 He concluded, "[t]he Constitution proscribes 
government discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided 
d . . . ,358 e ucatwn 1s no exceptwn. 
Justice Thomas's dissent was by far the most wordy of all the 
dissents, matching the judgment of the Court in length. 359 Thomas began 
with a quote attributed to the black abolitionist, Frederick Douglass 
(1817-95), delivered in Boston in 1865, regarding "What the Black Man 
Wants." Douglass urged white people to "Do nothing" with blacks 
because their interference was doing blacks positive injury. Thomas said, 
"Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of 
American life without the meddling of university administrators."360 He 
said Douglass's message was "lost on today's majority,"361 whom he 
accused of "uphold[ing] the Law School's racial discrimination, not by 
interpreting the people's Constitution, but by responding to a faddish 
slogan of the cognoscenti."362 Thomas had a problem not just with the 
majority but also with the Powell opinion in Bakke, upon which the 
majority based its judgment. "Both," he said, "rest on the fundamentally 
flawed proposition that racial discrimination can be contextualized so 
that a goal ... can be compelling in one context but not in another. This 
'we know it when we see it' approach to evaluating state interests is not 
capable of judicial application."363 Thomas said there was no 
Why not achieve diversity, he quizzed, by making the state school less "exclusive," rather than 
"hav[ing] a super-duper law school?" See Gary Wasserman, Politics in Action: Cases in Modern 
American Government 33 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2006) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Justices Look for 
Nuance in Race-Preference Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 2003). The university's counsel replied, "I 
don't think there's anything in this [C]ourt's cases that suggests that the law school has to make an 
election between academic excellence and racial diversity." /d. at 33-34. 
357. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348--49 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
358. /d. at 349. 
359. His opinion was twenty-nine pages long, compared to the Court's little more than thirty-
two-page opinion. /d. 
360. /d. at 350 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Some analysts have criticized Thomas for his reference to Douglass. Douglass, who worked 
for black equality, wanted whites to do nothing to keep blacks in bondage and would not mind 
preferential programs designed to achieve that purpose. In contrast, Thomas is no abolitionist in any 
sense and categorically opposes all kinds of preferential programs for blacks. See e.g. Jarrett, supra 
n. 39, who accused Thomas of "stab[bing] Douglass in [the] grave" by comparing himself to 
Douglass. See also Thomas Shows !lis True Colors on Affirmative Action Ruling, supra n. 39. 
361. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
362. /d. at 350. 
363. /d. at 357. 
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"articulated legal principle" to support the holding in Grutter, other than 
"the benighted notions that one can tell when racial discrimination 
benefits (rather than hurts) minority groups. . . and that racial 
discrimination is necessary to remedy general societal ills."364 He was 
disappointed that "the majority still cannot commit to the principle that 
racial classifications are per se harmful and that almost no amount of 
benefit in the eye ofthe beholder can justify such classifications."365 
Justice Thomas said the Constitution forbids racial classifications 
"not only because those classifications can harm favored races or are 
based on illegitimate motives, but also because every time the 
government places citizens on racial registers and makes race relevant to 
the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us al1."366 Thomas 
claimed darkly: "[c]ontained within today's majority opinion is the seed 
of a new constitutional justification for ... racial segregation."367 He 
said Michigan "tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a 
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers. 
These overmatched students take the bai~ only to find that they cannot 
succeed in the cauldron of competition." 68 He claims "the majority of 
blacks" admitted to the law school based on affirmative action "all are 
tarred as undeserving," adding: 
This problem of stigma does not depend on determinacy as to whether 
those stigmatized are actually the 'beneficiaries' of racial 
discrimination. When blacks take positions in the highest places of 
government, industry, or academic, it is an open que:rJ~on today 
whether their skin color played a part in their advancement. 
The only portion of the majority opinion Thomas partially agreed 
with was the part about affirmative action not being necessary in twenty-
five years. However, even here he could not completely agree with his 
colleagues: "I believe that the Law School's current use of race violates 
the Equal Protection Clause and that the Constitution means the same 
thing today as it will in 300 months."370 He accused the Court of 
granting the law school "a [twenty-five]-year license to violate the 
C . . ,371 onstitutwn. 
364. !d. at 3 71. 
365. !d. 
366. !d. at 353. 
367. !d. at 365-66. 
368. !d. at 372. 
369. /d. at 373. 
370. /d. at 351. See also id. at 375 ("While I agree that in (twenty-five] years the practices of 
the Law School will be illegal, they are, for the reasons I have given, illegal now."). 
371. !d. at 370. 
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Although his dissent tracks those of the other dissenters, he went far 
beyond them, and his criticism was more thorough and biting. Thomas 
believed the Court deferred too much to the law school's educational 
judgment.372 He believed not just that strict scrutiny was 
compromised, 373 but that the program under review could never 
withstand strict scrutiny since, according to him, the school's claimed 
compelling government interest was a "fabricated" one, designed to 
maintain its own elite image and status.374 He questioned the interest in 
diversity and critical mass. 375 He mocked diversity alternately as 
"aesthetic"376 and "trivial."377 Thomas called preferences not based on 
race, such as "legac( preferences elite schools extend to the children of 
alumni, "unseemly" 78 but said the Constitution does not forbid them. 379 
He claimed, however, that "[ w ]ere this court to have the courage to 
forbid the use of racial discrimination in admissions, legacy preferences 
(and similar practices) might quickly become less popular. ... "380 He 
opined that extension of special preferences for black students to law 
schools like Michigan gave them little incentive to prepare for and 
achieve high scores on the law school admissions test (LSA T). 381 In 
sum, in Grutter, Justice Thomas elaborated, in many words, the 
declamation embodied in his concurrence in Gratz that the Constitution 
"categorically" forbids racial preferences. 382 
(ii) Gratz v. Bollinger 
In Gratz, the Supreme Court invalidated the University of Michigan 
3 72. See id. at 350, 362-64. 
373. See id. at 351-54, 357-62. 
374. See id. at 357, 360--{)1. 
375. !d. at 354, 374-78. 
376. See id. at 355 n. 3, where Thomas explained: 'That is, the Law School wants to have a 
certain appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the 
students sitting at them." See also id. at 372 where he maintained that "[t]he Law School seeks only 
a facade-it is sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does not perform right." He also posited 
that diversity "does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher education 
and therefore presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our Nation." !d. at 355 n. 3. 
377. !d. at 357. 
378. !d. at 368. 
379. !d. ("[W]hile legacy preferences can stand under the Constitution, racial discrimination 
cannot."). 
380. !d. at 368 n. 10. 
381. !d. at 377. Note that this statement is at variance with the views of legal educators and 
jurists who regard the LSA T as biased in favor of white law applicants. In De Funis, Justice Douglas 
argued that "a good start" in the design of a racially neutral law school admissions regime would be 
to abolish the LSAT. See DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 340 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
382. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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College of Literature, Science, and the Arts undergraduate admission 
system that awarded twenty points to under-represented minorities made 
up of African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans. Two 
Caucasian applicants, Jennifer Gratz, female, and Patrick Hamacher, 
male, were denied admission into the program and challenged this race-
( or point-) conscious admissions system. As in Grutter, the petitioners 
alleged that the University's use of race violated their rights to 
nondiscriminatory treatment under the U.S. Constitution, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Section 1981.383 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
granted the petitioners' motion for a class-action lawsuit,384 designating 
Hamacher as the class representative. 385 The district court ruled not only 
that the University could use race to diversify its student body, but that it 
also presented "solid evidence" that its use of race was designed to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest. 386 The court next turned to 
whether the use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve the interest the 
University sought to achieve. The University changed its admissions 
guidelines a number of times during the period relevant to the lawsuit. 387 
The court found that the use of race embodied in the University's 
admissions guidelines for the periods 1999-2000 were narrowly 
tailored,388 but those of 1995-1998 were not. 389 Regarding the years 
1999-2000, the district court concluded that the award of twenty points 
d d . . . 390 d . d h to un er-represente mmontles was not a quota an reJecte t e 
petitioners assertion that the program at issue operated like the two-track 
system Justice Powell found objectionable in Bakke. 391 It also rejected 
their assertion that the admissions system was a tool for achieving racial 
balancing.392 The University did not seek to achieve a certain proportion 
of minority students, it said, "let alone a proportion that represents the 
community. "393 What made the guidelines for 1995-1998 problematic, 
compared to those of 1999-2000, the district court said, related to the 
University's prior practice of "protecting" or "reserving" seats for under-
represented minorities, which effectively precluded non-protected 
383. See supra nn. 20, 314. 
384. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253. 
385. !d. at 253-54. 
386. !d. at 258. 
387. !d. at 253-57. 
388. !d. at 258. 
389. !d. at 259. 
390. !d. at 258. 
391. !d. 
392. !d. 
393. !d. at 258--59. 
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applicants from competing for those slots. 394 This system, it said, 
operated as the functional equivalent of the kind of quota Justice Powell 
found constitutionally objectionable in Bakke?95 
Each side appealed its negative ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals that heard the case en bane but had not let issued its decision by 
the time the Supreme Court granted review.39 The petitioners argued 
that the University did not base its use of race in undergraduate 
admissions on remediation of identified discrimination but rather on 
diversity which, they maintained, "is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, 
and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting 
narrowly-tailored means."397 But, they said, assuming the Court ruled 
the University's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling state 
interest, it did not narrowly tailor its use of race because its 
undergraduate admissions guidelines do not "remotely resemble the kind 
of consideration of race and ethnicity that Justice Powell endorsed in 
Bakke."398 The University refuted this allegation, claiming that its 
program "hew[ ed] closely" to both the admissions program Justice 
Powell described in Bakke and the Harvard College admissions program 
399 that Powell endorsed. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the judgment of the Court.400 Allan 
Bakke, in the Bakke case, single-mindedly sought a medical education 
from the University of California at Davis, and Barbara Grutter, in the 
Grutter case, sought to attend the University of Michigan law school and 
no other. But the petitioners in Gratz enrolled at other schools before 
394. !d. at 259. 
395. !d. 
396. Gratz v. Bollinger, 537 U.S. I 044 (2002). 
397. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268. 
398. !d. at 269. 
399. !d. 
400. Rehnquist (1924-2005), a Republican from Arizona, appointed by President Richard 
Nixon, joined the Court in 1971. He was promoted Chief Justice in 1986 by President Reagan. Many 
civil rights and liberties groups strongly opposed his confirmation by the Senate. See Hensley et al., 
supra n. 3, at 64. He eventually won confirmation by a vote of sixty-eight in favor and twenty-six 
against because of "his impressive academic credentials, his intellectual abilities, and his 
performance in the Justice Department" under Nixon. !d. As a young law clerk for Justice Robert 
Jackson in 1954, Rehnquist wanted to maintain the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. 
Ferguson. !d. Rehnquist's "conservative legal and political views were well known before he came 
to the Court." !d. at 63. His consistently conservative voting record in civil rights and liberties cases 
bore out the apprehension of civil rights groups that he would be anti-civil rights. !d. at 64; see also 
Baum, supra n. 50, at 149-50. Rehnquist had a judicial philosophy made up of a hierarchy of values, 
which ranks federalism as the highest value, followed by property rights in the second level, and 
individual rights occupying the lowest rung of his hierarchy. Hensley et al., supra n. 3, at 65. The 
Chief Justice was part of a solid "conservative voting bloc" on the Court that included Justices Scalia 
and Thomas. /d. 
I] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 59 
they filed their complaint. Gratz enrolled at the University of Michigan at 
Dearborn, where she graduated in 1999; Hamacher, who applied to the 
University as a transfer student rather than as a freshman, enrolled at 
Michigan State University, where he graduated in 2001.401 So, a 
preliminary issue important in every case, but more so here, was standing 
to sue, particularly for injunctive or prospective relief. The Court 
determined that such standing nevertheless existed,402 citing a series of 
cases that included Northeastern Florida Chapter, Associated General 
Contractors of America v. Jacksonville. 403 There, the decision changed 
the requirem~nt for "injury in fact" in equal protection cases.404 Under 
the standard established by that case, a party challenging a set-aside 
program need only prove that she was denied the opportunity to compete 
on an equal footing, rather than the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit 
or the loss of the contract. 
Having thus found standing to seek relief under Article III, the Court 
moved to the merits of the case and addressed two issues. The first was 
whether the use of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment; the Court 
ruled that it did not, citing its opinion in the companion Grutter case for 
support.405 Finding that the Constitution does not categorically preclude 
the use of race, it next considered whether the University narrowly 
tailored its use of race to achieve the educational diversit¥ it sought. The 
Court found that the use was "not narrowly tailored."4° Citing Justice 
Powell's opinion in Bakke4 it said there was no "individualized 
consideration" of applicants. 07 Instead, "[t]he only consideration that 
accompanie[d]" the award of twenty points to applicants from under-
represented minority groups was "a factual review of an application to 
determine whether an individual is a member of one of these minority 
401. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260-D8. 
402. !d. 
403. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors ()fAm. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 
656 (1993). 
404. !d. at 666. 
405. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268; see also id. at 257. 
406. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. The petitioners contested Michigan's argument that diversity rose 
to a compelling government interest warranting the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions. 
They said that the Court only sanctioned the use of race to remedy identified discrimination. !d. at 
268. Diversity, they said, "is simply too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a 
compelling interest." !d. As indicated, the Court disagreed. With respect to the use of race as a 
remedy for identified discrimination, the Court simply stated that the University never relied on this 
as justification for its use of race. !d. It is amazing that the petitioners would point to past 
discrimination, given that the only interest warranting a constitutional use of race that Justice Powell 
approved in Bakke was diversity. Bakke 438 U.S. at 306-10; see also Part ll(C)(l), supra (discussing 
the Supreme Court and affirmative action up to Bakke). 
407. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 269-97 (discussing the Harvard College plan which Powell endorsed 
and attached to his opinion in Bakke). 
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groups."408 Also, the Court said the bonus points made race a "decisive" 
factor, rather than a plus factor, contrary to Justice Powell 's prescription 
. B kk 409 m a e. 
The Court disagreed with the University that tl~§ing certain 
applicants for review by an admissions review committee amounts to 
individualized consideration.411 It also disagreed with the University that 
the large volume of applications to the undergraduate school renders 
impractical an admissions system not based on points. Rather, it said, 
"The fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing 
individualized consideration might present administrative challenges 
does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system."412 At 
any rate, "[n]othing in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke signaled that a 
university may employ whatever means it desires to achieve the stated 
goal of diversity without regard to the limits imposed by" strict 
0 413 
scrutmy. 
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion wherein she 
maintained that the admissions P.Olicy in Gratz was "a non[-
]individualized, mechanical one"4 P:1 that did "not provide for a 
meaningful individualized review of applicants."415 She distin§uished 
the program in Gratz from the one the Court approved in Grutter. 16 The 
plan in Gratz "ensures that the diversity contributions of applicants 
cannot be individually assessed."417 And it "stands in sharp contrast" to 
the program in Grutter, "which enables admissions officers to make 
nuanced judgments with respect to the contributions each applicant is 
likely to make to the diversity of the incoming class. "418 She said, "The 
only potential source of individualized consideration appears to be the 
Admissions Review Committee."419 Unfortunately, available evidence 
408. !d. at 271-72. 
409. !d. at 272. 
410. !d. at 256-57 (flagging system described). 
411. For example, Rehnquist said, "The flagging program only emphasizes the flaws of the 
University's system as a whole when compared to that described by Justice Powell," and what little 
individualized review does takes place occurs after the fact, after points have been distributed to 
benefited groups. !d. at 273. 
412. !d. at 275. 
413. !d. 
414. !d. at 280 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
415. !d. at 276. 
416. ld.at276-77. 
417. !d. at 273 n. 29. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, quoted this statement 
approvingly in rebutting Justice Souter's contention that "applicants to the undergraduate college are 
not denied individualized consideration." 
418. ld.at279. 
419. !d. 
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"reveals very little about [how] the review committee actually functions. 
And what evidence there is indicated that the committee is a kind of 
after-thought, rather than an integral component of a system of 
individualized review."420 She said she shared the opinion of the Court 
that the committee "reviews only a portion of all the applications," 
leaving the majority of admissions decisions to be based on points.421 In 
short, she said, the flagging system did little "to offset the apparent 
absence of individualized consideration. "422 
Justice Thomas, in his own concurring opinion, stated that the 
factoring of race in higher education admissions "is categorically 
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause."423 He was also of the view 
that a constitutionally permissible affirmative action plan should 
"sufficiently allow for the consideration of non-racial distinctions among 
under[-]represented minority applicants," an ingredient, he said, the 
affirmative action plan under review lacked.424 
Justice Breyer joined in the judgment of the Court, but not its 
opinion.425 He joined Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, except the 
part relating to the Court's opinion,426 and he agreed with the dissent of 
Justice Ginsburg to the effect that the Court should have properly 
distinguished between policies of inclusion, which should be acceptable 
under the Constitution, and f:olicies of exclusion, which should be 
constitutionally impermissible. 27 
Three Justices-Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens--dissented from the 
Court's judgment.428 Justice Ginsburg complained that the Court applied 
strict scrutiny to all racial classifications9 both classifications that exclude people, as well as those that include.42 She said the Court's insistence 
on one uniform standard of review for all classifications "would have 
been fitting were our Nation free of the vestiges of rank discrimination 
long reinforced by law,"430 which it was not. Instead, the "effects of 
centuries of law-sanctioned inequality ... remain painfully evident in our 
420. !d. at 279-80. 
421. !d. at 280. 
422. !d. 
423. !d. at 281 (Thomas, J ., concurring). 
424. !d. 
425. !d. at 281-82 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
426. !d. at 282; see also id. at 276-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
427. !d. at 282. 
428. !d. at 298-309 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 291-98 
(Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 282-91 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
429. !d. at 298 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting). 
430. !d. 
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communities and schools."431 These unwholesome effects are made 
evident in the large disparities between whites and minority groups that 
still exist in employment, wealth, access to health care, and education, 
among other sectors,432 "in the wake of a system of racial caste only 
recently ended."433 This is not to mention irrational prejudice, as well as 
conscious and unconscious biases, that must come down before equal 
opportunity and nondiscrimination take root in America.434 
Justice Ginsburg counseled that "[a]ctions designed to burden groups 
long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures 
taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its 
aftereffects have been extirpated."435 She explained that Supreme Court 
jurisprudence ranks race a suspect category "not because [race] is 
inevitably an impermissible classification, but because it is one which 
usually, to our national shame6 has been drawn for the purpose of 
maintaining racial inequality."43 But where race is considered to make 
people equal, "no automatic proscription is in order."437 In short, she 
said, the Constitution, is both color blind and color conscious-color 
blind in that, to avoid conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, a 
classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden 
must not be based on race; color conscious to prevent discrimination 
being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.438 She 
argued that contemporary international human rights documents 
distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed to 
accelerate de facto equality. 439 
Applying that distinction, Justice Ginsburg saw no constitutional 
infirmity in the program under review.440 The petitioners did not dispute 
that every applicant admitted under the current plan was qualified to 
attend the College, there was no suggestion that the College adopted its 
current policy in order to limit or decrease enrollment by any particular 
racial or ethnic group, there were no seats reserved based on race, and 
431. !d. 
432. See id. at 299. 
433. !d. (internal quotes omitted). 
434. See id. at 300-0 I. 
435. !d. at 30 I. 
436. !d. 
437. !d. 
438. !d. at 302. Justice Ginsburg contended that arguing for non-application of strict scrutiny 
for inclusive program does not mean insulation from careful judicial inspections. This is because 
close review is needed to fish out malign classifications masquerading as benign, and to ensure that 
preferences are not so large they unduly hurt innocent parties. !d. 
439. !d. at 302 (citing the ICERD and the CEDA W). See also supra n. 343. 
440. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303. 
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there was no demonstration that the program in question unduli' 
constricted admission opportunities for non-favored students.4 
Ginsburg disputed the contention in the brief of the United States that 
"race-neutral alternatives" such as "percentage plans," which guarantee 
admission to state universities for a fixed percentage (usually the top ten 
to twenty percent) of students from the high school of an affected state, 
would result in the enrollment of a meaningful number of minority 
students.442 These plans, experimented with in states like California, 
Florida, Texas, and Washington, depend on continued racial segregation 
at the secondary school level for their effectiveness.443 And, since they 
were designed to increase minority representation in the public higher 
education system of the affected states, they were not race-neutral to 
b . "h444 egm wtt . 
In removing "[t]he stain of generations of racial oppression" in our 
society, Justice Ginsburg observed that institutions of higher learning 
will seek to maintain their minority enrollment.445 The issue is whether 
they can do so in full candor through affirmative action programs such as 
the one at issue here. Otherwise, schools may resort to all kinds of 
camouflage designed to disguise their use of race in admissions.446 "If 
honesty is the best policy, surely Michigan's accurately described, fully 
disclosed College affirmative action program is preferable to achieving 
similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises."447 Responding to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist's accusation that she suggests "changing the 
Constitution so that it conforms to the conduct of the universities," 
Ginsburg maintained that "the Constitution, properly interpreted, permits 
government officials to respond openly to the continuing importance of 
race," and that, "[a]mong constitutionally permissible options, those that 
candidly disclose their consideration of race seem to [her] preferable to 
those that conceal it."448 Justice Ginsburg noted the Court's 
acknowledgment, in Gratz as well as in Grutter, that educational 
institutions "are not barred from any and all consideration of race when 
k. d . . d . . ,449 rna mg a mtsswns ectswns. 
Justice Souter, like Justice Stevens, raised a standing issue in his 
44! !d. 
442. !d. at 303 n. I 0. 
443. !d. 
444. See id. at 303-04 n. 10. 
445. !d. at 304. 
446. See id. at 304-05 for specification of these underhanded measures. 
447. !d. at 305. 
448. !d. at 305 n. I I. 
449. !d. at 298. 
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dissent. He believed Patrick Hamacher, one of the petitioners, who 
applied to the University as a transfer student, had no standing to 
challenge the "freshman's admissions policy that [would] never cause 
h. h ,450 L"k J . S . 1m any arm. 1 e ustlce tevens, he viewed the two as different 
admissions policies. For example, the transfer policy used race, rather 
than a points system, in assessing an applicant's contribution to diversity. 
Such use of race, he said, permitted the inference that the University 
engaged in a "holistic review" of transfer applicants consistent with the 
program the Court upheld in Grutter.451 In short, he would vacate the 
0 d c l k f 0 0 d" 0 452 s JU gment 10r ac o Juns Ictlon. outer regarded the majority's 
th d o W d l ,453 b h eory on stan mg as m u gent, ut e contended that not even its 
"new gloss on the law of standing" should permit it to reach the issue it 
d "d d 454 ec1 e . 
However, if a plaintiff with standing were to bring a similar case 
requiring him to reach the merits, Souter would have affirmed the 
judgment of the District Court and granted summary judgment to the 
University.455 The University's freshman admissions system, the focus 
of attention in the dispute, "is closer to what Grutter approves than to 
what Bakke condemns, and should not be held unconstitutional on the 
456 ° l 457 ° d h l current record." Here, there was no quota m pace; mstea , t e pan 
"lets all applicants compete for all places and values an applicant's 
offering for any place not only on grounds of race, but on grades, test 
scores, strength of high school, quality of course of study, residence, 
alumni relationships, leadership, personal character, socioeconomic 
disadvantage, athletic ability, and quality of a personal essay."458 This 
means that "[a] non[-]minority applicant who scores highly in these other 
categories can readily garner a selection index exceeding that of a 
0 0 )" h h 0 b ,459 mmonty app 1cant w o gets t e twenty-pomt onus. 
According to Souter, the university policy in Gratz was almost 
identical to the one envisioned by Powell in Bakke. Justice Powell's 
description of a constitutionally permissible admission process is one 
450. !d. at 291 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. at 292. 
451. !d. at 292 n. 2. 
452. !d. at 298. 
453. !d. at 292. 
454. !d. at 290. 
455. !d. at 298. 
456. !d. at 293. 
457. !d. See also id. at 296-97 ('The point system cannot operate as a de facto set-aside if the 
greater admissions process, including review by the committee, results in individualized review 
sufficient to meet the Court's standards."). 
458. !d. at 293-94. 
459. !d. at 294. 
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which considers "all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the 
particular qualifications of each applicant" and places each element "on 
the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according 
them the same weight."460 The only sense in which the program under 
challenge departed from this description was that it assigned an extra 
. d d . . . 461 H J . twenty pomts to un er-represente mmontles. owever, ustlce 
Souter said this assignment did not set race apart from all other weighted 
consideration, given that non-minority students may receive twenty 
points for athletic ability, socioeconomic disadvantage, attendance at a 
socio-economically disadvantaged or predominantly minority high 
h 1 h . . 462 sc oo , among ot er cntena. 
Justice Souter contended that the Court's objection to the program 
under challenge went to the use of points to quantify and compare 
characteristics or to the number of points awarded due to race. But on 
either reading, he said, the objection is mistaken. Concerning the use of 
race for quantification, college admission is not something left entirely to 
"inarticulate intuition," so there was nothing inappropriate in assigning 
some stated value measured in numbers to a relevant characteristic, be it 
reasoning ability, writing style, running speed, or minority race.463 
Justice Powell's plus factors were something colleges could reduce into 
values in numbers; the college simply did by a numbered scale what the 
law school accomplishes by its holistic review.464 Numbers therefore do 
not and should not spell denial of individualized consideration.465 
Additionally, assigning twenty points to race did not convert race 
into an unconstitutional quota, but rather made it merely a plus factor. It 
is possible to conceive of a points system where the "plus" factor 
becomes so extreme it turns race into a decisive factor for minorities. But 
the petitioners could not prove the freshman admissions system operated 
this way.466 Rather, the record shows that non-minority applicants may 
achieve higher selection point totals than minority applicants due to 
characteristics other than race.467 Also, the petitioners' contention in 
their brief that the University admitted "virtually every qualified under-
represented minority applicant" is unavailing because the occurrence 
may reflect nothing more than the likelihood that very few qualified 
460. /d. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317). 
461. !d. 
462. /d. at 295. 
463. /d. 
464. /d. 
465. See id. 
466. !d. at 295~96. 
467. !d. at 296. 
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minority applicants applied.468 In short, there are no set-aside seats of the 
kind the Court disallowed in Bakke, and "consideration of an applicant's 
whole spectrum of ability is no more ruled out by giving twenty points 
for race than by giving the same points for athletic ability or 
. . d" d ,469 sociOeconomic 1sa vantage. 
Souter believed the use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve the 
interest in diversity the University aimed to achieve-even though the 
award of a plus factor of twenty points, compared to, for example, ten 
points, may make some observers suspicious.470 In the record, the 
absence of information about the actual working of the University's 
admissions review committee charged with responsibility of conducting 
individualized reviews did not mean individualized consideration did not 
471 take place. 
Without knowing more about how the admissions review board 
actually functions, Souter said, "it seems especiall,t unfair to treat the 
candor of the admissions plan as an Achilles' heel." 72 The University is 
"forthright in saying just what plus factor" it gives to race, compared to 
supposedly "race-neutral" alternatives like percentage plans, which 
guarantee admission to a fixed percentage of the top students from each 
high school.473 While constitutional, he said, these plans deliberately 
obfuscate 474 and they might be pointless in a state like Michigan where 
minorities are a much smaller fraction of the population than they are in 
California, Florida, or Texas.475 At any rate, these plans are also just as 
race-conscious as the point scheme, only they get their racially diverse 
results without saying directly what they are doing or why they are doing 
it, compared to Michigan, which "states its purpose directly."476 "Equal 
protection cannot become an exercise in which the winners are the ones 
who hide the ball,"477 so Michigan deserves a pat on the back, not a 
rebuke, for its frankness. 478 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens said he would have dismissed the suit 
for lack of standing because, based on the Court's standing precedents, 
468. !d. 
469. !d. 
470. See id. 
471. !d. 
472. !d. at 297. 
473. !d. 
474. !d. 
475. See id. at 297 n. 4. 
476. !d. at 298. 
477. !d. 
478. !d. at 298. "[I]fthis were a doubtful case for me. I would be tempted to give Michigan an 
extra point of its own for its frankness." !d. 
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neither of the two petitioners had a personal stake in the outcome of the 
lawsuit. Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, each attended and 
received their undergraduate degrees from other universities after 
Michigan failed to extend them offers of admission.479 "Neither 
petitioner was in the process of reapplying to Michigan through the 
freshman admissions <Process at the time this suit was filed, and neither 
has done so since."48 The decision of these two petitioners to obtain a 
college education elsewhere distinguished them from the petitioners in 
Grutter and Bakke, neither of whom attended any other school but the 
one whose affirmative action policies they challenged.481 Justice Stevens 
examined in detail-and dismissed every aspect of-Hamacher' s 
contention that his intention to apply to the University as a transfer 
student gave him personal stake to challenge the freshman admissions 
1. 482 po Icy. 
Like Justice Souter, Stevens considered the Court's theory of 
standing exceedingly indulgent.483 He faulted the Court's contention that 
the petitioners' challenging "any use of race" in undergraduate 
admissions by Michigan, freshman and transfer alike8 gave them a personal stake over the freshman admissions policy.4 4 He likewise 
regarded as mistaken its assumption that "the University's use of race in 
undergraduate transfer admissions does not implicate a significantly 
different set of concerns than does its use of race in undergraduate 
freshman admissions."485 Justice Stevens said the fact that the action 
here is a class-action lawsuit does not change the fact that the petitioners 
lacked standing,486 given that "neither [petitioner] has standing to seek 
prospective relief on behalf of unidentified class members who may or 
may not have standing to litigate on behalf ofthemselves."487 
In both Grutter and Gratz, the Supreme Court recognized the 
benefits of diversity and importance of a university's ability to consider 
race in admissions decisions in order to achieve diversity. However, the 
Court held that this consideration of race must be individualized, 
flexible, and narrowly tailored to achieve diversity; and, universities may 
not use quotas. 
479. !d. at 282-83 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting). 
480. !d. at 282. 
481. Id at 282 n. I; and 284-85 n. 4. 
482. !d. at 285-89. 
483. See id. at 287 n. 6. 
484. !d. at 287-88. 
485. !d. at 288; see also id. at 265. 
486. !d. at 289-90. 
487. !d. at 290-91. 
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III. ANALYZING THE MICHIGAN DECISIONS: NINE INDICATORS OF 
HOSTILITY AGAINST AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BY THE REHNQUIST COURT 
Although Grutter and its companion cases signify a major 
advancement in the Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence, 
the decisions also reveal substantial evidence of hostility against 
affirmative action by the Rehnquist Court, as doctrine and as 
governmental policy. This part of the Article articulates and analyzes, in 
tum, nine of these indices or indicators of hostility, namely: (a) the 
narrow margin of victory in Grutter, (b) the defeat of affirmative action 
in Gratz, (c) the subjection of the programs under review to strict 
scrutiny, (d) the insistence on individualized consideration, (e) the color-
blind argument, (f) the anchor of Grutter on diversity, (g) the 
undependability of Justice Kennedy as a swing or middle justice, (h) the 
acerbic rhetoric of the conservative bloc, and (i) the tinkering with the 
"injury in fact" requirement for standing in equal protection. As the 
ensuing discussions make abundantly clear, although analytically 
separable, several of the indicators are closely interconnected rather than 
mutually exclusive. 
A. The Narrow Margin of Victory in Grutter. 
The narrow victory in Grutter, in the face of a wave of 
endorsements, indicates the Rehnquist Court's hostility toward 
affirmative action. As stated earlier, only five of the Court's nine justices 
stood up for affirmative action in Grutter. This endorsement was an 
improvement upon the plurality decision in Bakke twenty-five years 
before. However, the improvement on Bakke was built on one fragile 
vote; Grutter and affirmative action were only one vote away from 
defeat. This margin of "victory" came despite the enormous endorsement 
evident in the more than one hundred amicus briefs from a multiplicity of 
educational institutions, corporate businesses, and governmental agencies 
like the U.S. military, and other organizations, testifying to the 
substantial benefits of diversity and the necessity for maintenance of 
0 488 u 0 0 1 h 0 h race-conscwus programs. nsurpnsmg y, sue testimony to t e 
benefits of affirmative action was not presented during Bakke because 
there was not yet enough experience with the practice of affirmative 
action to draw on. These organizational endorsements of the University 
of Michigan Law School's race-conscious program and support for 
affirmative action should have led to, but did not result in, a decisional 
margin better than the five-to-four achieved. Imagine just what the fate 
488. Gruffer, 539 U.S. at 330-31. 
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of affirmative action would have been had it not been for the 
groundswell of support and the deluge of organizational endorsement. 
B. The Defeat of Affirmative Action in Gratz 
Another indicator, related to the narrow margin of victory in Grutter, 
is the defeat of the program in Gratz-and by a wider, more impressive, 
six-to-three majority. Gratz is unsettling for several important reasons. 
The Court's misrepresentation of the facts and poor reasoning in Gratz 
indicate hostility toward the policy of affirmative action. 
Justice Powell in his approach to inclusiveness draws the line at 
individual rights; for him "constitutional limitations protecting individual 
rights may not be disregarded," even in an effort to include minorities.489 
In Gratz, the program in controversy lacked any resemblance to the 
impermissible two-track or quota system that Powell, in Bakke, said 
"disregard[ed] ... individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment."490 The law on affirmative action, as laid down in Grutter, 
is that, to be constitutional, a race-conscious program must "giv[e] 
serious consideration to all the w~s an applicant might contribute to a 
diverse educational environment." 1 In practical terms, this means such 
a race-conscious program must "adequately ensure that all factors that 
may contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered 
alongside race in admissions decisions"492 and must also "seriously 
weigh many other diversity factors besides race that can make a real and 
dispositive difference for non-minority applicants as well. "493 
Instead of being a quota or making race the decisive factor, the 
undergraduate admissions system the Court struck down in Gratz 
considers all applicants for places based not only on race, but also on a 
multiplicity of other factors that include "grades, test scores, strength of 
high school, quality of course of study, residence, alumni relationships, 
leadership, personal character, socioeconomic disadvantage, athletic 
ability, and quality of a personal essay."494 In more practical terms, this 
means that "[a] non-minority applicant who scores highly in these other 
categories can readily gamer a selection index exceeding that of a 
. . 1' h h [ . 495 mmonty app 1cant w o gets t e twenty]-pomt bonus." Put 
489. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314. 
490. !d. at 320. 
491. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added). 
492. !d. 
493. I d. at 338. 
494. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 293-94 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
495. !d. at 294. For accord, see Norma M. Riccucci, Affirmative Action in the Twenty-First 
Century, in Public Personnel Management: Current Concerns, Future Challenges 51, 53 (Norma M. 
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differently, the plan in Gratz simply does by a numbered scale what the 
law school program approved in Grutter accomplished by its "holistic 
review."496 In short, as Justice Souter argued in his dissent, the point 
system does not operate as a de facto set-aside system if the greater 
admissions process, including review by the committee, results in 
individualized review sufficient to meet the Court's standards.497 In the 
final analysis, the undergraduate college lost because it chose to be 
forthright about just what plus factor it assigns to race in admission 
decisions when it could have chosen to make itself a winner by hiding 
the ball.498 
The decision in Gratz also contradicts the Court's claim to 
conservatism and judicial restraint.499 "It is ironic indeed," as the 
constitutional law expert Professor Sunstein contends, "that 
conservatives, who have been ... skeptical of judicial activism, now 
embrace an extreme form of judicial activism in their attack on 
affirmative action."500 This is why Sunstein considers Gratz "a big 
mistake."501 
The defeat of affirmative action in Gratz minimized the overall 
"sweetness" of the victory for race-based programs emanating from 
Grutter. The Court was so disturbed by its contradictory rulings in two 
admissions policies arising from the same University, neither of which 
involved a Bakke-type set-aside, that Justice O'Connor, whose "swing" 
or majority initiative gave birth to Gruffer, felt impelled in Gratz to write 
an unpersuasive concurring opinion explaining the ways in which the 
program struck down in Gratz departed from the one approved by the 
Riccucci ed., 4th ed., Longman 2006) (pointing out that the University awarded up to 20 points at 
the Provost's discretion, and up to 10 points for Michigan residency, among other non-academic 
criteria). 
496. /d. at 295. 
497. !d. at 296-97. 
498. See id. at 298 (stating that "[e]qual protection cannot become an exercise in which the 
winners are the ones who hide the ball."). 
499. Judicial restraint is a doctrine that teaches that "the courts should not thwart the 
implementation of legislative acts and agency rules unless they are clearly unconstitutional." 
Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 471. The doctrine "rests on the assumption that the courts should defer 
to the decisions made by Congress, the President, and administrative agencies, because members of 
Congress and the President are elected by the people" (while federal judges are not) and 
administrative agencies have expertise. !d. Judicial restraintists are distinguishable from judicial 
activists who believe that judges should use their power of interpretation and judicial review to 
checkmate "the activities of Congress, state legislatures, and administrative agencies when those 
governmental bodies exceed their authority." !d. Unlike the Gratz majority, conservatives tend to be 
judicial restraintists. 
500. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Why Grutter was 
Correctly Decided, J. Blacks in Higher Educ., 80 (Oct. 31, 2003). 
50 I. !d. 
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C . G so2 ourt m rutter. 
C. The Subjection of the Programs under Review to Strict Scrutiny 
A third indicator of the Supreme Court's hostility toward affirmative 
action is the subjection of the two Michigan programs under review to 
strict scrutiny. Of the three standards of Constitutional review, strict 
scrutiny is the most exacting, followed by intermediate scrutiny and the 
rational test. The race-conscious program in Grutter survived strict 
scrutiny, while the one in Gratz did not. Because programs subjected to 
strict scrutiny are most often struck down, some scholars appropriately 
consider the test "strict in theory, but fatal in fact."503 The Court 
probably would have found the program in Gratz constitutional if it had 
been assessed under the less onerous stricture of intermediate scrutiny. 
In past cases, the Court made a distinction between racial 
classifications that oppress (invidious) and those that are meant to assist 
minorities or promote de facto equality (benign). 504 It also distinguished 
between programs a~~roved by Congress and those designed by state and 
local governments. 5 Race-conscious programs determined to be 
benign, as were affirmative action plans designed by Congress, received 
the more lenient intermediate scrutiny; all others were subjected to strict 
scrutiny.506 Programs assessed using strict scrutiny pass constitutional 
muster "only if they are narrowl):6-jtailored measures that further 
compelling governmental interests."5 For programs assessed under 
intermediate scrutiny, the constitutional test is met if the affected 
measures "serve important governmental objectives and are substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives."508 Another important 
distinction is that race-conscious programs subjected to strict scrutiny 
require specific findings of discrimination, whereas programs assessed 
under the intermediate standard need no such specific findings. That was 
502. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
503. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: in Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changin Court· A 
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972). g · 
504. See e.g. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228-29. 
505. !d. at 229. 
506. ld. at 225 (citing Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547). 
507. ld. at 227. In determining whether a pro ram is narr 1 · · 
measures or criteria that include (I) The necessity gfor the relie~~~dt~~~r::fic~~urt~/:~e::~~~; 
remedies, (2) the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availability of w~ver r · · . 
(3) ~e relatiOnship of numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and (4) the impact :r ~h:is:~~;f 
~~St, ;2~~~t:t~~~n~~~~;thud parties. Engr. Contractors Assn. of S. Fla. v. Dade County, 122 F.3d 
508. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,517-22 (1980) (Mar h 11 J · · db 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment). s a • ·• JOme Y Brennan and 
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the case, for example, in Fullilove, involving the challenge of an 
affirmative action program enacted by Congress. There, the Supreme 
Court ruled that there is no requirement to establish specific findings of 
discrimination because, more than any other organ of government, 
Congress is vested with the most comprehensive constitutional authority 
to enforce the equal protection guarantees, 509 along with an "affirmative 
duty" to combat discrimination "as a matter of national concern."510 This 
dual system of review in equal protection cases prevailed until Adarand 
in 1995. Beginning with the Adarand case, the Court applied one 
uniform assessment standard, all in the name of consistency and 
congruence, to "all racial classifications," irrespective of the motivations 
underlying them and regardless of the governmental actor, federal, state, 
or local, that designed the classification.511 
Given that the standard applied has serious practical consequences 
for the programs under examination, debate on the proper standard-
between intermediate or strict scrutiny-to apply in affirmative action 
and related equal protection cases has divided the Court. In Bakke, in 
1978, Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny to the race-conscious 
program under review, whereas Justice Brennan argued that intermediate 
scrutiny was the appropriate approach. 512 More than ten years later, 
Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Croson, lamented that: "[t]oday, for the 
first time, a majority of this Court has adopted strict scrutiny as its 
standard of Equal Protection review of race-conscious remedial 
measures."
513 He adjudged the occurrence "unwelcome,"514 reasoning 
that "[a] profound difference separates governmental actions that 
themselves are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the 
effects of prior racism or to prevent neutral government activity from 
perpetuating the effects of such racism."515 For subjecting remedial 
classification to strict scrutiny, Marshall accused his colleagues of 
"regard[ing] racial discrimination as lar~e~ a phenomenon of the past," 
a position he vehemently disagreed with. 1 
Then, years later Justice Stevens, in his dissent in Adarand, accused 
the majority of "ignor[ing] a difference, fundamental to our 
509. !d. at 483. See also Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion) (denoting that Congress 
"has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
510. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-523 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring in the judgment). 
511. Adarand,5J5U.S.at227. 
512. See supra nn. 225-226 and corresponding text. 
513. Croson, 488 U.S. at 551 (plurality opinion) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
514. /d. 
515. /d.at551-52. 
516. /d. at 552. 
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constitutional system, between the Federal Government and the 
States,"517 and "ignor[ing] a difference, fundamental to the idea of equal 
. b . d . "518 H 't d "Th . protection, etween oppresswn an assistance. e post e , ere IS 
no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed 
to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial 
subordination."519 Most recently, in Gratz, the very same line of 
argument has resurfaced. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that the 
Court should have "properly" and "sensiblY.'' distinguished between 
policies that include and those that exclude,520 between policies that 
promote de facto equality and those that oppress.521 The former should 
be assessed under intermediate scrutiny, the latter under strict 
. 522 I . . J . B l h d 523 scrutmy. twas a position ustice reyer a so s are . 
In Adarand and Gruffer, Justice O'Connor attempted to dispel the 
conventional notion regarding the fatalities caused by strict scrutiny,524 
saying, "Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict 
scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it."525 Narrowly tailored race-based 
action necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, she said, 
'11 . . 526 C "N d .. wt pass stnct scrutmy. ontext matters. ot every ectston 
influenced by race is equally objectionable, and strict scrutiny is 
designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance 
and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decision-
maker for the use of race in that particular context. "527 For all the nerve-
calming assurances, Gruffer is one of those rare instances in the equal 
517. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 264 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
518. !d. 
519. !d. at 243. 
520. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J.,joined by Souter, J., dissenting). 
521. !d. at 301-02. Justice Ginsburg noted importantly, in distinguishing between policies that 
oppress and policies designed to promote de facto equality, that the centuries of struggle for the most 
basic of civil rights in America have been about freedom from racial oppression, instead of just 
merely freedom from racial categorization. See id. at 301 (quoting Stephen L. Carter, When Victims 
Happen to Be Black, 97 Yale L.J. 420, 433-34 (\ 988)). She also instructively pointed out, citing her 
concurrence in Grutter, and the relevant multilateral human rights treaties designed to eliminate 
racial discrimination and discrimination against women, that contemporary human rights documents 
distinguish "between policies of oppression and measures designed to accelerate de facto equality." 
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302. 
522. Justice Ginsburg also had a problem with the Court's application of strict scrutiny in the 
program under review in Gruffer but saw no need to pursue that argument since the program under 
examination survived the test. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., 
concurring) (asterisked footnote following last sentence in concurrence). 
523. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 282 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
524. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. 
525. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327. 
526. !d. 
527. !d. 
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protection jurisprudence of the Supreme Court where a racial 
classification withstood strict scrutiny. However, by applying strict 
scrutiny to all racial classifications, the Supreme Court has sealed the 
fate of and revealed its hostility towards the majority of affirmative 
action programs. 
D. The Insistence on Individualized Consideration 
Another indicator of the abiding hostility of the Supreme Court 
toward affirmative action is the insistence on individualized 
consideration. The reason for this emphasis, the Court explains, is that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the 
government to treat people as individuals rather than as groups. In Bakke, 
Justice Powell indicated "[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot 
mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when 
applied to a person of another color."528 Powell disapproved the race-
conscious program of the University of California at Davis Medical 
School under review, ruling it an unconstitutional set-aside, because, in 
his view, the plan disre<farded individual rights guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 52 
In Grutter, the Supreme Court laid out the elements of a properly 
"individualized" race-conscious program that meets constitutional 
muster. Such a program must give "serious consideration to all the wa1.3s 
an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational environment;" 0 
it must adequately ensure "that all factors that may contribute to student 
body diversitr are meaningfully considered alongside race in 
admissions;"53 and it must "seriously weigh many other diversity 
factors besides race that can make a real and dispositive difference for 
non[-]minority applicants as well."532 In short, as the Court explained, an 
affirmative action program "must be flexible enough to ensure that each 
applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an 
applicant's race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or application."533 
Using this standard, the Court upheld the plan in Grutter because it 
found it sufficiently individualized, compared to the one in Gratz, which 
it adjudged insufficiently individualized, and, therefore, 
0 0 1534 
unconstltutwna . 
528. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289. 
529. /d. at 320. 
530. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322. 
531. !d. at 337. 
532. !d. at 338. 
533. ld .at 336-37. 
534. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334. 
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The insistence on individualized consideration would have been 
adequate if our society sufficiently treated and regarded people as 
individuals. Unfortunately, it does not; instead, group factors and 
considerations have played and continue to play a major role in the 
treatment and assessment of blacks and other minorities in this society. 
For several hundred years in this country, blacks were "discriminated 
against5 not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their 
skins." 35 And for sixty years, until Brown in 1954, the U.S. was a 
Nation where, by law, one group was singled out for inferior treatment 
while the other group was accorded special treatment, each based on 
their race.536 Insistence on individualized consideration in the Court's 
equal protection jurisprudence ignores these occurrences or realities. 
Such insistence also turns a deaf ear to the still lingering disparities 
between whites and minorities in numerous life measures, embedded in 
group consciousness.537 As Justice Ginsburg aptly observed in her 
dissent in Grutter, "conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank 
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impeding 
realization of our highest values and ideals."538 Independent study after 
study corroborates these findings. These include the Advisory Board on 
Race, set up by former President Clinton, which after a year-long 
investigation, found that at the end of the twentieth century, "the color of 
one's skin continues to affect an individual's opportunities to receive a 
good education, acquire the skills to get and maintain a good job, have 
access to adequate health care, and receive equal justice under the 
law."539 In sum: 
Race consciousness continues to divide African Americans and white 
Americans. Whether we are talking about college attendance, media 
stereotyping, racial profiling, or academic achievement, the black 
experience is different from the white one .... African Americans view 
the [N]ation a~10many specific issues differently than their white 
counterparts do. 
Evidence of widespread prevalence of group consciousness in 
American society today is a reason why many blacks view the stress on 
535. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
generally Francis D. Adams & Barry Sanders, Alienable Rights: The Exclusion of Ajrican Americans 
in a White Man's Land, 1619~2000 (Harper Collins 2003). 
536. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 394 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
537. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-301 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting); Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 344-45 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring). See also Adams & Sanders, 
supra n. 535, at xiii (instructively describing the exclusion of African Americans as "continuing"). 
538. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring). 
539. John Hope Franklin et al., One America in the 21st Century 35 (McGraw-Hill 1998). 
540. Schmidt et al., supra n. 27, at 163. 
76 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2006 
individualized consideration as little more than another disingenuous 
device, no different from color-blindness,541 designed to prevent 
inclusiveness for blacks and other minorities. In Bakke, Justice Marshall 
was at a loss that anyone could ignore the fact that "for several hundred 
years Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but 
rather solely because of the color of their skins."542 And he considered it 
"more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based 
discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a 
class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible."543 Similarly, 
the African American literary giant, Richard Wright (1908-60), once 
rebuked U.S. conservatives whom, Wright said, seek "to smother the 
Negro problem as a whole" when they insist "upon regarding Negroes as 
individuals and making individual deals with individual Negroes, 
ignoring the inevitable race consciousness which three hundred years of 
Jim Crow living has burned into" the collective heart of American 
blacks. 544 
Last but not least among critics of insistence on individual treatment 
when faced with overwhelming evidence of group consciousness is 
Professor Jeremiah Moses. Moses provides an interesting and eloquent 
understanding of the roots of black nationalism in America. He contends 
that in Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney, ironically, presented an argument 
for black nationalism. 545 Taney said the Constitution did not recognize 
African Americans as citizens, or even as individuals, but as a class of 
persons "whose ancestors were Negroes of the African race ... [and] 
were not intended to be included, under the word 'citizens' in the 
Constitution."546 The Chief Justice of the United States defined African 
Americans as a people both "subordinate and inferior," proclaiming, in 
effect, that in the e:res of the founding fathers, a free black individual 
was an anomaly.54 To the Framers of the Constitution, Taney said, 
blacks were "a subject people, a nation in bondage, a class eternally 
541. See supra Section E, dealing with the color-blind argument. 
542. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Adams 
and Sanders also expressed a similar indignation when in the introduction to their book on the 
exclusion of African Americans in American life, stated that "[i]n our willingness to dismiss the 
manifold social disadvantages that most [B]lacks endure as simply the result of their own personal 
failures, we all share in the responsibility for America's continuing exclusion of its black citizens." 
Adams & Sanders, supra n. 535, at xv. 
543. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 400 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
544. Richard Wright, Introduction, in St. Clair Drake & Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: 
A Study ofNegro Life in a Northern City xxix (U. of Chi. Press 1993). 
545. See Classical Black Nationalism: From the American Revolution to Marcus Garvey 25 
(Wilson Jeremiah Moses, ed., N.Y. U. Press 1996). 
546. !d.; see also Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403--04. 
547. Classical Black Nationalism, supra n. 545, at 25; see also Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05. 
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separate from the American people, and in a state of subordination to 
them. "548 Moses looked at both sides of the argument as to whether 
federal law dealt with African Americans as group rather than as 
individuals and concludes that, generally, American law dealt with 
African Americans as a "subordinate and inferior class," rather than as 
I . d. .d I . . 549 equa m tvt ua citizens. 
Recent occurrences in the aftermath of the Michigan cases serve, 
unfortunately and disconcertingly, to reinforce black apprehension and 
suspicion regarding individualized consideration. These occurrences 
revolve around some schools that are using the requirement of 
"individualized consideration" as a guise to scrap programs formerly 
reserved for minorities. 550 Individualized consideration prevented 
progress designed to remedy the effects of discrimination. 
E. The Color-Blind Argument 
Another indicator of the Supreme Court's hostility to affirmative 
action is its support of the color-blind argument. The argument takes the 
form of claims that our laws must be "color-blind" or that data relating to 
race "is no longer relevant to public policy."551 Color-blindness traces its 
roots to the dissent of Justice Harlan in Plessy, in 1896, to the effect that 
the law recognizes no caste, but instead, "[ o ]ur Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."552 
Professor Jan Pillai explains that "[ e ]ncoded in the principle of color[-
]blindness is the concept of neutrality that mandates absolute government 
impartiality toward individuals and groups without regard to their race, 
color, ethnicity, gender or disabilities."55 
The color-blind doctrine manifested itself in two important ways in 
the Michigan cases. The first is in the context of Justice O'Connor's 
projection regarding a possible date for the sunset of race-conscious 
548. Classical Black Nationalism, supra n. 545, at 25. 
549. !d. at25-26. 
550. See Minority Programs for All, Chi. Trib. Red Eye Ed. 6 (Sept. 29, 2004). This story 
embodies the views of Sharon Jones, President of the Black Women Lawyers' Association of 
Greater Chicago, whose association was among the groups that submitted briefs to the Supreme 
Court supporting the University of Michigan. Ms. Jones believes universities are unnecessarily 
caving in to legal threats. "Nothing requires the schools to get rid of those programs," she said. 
"However," she also observed, "you have to be willing to be sued, litigate it and spend a lot of 
money to win. And a lot of institutions aren't willing to." !d. 
551. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
552. Ples.1y, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
553. K.G. Jan Pillai, Neutrality of the Equal Protection Clause, 27 Hastings Cons!. L.Q. 89, 89 
(1999). 
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programs. The second relates to so-called "race-neutral" alternatives to 
affirmative action such as percentage plans. This Article discusses race 
neutral alternatives here and saves O'Connor's sunset date for the next 
section dealing with diversity, where the topic more properly belongs. 
There were color-blind statements focused on race-neutral 
alternatives to affirmative action in the Michigan cases, all of them made 
in Gratz, where the Court disapproved the program under challenge. One 
of these statements was by Justice Ginsburg; the other by Justice Souter. 
Justice Ginsburg criticized the percentage plans the United States 
advocated in its amicus curiae brief to the Court on several grounds: the 
plans depend on continued racial segregation at the secondary school 
level for their effectiveness; they link college admission to a single 
criterion, namely high school class rank; they create perverse incentives; 
they encourage parents to keep their children in low-performing 
segregated schools and discourage students from taking challenging 
classes that might lower their grade point avera§es; and they have little 
relevance in graduate and professional schools. 54 Most fundamentally 
for our purpose here, such programs are not race-neutral since "they 
unquestionably were adopted with the specific purpose of increasing 
representation of African Americans and Hispanics in the public higher 
education system."555 Justice Souter expressed a similar view regardins§ 
the lack of race-neutrality, in addition to the "deliberate obfuscation,"5 
of these programs,557 to name just these problems.558 Justice O'Connor, 
in her opinion for the Court in Grutter, also criticized these so-called 
race-neutral programs, stating they may work against individualized 
consideration and that they have little applicability in graduate and 
professional schools. 559 Percentage plans were not the only "race-
neutral" alternatives to race-conscious programs mentioned in the 
Michigan cases. Others include the use of a lottery system and 
decreasing the emphasis for all applicants on undergraduate GPA and 
LSAT scores as suggested by the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan in Grutter.560 
The ideal of a society where race has no bearing on decisions 
relating to hiring, promotion, school admission and distribution of other 
554. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 303--{)4 n. 10 (Ginsburg, J.,joined by Souter, J., dissenting). 
555. !d. 
556. !d. 
557. !d. at 298 (Souter, J ., joined by Ginsburg, J .• dissenting). 
558. See id. at 297. 
559. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. 
560. !d. See also supra n. 356 for the suggestion by Justice Scalia, during oral argument in 
Grutter, on how the University of Michigan law school could achieve diversity by making itself less 
exclusive or elitist. 
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scarce societal resources, is a value no American quarrels with. 
However, we are not there yet. Color-blindness "must be seen as 
aspiration rather than as description of reality."561 As Justice Blackmun 
counseled in Bakke, "to get beyond racism, we must first take account of 
"
562 H ·1· ffi . race. ostl 1ty to a Irmattve action or the premature retirement of 
these programs will serve only to deJa~ the date of our true evolution into 
a color- and gender-blind society.5 3 Headlong insistence on color-
blindness glosses over the continuing cost of racism on blacks and other 
minorities. Moreover, like "individualized consideration," and related 
requirements like the insistence on "merit,"564 color-blindness is a 
disingenuous tool that opponents of affirmative action use to maintain 
the status quo and prevent or contain demands from blacks and other 
. . . fi . I . 565 A 1 h f: mmontles or me us1veness. s one ana yst, w o goes as ar as to 
label this orientation a modem-day Jim Crowism, points out, color-
blindness calls to mind people in the Nineteenth century "who would do 
in the Negro [yet] were absolved from their heinous acts so long as they 
did not proclaim their intentions to the world in so many words."566 Not 
too long ago, color-blindness was an outlook the Rehnquist Court 
employ:ed as a cover to ignore the Court's own precedents on affirmative 
. 567 
actiOn. 
561. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
562. !d. at 407 (Blackmun J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
563. See K. G. Jan Pillai, Affirmative Action: In Search of a National Policy, 2 Temp. Pol. & 
Civ. Rights L. Rev. 6 (1992) (stating "By helping to raise the disadvantaged to a position where they 
can compete on a level playing field with the rest of society, affirmative action clearly has a central 
role to play in society's progress toward the ultimate goal of a color-blind society where racism does 
not exist."). 
564. One understanding of the proper meaning of merit is by Professor Frank Wu who points 
out that interjecting race as a factor in admissions decisions "compel[s] us to realize that merit comes 
in many forms, and the distribution of rewards can be made more just." Wu, supra n. 77, at 151. For 
accord, see the views of California Supreme Court justice Paul Turner who reportedly said, "[l]fyou 
decide you are going to have a merit-based selection system-if it's really going to be merit-based-
it's going to be diverse." Greg Mitchell, No Place at the Table, Recorder (San Francisco) 12 (Sept. 
18, 1998). Justice Turner was commenting on the hiring of law clerks. 
565. See Molly Townes O'Brien, Justice John Marshall Harlan as Prophet: The Plessy 
Dissenter's Color-Blind Constitution, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rights J. 754 (1998); Linda Greene, 
Jim Crowism in the Twenty-First Century, 27 Capital U. L. Rev. 51 (1998). See also David Kairys, 
Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race, Am. U. L. Rev. 748-49 (1996) (importantly 
portraying color-blindness as a "rationalization for halting and reversing the process of integration of 
African Americans into the economy and society," as well as a disguise for a "society in which 
people value only themselves and those close to or like them."). 
566. Greene, supra n. 565, at 51. 
567. See A Court Running in the Wrong Direction, N.Y. Times A20 (July 6, 1995) (editorial). 
See also Affirmative Action Without Fear, N.Y. Times Al6 (Sept. 19, 1994) (editorial) (commenting 
on the cutback on anti-discrimination enforcement that took place during the Reagan and first Bush 
presidencies). 
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"[T]he color of one's skin continues to affect an individual's 
opportunities to receive a good education, acquire the skills to get and 
maintain a good job, have access to adequate health care, and receive 
equal justice under the law."568 Accordingly, as Professor Pillai points 
out, color-blindness, with the neutrality it conjures, is "an amorphous 
concept in equal protection jurisprudence."569 From a practical point of 
view, "[ e ]nding affirmative action is not color-blind. It is blind to 
centuries of discrimination, blind to the racism that is still deeply 
embedded in our society, blind to the barriers that continue to confront 
generation u;on generation of African Americans and other 
minorities."57 Putting all these factors together, as the House of 
Representatives stated, after defeating an attempt in 1998 to implement a 
proposal that would have banned public colleges and universities from 
using race or gender in admissions decisions, the notion that "we live in a 
color-blind society in which only merit counts ... is a cruel hoax."571 
The Supreme Court, unwittingly, does not dispute this conclusion 
regarding the still-pervasive influence of race in America matched 
against the din of advocacy for color-blindness. In Adarand, the Court 
called "the unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering 
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this 
country ... an unfortunate reality," yet imposed strict scrutin~ of all 
race-conscious programs, including those designed by Congress. 2 Also, 
in Croson, the high court said it had "no doubt that the sorry history of 
both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a 
lack of opportunities for black entrepreneurs,"573 yet ruled the race-
conscious program for minorities at issue in the case unconstitutional. 
It is hard to reconcile the persistence of racism and insistence on 
retirement of remedial programs. The two simply do not go hand in hand. 
For as long as racism persists and group consciousness grips our society, 
color-blindness is an impulse that should never be interpreted to bar race-
conscious measures.574 In sum, the best answer yet to the color-blind 
568. Franklin et al., supra n. 539, at 35. 
569. Pillai, supra n. 553, at 89. 
570. Charles Dervarics, Anti-Affirmative Action Bill Defeated, 15 Black Issues in Higher Educ. 
5 (May 28, 1998) (statement of Rep. John Lewis (D-Ga.)). In defeating the measure, the House 
rejected the argument of Rep. Frank Riggs (R-Ca.) who sponsored the proposal. Rep. Riggs 
acknowledged "that discrimination continues to exist in our society and that it is morally wrong," but 
believes "we will never end discrimination by practicing discrimination." /d. 
571. /d. (statement of Rep. William Clay (D-Mo)). 
572. 515U.S.at237. 
573. 488 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion). 
574. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 239 (Harv. U. Press 1977). Professor 
Dworkin counsels instructively that we must "take care not to usc the Equal Protection Clause to 
cheat ourselves of equality." /d. 
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argument is the one Justice Ginsburg proffered when she said our 
Constitution is both color-blind and color conscious, elaborating: "To 
avoid conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, a classification that 
denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not be based on 
race. In that sense, the Constitution is color-blind. But the Constitution is 
also color conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and to 
undo the effects of past discrimination."575 
F. Grutter 's Anchoring on Diversity 
A sixth indicator of the Supreme Court's abiding hostility to 
affirmative action is the anchoring of the race-conscious program the 
Court approved in Grutter on diversity, rather than, for example, on the 
eradication of the lingering effects of past discrimination against blacks 
and other minorities. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell examined 
various options before settling on diversity as a constitutionally 
permissible basis for a race-conscious program. In the same vein, the 
Supreme Court rationalized its judgment in Grutter on diversity, ruling 
that striving for diversity in the student body of a public institution rises 
to the level of a compelling government interest that survives strict 
scrutiny. The Court made abundantly clear that its decisions 
constitutionalizing affirmative action plans had no basis in the legacy of 
past discrimination. Justice O'Connor said, "[i]t is true that some 
language in" the Court's cases since Bakke "might be read to suggest 
that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification 
for race-based governmental action."576 She quoted Croson, where the 
Court stated that, unless classifications based on race are "strictly 
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."577 She then indicated, 
But we have never held that the only governmental use of race that can 
survive strict scrutiny is remedying past discrimination. Nor, since 
Bakke, have we directly addressed the use of race in the context of 
public higher education. Today, we hold that the L~'J: School has a 
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body. 8 
In Gratz, the Court responded to two arguments asserting the legacy 
of past discrimination as basis for affirmative action by saying that the 
University of Michigan did not found its program on that basis. The first 
575. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Judge J. 
Wisdom in U.S. v. Jefferson County Bd. ofEd., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
576. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
577. !d. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (plurality opinion)). 
578. !d. 
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argument asserted by parties intervening on the side of the University 
(respondent-intervenors) contended that the University had a compelling 
interest in remedyin? the University's past and current discrimination 
against minorities. 57 In a supplemental opinion and order, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan considered and 
rejected this argument,580 on the ground that respondent-intervenors 
"failed to present any evidence that the discrimination alleged by them, 
or the continuing effects of such discrimination, was the real justification 
for the [University's] race-conscious admissions programs."581 The 
Supreme Court, in agreement with the district court, and to the extent 
respondent-intervenors reasserted this justification which they had failed 
to introduce earlier in the litigation process, affirmed the district court's 
decision. 582 The other argument was offered by the petitioners who 
contended that the only ground for the use of race the Court permits is 
for the remedy of "identified discrimination," not diversity, which they 
called "too open-ended, ill-defined, and indefinite."583 The Court replied 
simply that the University "never relied" on identified discrimination as a 
rationale, and that it has approved diversity, which the University relied 
. G 584 
on m rutter. 
The interest in diversity the Supreme Court constitutionalized in 
Grutter is narrow indeed. Recall the Court's concept of individualized 
consideration,585 based on its understanding of what Justice Powell said 
in Bakke regarding the use of race in attaining diversity, as Justice 
O'Connor painstakingly articulated in Grutter. Part of that what Powell 
said was that race "is only one element in a range of factors a university 
proper~ may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student 
body." 86 O'Connor explained that the use of race the Constitution 
permits is "not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified 
percentage of the study body is in effect guaranteed to be members of 
selected ethnic groups."587 "Simple ethnic diversity" means not only no 
579. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257. 
580. !d. at 257 n. 9 (citing 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001 )). 
581. /d.( citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790,795 (E.D. Mich. 2001)). 
582. !d. 
583. !d. at 268. It is not clear whether the "identified discrimination" the Gratz petitioners 
asserted here is the same as the legacy of past discrimination. If it is, this is disingenuous because 
societal discrimination was among the interests constituting a basis for an appropriate use of race 
that Justice Powell dismissed in Bakke, before settling down for the interest in diversity that the 
petitioners contend, obviously insincerely, to be amorphous. 
584. ld. 
585. See supra nn. 530533-534. 
586. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324. 
587. !d. 
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quota, but also mandates that the percentage of minority students 
admitted from year to year vary. Phrased differently, "the diversity that 
furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a 
single though important element."588 
Grutter singularly and palpably highlights Justice O'Connor's 
tremendous unease with race-conscious measures: there are serious 
problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself, and race-
based governmental action needs to be subjected to "continuing 
oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other 
innocent persons competing for the benefit."589 In short, the diversity the 
Court constitutionalized is so stringent it is a surprise that the affirmative 
action program under review in Grutter made it. It is simply amazing 
that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
would find the law school's use of race not narrowly tailored;590 things 
just do not get any more stringent than this. The same is true of the four 
judges who dissented in the Court of Appeals.591 The narrow 
constitutionalization of diversity accomplished in Grutter justifies 
Professor Klarman's characterization that "Justice O'Connor's 
conservative commitment to preserving the status quo trumped her 
'd I . I . . 1 d' ,592 1 eo og1ca aversiOn to race-consciOus governmenta reme IeS, 
although Klarman also suggested the "entrench[ment of] the notion that 
all of our social, political, and economic institutions should 'look like 
America"' also shaped O'Connor's action.593 
Diversity necessarily became a basis for constitutionalization of 
affirmative action programs because these programs have become almost 
impossible to justify based on the legacy of past discrimination. The 
difficulty of justification is due to the Supreme Court's assessment of all 
race-conscious programs, discussed above, using strict scrutiny. 
However, the problem with constitutionalization of diversity as an 
anchor for a race-conscious program is that it "has very little in common 
with the original motives for affirmative action in the United States."594 
Specifically, as Professor Walters puts it, a constitutionalization rooted in 
588. /d. at 325 (quoting Justice Powell). 
589. /d. at 341. 
590. /d. at 321. 
591. /d. at 321-22. 
592. Klarman, supra n. 48. 
593. /d. The attentiveness to societal realities serves to reinforce Justice O'Connor's 
credentials as a conservative justice, favoring conservative outcomes, who strives to balance 
competing interests in cases before her, rather than seek to promote a particular ideology. See supra 
n. 49. 
594. Boston & Nair-Reichert, supra n. 233, at 4. 
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diversity "does not value, when it should, the special history of blacks 
who have experienced slavery and post-slavery racism to the extent that 
in only a few places in the country are blacks enrolled in a white 
institution of higher education in numbers proportional to their 
0 h 1 0 ,595 percentage m t e state popu atiOn. 
Analyzing the issue carried over from the discussion in the previous 
section on color-blindness, there are two problems with Justice 
O'Connor's pronouncement of a possible sunset date for affirmative 
action. First, few disFute that affirmative action programs must have "a 
logical end point."59 However, this should not happen until "after the 
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved;"597 sunset of 
race-conscious programs should be predicated upon "progress toward 
nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity"598 that are still not 
present in American society. Instead, large-scale "conscious and 
unconscious race bias" along with "rank discrimination based on race" 
remain alive, "impeding realization of our highest values and ideals,"599 
and warranting the conclusion that "[f]rom today's vantage point, one 
may hopeb but not firmly forecast," retirement of race-conscious 
programs. 6 0 Justice Ginsburg properly reminded her colleagues that for 
part of the twenty-five years following Bakke in 1978, the law relating to 
the practice of affirmative action was anything but settled. A second 
problem with pronouncing a date when racial preferences will no longer 
be necessary, is that affirmative action programs based on diversity, 
compared to those focusing on remedying the legacy of past 
discrimination, do not lend themselves to sunset dates. As one analyst 
aptly puts it, "diversity is a continual compelling interest" that is not 
0 0 0 601 
time-sensitive. 
As with individualized consideration analyzed before, "diversity" 
could be used in an abusive manner that works against minority 
inclusiveness. Part of the result of the new stress on diversity is that 
programs formerly reserved for minorities are thrown to whites who are 
595. Walters, supra n. 15. 
596. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342. 
597. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring) (citing the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the 
U.S. in 1994). 
598. !d. at 346. 
599. !d. at 345-46. 
600. !d. at 346. 
601. Christopher J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter's Expectation that 
Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years, 24 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 753, 
762--65 (2004). 
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displacing groups for which these programs were initially targeted.602 
Concluding the discussion on diversity as an indicator of hostility are 
two parenthetical observations. The first is that Gruffer is not the first 
time the Supreme Court has talked about a possible sunset of affirmative 
action. In his opinion in Bakke, Justice Blackmun expressed an "earnest 
hope" that the day comes when the United States reaches "a stage of 
maturity" where affirmative action programs are unnecessary and "in 
truth, only a relic of the past."603 Blackmun hoped "that we could reach 
this stage within a decade at the most." Blackmun stated, "But the story 
of Brown, . .. decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that 
hope is a slim one."604 While both projections embody dates, Justice 
Blackmun's was more tentative than Justice O'Connor's. At any rate, as 
Justice Ginsburg said in her dissent, there is little basis to make firm 
insistence on what should remain only a hope or forecast. The second 
observation is that, in actuality, diversity and legacy of past 
discrimination are so intermingled that the line between them can be hard 
to pinpoint. The program upheld in Gruffer was based on a policy that 
explicitly reaffirms the law school's longstanding commitment to 
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from racial 
and ethnic groups that have been historically discriminated against, like 
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans. Without this 
commitment, these students might not be enrolled in the law school in a 
critical mass or meaningful number;605 in other words, the law school's 
affirmative action program inextricably intermingles diversity and the 
legacy of past discrimination. Also, critics of Michigan's anchorage of its 
defense of its affirmative action program on diversity point out, not 
unpersuasively, that the University in the past discriminated against 
Blacks.606 This inter-linkage means that the hostility relating to diversity 
is as much about the narrow constitutionalization of the concept as it is 
about the anchor of affirmative action on diversity, in opposition to the 
legacy of past discrimination. 
G. The Undependability of Justice Kennedy as a Swing or Middle Justice 
A seventh indicator of the Supreme Court's lingering hostility to 
602. See Minority Programs jiJr All, supra n. 550 (reporting on how undergraduate 
scholarships and programs once restricted to minority students "are offered to anyone who adds to 
'the overall excellence and diversity of the university community."'). 
603. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 403 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
604. !d. 
605. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336-39. 
606. See George E. Curry, Supreme Court Ignores University of Michigan's Racism, Stand. 
Newsps. (Chi.) 9 (Mar. 27, 2003). 
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affirmative action is Justice Kennedy's undependability as a swing 
justice. The Rehnquist Court was a tribunal defined by Justices Sandra 
Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy as "the two justices in the 
middle."607 Analysts predicted that the result of the Michigan cases 
would turn on the votes of these two middle justices. 608 This is because 
before the cases, as Professor Klarman explains, the "justices' votes in 
affirmative-action cases have followed fairly predictable political lines." 
The three most conservative justices, namely Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas, "have insisted on a nearly absolute ban on government race-
consciousness" and "have never voted to sustain an affirmative-action 
plan;" whereas the four most liberal justices, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, 
and Stevens, "have rarely (or never) voted to invalidate an affirmative-
action plan."609 Kennedy's stature as a swing or middle justice derives 
partly from the fact that he replaced another swing justice, Lewis Powell, 
and "partly because he isn't as dug-in and as certain as some of his 
610 
colleagues." 
In the Michigan cases, Justice O'Connor lived up to her billing as a 
justice in the middle, voting to uphold the race-conscious program-and 
lending critical backing to affirmative action-in Grutter, but giving a 
thumbs-down to the program in Gratz. In fidelity to her role as a swing 
justice, O'Connor voted with the liberal wing of the Court in one case 
and with the conservative bloc in the other.611 To deflect a possible 
charge of inconsistency, she wrote a concurrence in Gratz, defensively 
explaining why her votes varied in the two cases. 
In contrast, Justice Kennedy stood against affirmative action in both 
cases. Kennedy was part of the six-three majority that struck down the 
program in Gratz, and he filed a dissent in Grutter in which he 
complained that there was not enough scrutiny in the strict scrutiny 
standard the Court applied in its review. He accused the law school of 
"engag[ing] in racial balancing," and he lambasted the majority's review 
as "perfunctory" for deferring too easily to the law school's "assurances" 
607. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Supreme Court Confounds Critics. Chi. Trib. at 18 (June 29, 
2003). 
608. Klarman, supra n. 48. 
609. !d. 
610. Joan Biskupic, The Distinct Voices <d"Justice, Dallas Morn. News 26A (May 3, !998). 
611. Justice O'Connor was praised effusively, and deservedly, in the popular media by 
commentators who viewed her as a voice of reason on the Court because of her support for 
affirmative action in Grutter. See e.g. Stanley Fish, One Man's Opinion, N.Y. Times A21 (June 30, 
2003) (assessing O'Connor as "alert ... to the real-world consequences of what she decides."). See 
also Thomas Shows His True Colors on Affirmative Action Ruling. supra n. 39. (praising O'Connor 
as "an unabashed conservative" who "refuse[s] to be typecast by her ideological disposition.") 
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of the constitutionality of its own admissions policy.612 Justice Kennedy 
was not persuaded that the twenty-five years the Court projected for the 
sunset of affirmative action minimizes any imaginary damage that would 
attend what he regards as the Court's failure to give strict scrutiny full 
scope. "If it is intended to mitigate the damage the Court does to the 
concept of strict scrutiny, neither petitioners nor other rejected law 
school applicants will find solace in knowing the basic protection put in 
place by Justice Powell will be suspended for a full quarter of a 
century. "613 
In his dissent in Gruffer, Kennedy indicates that he would support a 
race-conscious program in the context of diversity, given a proper 
case,
614 but the assertion can have value only as a face-saving statement 
given the narrowness, discussed already, of the diversity concept the 
Court constitutionalized in Gruffer. It will be hard to find a race-
conscious program more narrowly tailored than the one in Grutter that 
Kennedy can lend his support. 
Despite his negative votes in the Michigan cases, Justice Kennedy is 
not anti-civil rights. To the contrary, Kennedy has authored decisions 
supporting gay rights615 and constitutional guarantees for juveniles in 
capital punishment. 616 There is, therefore, nothing yet detracting from 
Kennedy's reputation as a swing or majority maker and his status as 
swing justice remains intact. It is just that Justice Kennedy draws the line 
in his pro-civil rights orientation at affirmative action. His antipathy to 
civil rights, to the extent that antipathy exists, is something limited to 
race-conscious programs. Judging by his record, Kennedy is a middle 
justice whose swing balance, compared to Justice O'Connor's, shifts 
little, if at all, when it comes to affirmative action. With swing friends 
like Kennedy, affirmative action needs no enemy. Kennedy's proven 
non-solicitude for affirmative action, coupled with Justice O'Connor's 
retirement from the Court, creates a dire need for a middle justice not 
opposed to affirmative action. Will Judge Samuel A. Alito Jr., who 
replaced O'Connor, be that will middle justice? Although Alito's 
conservative orientation, based on his records both as a judge on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and as a lawyer for the Reagan 
612. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388-89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
613. !d. at 394. 
614. See id. at 395 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("reiterat[ing] my approval of giving appropriate 
consideration to race in this one [student diversity] context .... "). 
615. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186 (1986), a challenge of a Georgia sodomy law, where the Supreme Court ruled that the right to 
privacy does not include the right of homosexuals to consensual sex). 
616. See Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 2248 (2005) (ruling unconstitutional the imposition of 
death sentences on juveniles under 18). 
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administration, leave little hope of solicitude for affirmative action,617 the 
jury is still out and it is much too early to tell. 
H. The Acerbic Rhetoric of the Conservative Bloc 
An eighth indicator of the Supreme Court's hostility to affirmative 
action is the acerbic rhetoric of the Court's conservative bloc, made up of 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Although 
Rehnquist portrayed the race-conscious program in Grutter as an 
unconstitutional racial balancing in favor of African Americans,618 his 
commentary directed at affirmative action, when it comes to deployment 
of venomous language, is otherwise restrained. Therefore, the discussion 
is limited to the verbal attacks on affirmative action by Justices Scalia 
and Thomas. 
Justice Scalia dismissed the law school program the Court approved 
in Grutter as a "sham"619 and mockingly, yet severely, questioned the 
educational benefit of diversity, which he regards as something better left 
for public school kindergartners and children in the Boys Scouts. 620 He 
equated the manner in which black students network among themselves 
on college campus to "tribalism."621 Scalia has a reputation for 
"unrestrained sarcasm" on the Court, 622 but some of these comments 
raise question of appropriate language and good taste in legal 
jurisprudence. 
Thomas repeatedly referred to the affirmative action program the 
Court upheld in Grutter as "racial discrimination,"623 and berated the 
Grutter majority for upholding "the Law School's racial discrimination . 
. . by responding to a faddish slogan of the cognoscenti."624 He 
maintained that the school's compelling governmental interest claim was 
a "fabricated" one625 designed to maintain its own elite image and 
617. See e.g. Jesse J. Holland, Alita Appears Headed for Confirmation, Associated Press (Jan. 
12, 2006) (conveying, among other things, concern by Democratic legislators, during Senate 
confirmation hearings, that Alito's background and record are replete with opposition to women and 
minority rights). 
618. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348-87 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Kennedy, Scalia, and 
Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
619. 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
620. !d. at 34 7-48. 
621. !d. at 349. 
622. Biskupic, supra n. 610. 
623. 539 U.S. 350 (Thomas, J.,joined by Scalia J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
624. !d. 
625. !d. at 375. 
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626 
status. He also questioned its interest in diversity, as well as its 
concept of critical mass.627 He mocked diversity alternately as 
"aesthetic,"628 and "trivial."629 And, he called the majority's goal of 
ending affirmative action in twenty-five years "a [twenty-five]-year 
license to violate the Constitution."630 Thomas claimed-with dark 
alarmism unrooted in reality-that "[c]ontained within today's majority 
opinion is the seed of a new constitutional justification for . . . racial 
. ,631 
segregatiOn. 
In their oppositions to affirmative action, no one can accuse Thomas 
and Scalia of inconsistency. Scalia's approach to affirmative action and 
inclusiveness is rooted in his assertion that "!i]n the eyes of government, 
we are just one race here. It is American."63 Operating from this belief, 
he has opined that "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in 
discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial 
discrimination in the opposite direction,"633 that "under our Constitution 
there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race,"634 and 
that pursuit of "the concept of racial entitlement ... is to reinforce and 
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race 
slavery, race privilege, and race hatred."635 
Justice Thomas's own approach to affirmative action and 
inclusiveness is the expression that the Equal Protection Clause 
"categorically" prohibits application of race in decisions relating to 
admissions in higher education and distribution of other public 
rewards.636 Guided by this world view, he has denounced race-conscious 
preferential programs as "racial paternalism"637 and insisted that 
626. See id. at 356. 
627. /d. at365-66,374. 
628. See id. at 355 n. 3 (indicating, "[t]hat is, the Law School wants to have a certain 
appearance, from the shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of the students 
sitting at them"); see also id. at 354 n. 3 (contending, "[t]he Law School seeks only a facade-it is 
sufficient that the class looks right, even if it does not perform right"). He also posited that diversity 
"does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to participate in elite higher education and therefore 
presents only an illusory solution to the challenges facing our Nation." !d. at 355 n. 3. 
629. /d. at 357. 
630. /d. at 3 70. 
631. /d.at365-66. 
632. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
633. /d. 
634. /d. 
635. /d. 
636. See Gratz, 539 U.S. 281 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
("I would hold that a State's use of racial discrimination in higher education admissions is 
categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause."). 
637. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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preferences designed to help people are as obnoxious as preferences that 
oppress, on the ground that "[i]n each instance, it is racial discrimination, 
plain and simple."638 He has declared affirmative action as being "at war 
with the princifle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our 
Constitution"63 and asserted that race-conscious pro~rams "undermine 
the moral basis of the equal protection principle." 0 Responding to 
Justice Steven's position in Adarand that "[t]here is no moral or 
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to Rerpetuate 
a caste and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination,"6 1 Thomas 
contended, "I believe that there is a moral [and] constitutional 
equivalence" between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that 
distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current 
notion of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only 
recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law."642 The only 
departure to this familiar approach for Thomas was his irreverent citation 
to Frederick Douglass, venerated among African Americans as a 
foremost freedom fighter and supporter of black causes, to support an 
argument against affirmative action, in Grutter, that many blacks regard 
as unprincipled, given the advantages he, along with others, received as 
an "affirmative action baby."643 Justice Thomas's conservatism on the 
court and his opposition to inclusive programs that seek to benefit 
638. !d. at 241. 
639. !d. at 240. 
640. !d. 
641. ld. at 243 (Stevens, J.,joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
642. ld. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
643. See Jarrett, supra n. 39, who accused Thomas of "stab[bing] Douglass in [the] grave" by 
comparing himself to Douglass. See also Thomas Shows His True Colors on Affirmative Action 
Ruling, supra n. 39. The expression "affirmative action baby" comes from Stephen L. Carter, 
Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (Basic Books 1991). In his wordy dissent in Grutter, 
Thomas claimed that affirmative action so stigmatizes its beneficiaries that "[ w ]hen [B]lacks take 
positions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open question today 
whether their skin color played a part in their advancement." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Perhaps Justice Thomas is 
also referring to himself. As part of the investigation that precedes the confirmation by the Senate of 
a Supreme Court Justice, the American Bar Association (ABA), the premier national organization of 
lawyers that represents the interests of the legal profession, rates each nominee, based on his or her 
qualifications, as Highly Qualified (now called "Well Qualified"), Qualified, or Not Qualified. 
Thomas got only a Qualified rating (and before the charges of sexual harassment against him by law 
professor Anita Hill became public), with two members voting Not Qualified. See Karen O'Connor 
& Larry J. Sabato, American Government: Continuity and Change, 394 (1999 ed., Allyn & Bacon 
1999). Of the twenty-two previous successful nominees rated by the ABA, Thomas was the first to 
receive less than a unanimous Qualified rating. !d. Thomas won confirmation "by the smallest 
margin in the twentieth century." Baum, supra n. 50, at 55. His confirmation was made possible by 
the effective support he received from the first Bush administration and because "many Democrats 
favored the continuation of black representation on the Court." !d. at 55-56. 
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minorities has led some to compare him, fairly or unfairly, in ideological 
pristineness to a Scalia-without the talent and intellectual endowment 
of the real Scalia.644 
Both Thomas and Scalia pride themselves as conservatives 
committed to "originalism" as a method of constitutional interpretation. 
Originalists base the meaning of the Constitution on what the document 
meant when it was originally ratified. To the credit of these justices, they 
usually practice the method that they preach. However, as Professor 
Sunstein points out, this is not the case for the justices when it comes to 
affirmative action. He cites correctly a great deal of historical work 
which suggests that affirmative action was accepted by those who 
ratified the Equal Protection Clause, stating that "in the aftermath of the 
[C]ivil [W[ar, Congress engaged in numerous race-conscious efforts 
singling out African Americans for special help." "Perhaps, the historical 
work is mistaken6" he said, but the two justices "have not even bothered to investigate it." 45 
Despite the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the conservative wing 
of the Supreme Court is still alive and well. The new jurist who replaced 
Rehnquist, former Judge John G. Roberts Jr. of the U.S. Circuit Court for 
the District of Columbia, is an individual noted for his conservative 
values and record, even if he lacks the ideological pristineness of 
Rehnquist. 646 This is not to mention to inclusion of Samuel Alita, Justice 
O'Connor replacement, whose appointment and confirmation to the 
644. On Scalia's intellect, see Baum, supra n. 50, at 64, 169. Senator Harry Reid (D-Nev.) 
recently dismissed the speculation that Thomas could be in line for Chief Justice of the United States 
following the expected departure, given the ill-health and increasing fragility of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. Reid, who is white, reportedly stated that Thomas "has been an embarrassment to the 
Supreme Court. I think that his opinions are poorly written .... I just don't think he's done a good 
job as a Supreme Court justice."). See Armstrong Williams, Racism Finds A Home in White Towers, 
USA Today 25A (Dec. I 0, 2004). See also the previous footnote. 
645. Sunstein, supra n. 500, at 80. 
646. See Terrence Hunt, Court Reorder: Roberts Now Up for Top Job, Chic. Sun-Times 8 
(Sept. 6, 2005) (stating that "[l]ike Rehnquist, Robert is deeply conservative" and that he was 
nominated to succeed O'Connor because the latter's "tie-breaking votes on contentious issues like 
abortion restrictions, campaign finance limits, discrimination laws, and religion" "angered 
conservatives."). Nominated initially in July 2005 to replace O'Connor, Roberts was upgraded to the 
Chief Justice position following the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist on September 3, 2005. On 
possible reasons why the President did not choose Justice Scalia, said to be the favorite for the job 
among conservatives, see Robert Novak, Bush Secretly Decided Weeki- Ago on Simplest Solution, 
Chic. Sun-Times 8 (Sept. 6, 2005). According to Novak, selecting Scalia would have meant a longer 
confirmation process given the associate justice's "notoriety as a right-wing icon," while conflicting 
with President's Bush's known knack for simplicity. /d. Regarding the latter point, "[p]romoting 
Scalia would have meant three confirmation processes at the same time: for Scalia as chief justice, 
for Roberts as associate justice and for somebody to replace Scalia as associate justice. To the 
strategists at the Bush White House, that looked like too many moving parts and the possibility of 
something going wrong." !d. 
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Court some analysts predict could lead to "an ideological shift" on the 
Court, given his known conservative orientation.647 
!. Tinkering with the "Injury in Fact" Requirement Necessary for 
Standing in Equal Protection Cases 
The final indicator of Supreme Court hostility toward affirmative 
action analyzed here is its tinkering with the "injury in fact" requirement 
necessary for standing in equal protection cases. The Supreme Court's 
rulings have resulted in a relaxation of the requirement for standing. 
Before 1993, it was necessary for a petitioner to show that he would have 
received a benefit but for a preferential treatment against him.648 From 
1993, beginning with the Jacksonville case, 649 all that a petitioner had to 
establish to make a prima facie case of injury in fact was that it did not 
have equal opportunity to compete. Jacksonville involved the challenge 
of an ordinance that gave preferential treatment to certain minority-
owned businesses in the award of city contracts by an association. The 
Court ruled that, to establish standing, the association did not need to 
show that one of its members would have received a contract absent the 
ordinance, loss of contract, or ultimate inability to obtain the benefit. 
Rather, the injury in fact that it needed to establish was "the inability to 
compete on an equal footing in the bidding process,"650 specifically that 
"it is able and ready to bid on contracts and that a discriminatory policy 
prevents it from doing so on an equal basis."651 This was a minimization 
of the injury in fact requirement in equal protection cases to a point that, 
for want of a better expression, effectively transformed the injury in fact 
requirement into an injury in theory requirement. 
More recently, in Gratz, the Supreme Court used the Jacksonville 
line of reasoning to afford standing to a petitioner who sought 
prospective relief against the University of Michigan for allegedly using 
race in its admissions decisions.652 Both Justices Souter and Stevens 
objected to the award of standing in the case as overly indulgent. 653 The 
Court rejected Justice Stevens's contention that, because the petitioner, 
Patrick Hamacher, did not actually apply for admission as a transfer 
647 See Hunt, Court Reorder, supra n. 646. 
648. Northeastern Fla. Chapter. Associated Gen. Contractors ofAm. v. Jackmnville, 508 U.S. 
656, 666 (1993). 
649. !d. 
650. !d. at 666. 
65 I !d. 
652. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 260-68. 
653. See id. at 291-92 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); !d. at 287 n. 6 (Stevens, 
J., joined by Souter, J., dissenting). 
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student, his future injury claim is at best conjectural or hypothetical 
rather than real and immediate.654 Citing Jacksonville, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist ruled that the inju7 in fact necessary to establish standing is 
the denial of equal treatment. 55 Rehnquist's argument went as follows: 
in bringing his equal protection challenge against the University's use of 
race in undergraduate admissions, Hamacher alleged that the University 
denied him the opportunity to compete for admission on an equal 
basis. 656 When Hamacher applied to the University as a freshman 
applicant, he was denied admission even though an under-represented 
minority applicant with his qualifications would have been admitted.657 
After being denied admission, Hamacher demonstrated that he was "able 
and ready" to apply as a transfer student should the University cease to 
use race in undergraduate admissions. 658 The Chief Justice also rejected 
Justice Stevens's contention that the use of race in undergraduate transfer 
student admissions differs from the use of race in undergraduate 
freshman admissions. 659 Justice O'Connor also cited Jacksonville for 
authority in Grutter, indicating that "Petitioner [meaning Ms. GrutterJ 
h d o b o h" 1 o ,660 clearly as stan mg to nng t IS awsmt. 
This tinkering with the requirement for injury in fact in equal 
protection cases is part of a general pattern of chipping away at civil 
rights by the Rehnquist court. In Alexander v. Sandovaf61 decided in 
200 l, the Court ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allowed 
individuals to sue only in disparate treatment cases, not in disparate 
impact cases. The case dealt "a death blow to the right of individuals to 
challenge practices of institutional racism by states."662 It also 
"overruled the decisions of nine of the twelve circuit courts that had 
ruled on the issue in more than two decades of litigation."663 Disparate 
impact cases are cases related to institutional racism, that is, policies or 
programs that have a racially discriminatory impact or effect. By 
contrast, disparate treatment involves individual racism or intentional 
acts of discrimination. Since the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, individuals have had the right to sue states for both types of 
discrimination. But in this five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court took 
654. See id. at 262-68. 
655. !d. at 261-62. 
656. !d. at 262. 
657. !d. 
658. ld 
659. !d. at 264-66. 
660. !d. at 317. 
661. 532 U.S. 275 (2001 ). 
662. Walton & Smith, supra n. 3, at 221-22. 
663. !d. at 222. 
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away the individual right to sue states practicing institutional racism. The 
case involved a challenge to an Alabama law requiring all applicants to 
take the state's written driver's license examination in English. The suit 
alleged that in its impact or effect the requirement discriminated on the 
basis of language or ethnic origin. The district court and the Eleventh 
Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act 
allowed suit only in disparate treatment cases and did not reach the 
merits of the case as to whether the requirement was discriminatory.664 
Justice Scalia, who is noted for his anti-civil rights orientation, wrote the 
opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens bitterly dissented from the 
judgment.665 He wrote that "it makes no sense" to distinguish between 
types of discrimination in terms of an individual's right to sue.666 He 
condemned his colleagues for reachin£ out to take the case when there 
was no conflict between the circuits, 7 and he was infuriated that the 
668 Court overturned two decades of precedent. What makes Sandoval 
potentially far-reaching is that disparate treatments, which require a 
plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent, are difficult to win, compared to 
disparate impact cases that require no such proof. Changes made by the 
Rehnquist Court relating to standing have allowed far-tetched assaults on 
affirmative action while depriving other potential litigants of an 
opportunity for adjudication. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Affirmative action is the use of race or gender, particularly race, in 
decisions relating to distribution of scarce public resources, including 
education. The Michigan cases are momentous because they signify, 
without a shadow of doubt, that race will for a long time to come remain 
a factor in those decisions. Grutter, which upheld the Michigan Law 
School program, portrayed the kind of narrowly-tailored use of race that 
in the view of the Supreme Court could be used to promote a compelling 
governmental interest. Gratz, striking down the Michigan undergraduate 
school affirmative action program, in contrast, provided an example of a 
constitutionally impermissible use of race. These authoritative 
clarifications became necessary given the legal and constitutional 
664. See generally Alexander, 532 U.S. 275. 
665. Justice Stevens read parts of his dissent, something a justice does to underscore the 
momentousness of a decision. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 293--316. 
666. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 310 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, 
dissenting). 
667. /d. at 317. 
668. !d. at 294. 
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fuzziness that characterized the practice of affirmative action in the post-
Bakke period before 2003. In the twenty-five years following Bakke, the 
law on affirmative action remained unsettled, with race-conscious 
policies under proscription in some regions of the country, like Texas.669 
Yet, none of these marks of progress minimizes the considerable 
hostility that still pervades the Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
affirmative action. An important function of this Article was to draw 
attention to that reality and to highlight the nature of that abiding 
hostility by identifying and discussing nine interrelated indicators arising 
from a careful reading of the Michigan cases. The Article also takes a 
historical approach that ties affirmative action to minority, especially 
black, civil rights in America. It is a refreshing perspective that sets this 
work apart from previous studies on affirmative action or the Michigan 
cases. As the legal and political tribunal charged with the "province" of 
pronouncing what the law is, the Sufreme Court has a leadership role in 
the "job of ending discrimination" 70 and enthroning inclusiveness in 
this country. Focusing on the role of the Supreme Court, this Article 
shows how far we, as a society, have come in the politics of 
inclusiveness without losing sight of unfinished business that also 
portends how far we still have to go. The key to reconciling the tension 
of progress on the one hand and the lingering problems on the other is to 
keep in mind that the assault on affirmative action that preceded the 
Michigan cases, which reached a peak in Adarand, will require much 
more than just one Gruffer case, however momentous, to repair. Its 
province and duty under the Constitution dictate that the Supreme Court 
should play a leadership role in that reparation. Will the Court, since 
October 2005, under the leadership of John G. Roberts,671 live up to its 
expectation in this role? To borrow the lyric of the Jamaican reggae 
maestro, Bob Marley (1945-1981 ), only time will tell. 
669. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
670. See Clinton, supra n. 19, at 1113, whose actual words were "[t]he job of ending 
discrimination in this country is not over." 
671. See e.g. David G. Savage, A Reading on Roberts: High Court's Lineup May Be an Early 
Test for the First New Justice in II Years, ABA J. 12-13 (Oct. 2005). 
